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Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the ‘world’s most powerful number’ (Fioramonti, 2013) and is ‘probably 
the largest information failure in the world’ (van den Bergh, 2009) because despite the fact that GDP is 
widely criticized, it is still influential in politics, economics, policy-making and society (van den Bergh, 2009). 
According to van den Bergh, this “GDP paradox” can be explained by recognizing that many economists 
accept the GDP-criticism but deny its importance. Over the last decade, calls have been made to urgently 
move beyond GDP as it is a bad indicator for social welfare, societal well-being or economic progress (Stiglitz 
et al., 2009, 2018; Costanza et al., 2014, Kubiszewski et al., 2013; Hoekstra, 2019). As a way to guide the 
transition away from GDP, countries should adopt new metrics (Costanza et al., 2014) to measure economic 
welfare. This thesis contributes to the field of (alternative) economic welfare measures (EWM) with a focus 
on the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) and Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI). Chapter 1 
elaborates on the theoretical and conceptual welfare framework of these measures. Chapter 2 standardizes 
and improves EWM’s methodologies. Chapter 3 estimates the welfare levels for the EU-15 based on a 
comparable methodology. Finally, Chapter 4 investigates whether these EWM are able to reveal a threshold 
point and social and biophysical limits to growth. 
Chapter 1 explores the theoretical foundation(s) of these EWM. The ISEW and GPI are often argued to lack 
a sound theoretical foundation. However, we observe that the initial ISEW by Daly and Cobb (1989) was 
jointly inspired by Hicksian and Fisherian income. Welfare’s experiential nature is Fisher-inspired, whereas 
seeing the consumption of community capital (e.g. the ecosystem) as a cost is Hicks-inspired. As most 
scholars do not recognize this double theoretical foundation, they have found it difficult to deal with 
welfare’s time and boundary issues. Elaborating on this duality, we have put forward two welfare 
interpretations with distinct time and boundary dimensions to address time and boundary complexities. 
EWM can be seen as either capturing the benefits and costs experienced (BCE), or as reflecting the benefits 
and costs of present economic activities (BCPA). The former interpretation only takes into account what is 
currently experienced within domestic borders: it excludes future costs, costs shifted abroad and capital 
changes. BCPA has broader time and boundary dimensions, and thus also includes the costs shifted in time 
and space and capital changes as they all are benefits and costs arising from current economic activities. 
Recent developments reveal that EWM are converging toward the ex post established experiential Fisherian 
foundation and the BCE-interpretation. Yet, we argue that this is not the only way forward as the BCPA-
perspective offers an alternative viewpoint to account for the costs of present activities shifted abroad or 
xii 
 
to the future such as those involved in climate disruption, irrespective of whether they are currently 
“experienced” or not. 
The second chapter builds on the different welfare interpretations set forth in the first chapter. Two EWM 
with distinct time and boundary effects are calculated for Belgium: the BCE and BCPA. This EWM-
compilation is the first to include the welfare benefits of the shadow economy and to employ a sufficiency 
threshold to calculate the welfare losses from income inequality. Other methodological novelties for the 
broader BCPA include a consumption footprint view for greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution by 
accounting for the emissions embodied in trade, and the registration of the climate impacts of aviation and 
shipping. Belgium’s welfare measured by both indicators improved from 1995 to 2018: BCE per capita 
improved by 15% and BCPA per capita enhanced by 18%, which is about half of the growth in GDP per capita 
by 30%. Furthermore, the aggregate trend over time masks that the per capita welfare losses from income 
inequality and the per capita broader ecological costs in BCPA have increased by, respectively, 89.9% and 
6.8%. Yet, these trends are outweighed or compensated by increasing benefits from consumption. As there 
are substantial ecological costs shifted in time and space, we suggest to account for ecological cost-shifting 
by using the BCPA-view when calculating EWM because it is more informative for policy-makers. A careful 
reflection on EWM’s design and use is needed to stimulate future studies’ policy-guiding and transformative 
potential.  
Next, we estimate both EWM for the EU-15 as a whole and all individual countries from 1995 to 2018 in 
Chapter 3. For the EU-15, GDP per capita improved by about 31% over time, yet, GDP and EWM diverged 
as BCE and BCPA per capita improved by 13% and 17%. By 2018, the EU-15 had entirely recovered from the 
financial crisis from a GDP-perspective but not from a welfare view. The financial crisis and its recovery had 
a different impact on GDP and EWM. In contrast to GDP, the response in EWM to the crisis in 2009 was 
delayed in some countries: their per capita BCPA only fell during the economic GDP-recovery in 2010 as the 
broader ecological costs increased. At the level of the EU-15, the broader ecological costs decreased in 2009 
but increased again in 2010 during an environmentally more polluting GDP-recovery. Our results thus 
indicate that a post-COVID agenda needs to aim for a green and just economic recovery that is centered 
around welfare and a move beyond GDP that prioritizes human well-being within planetary boundaries 
without growth. Despite the overall improvements over the entire period, GDP per capita barely improved 
after 2007: it only fully recovered from the financial crisis in 2018, when the EU-15’s GDP per capita reached 
its maximum value that was slightly higher than its pre-crisis level. The EU-15’s welfare per capita already 
peaked right before the financial crisis in 2006 for BCE and in 2007 for BCPA. In 2018, BCE per capita and 
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BCPA per capita were respectively 1.5% and 1.8% lower than their maximum values. As a consequence, we 
found no conclusive evidence for the EU-15 as a whole regarding the threshold hypothesis (i.e. the existence 
of a threshold beyond which continued GDP growth reduces welfare). However, we found evidence of 
thresholds in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK, where 
the per capita welfare levels were at least 5% lower in 2018 compared to their maximum welfare value. 
In Chapter 4, we revisited the debate about the threshold hypothesis. Concerns over social limits and 
biophysical limits to growth have led scholars to belief that the social benefits indicated by GDP growth 
would evaporate when a more comprehensive measure of economic welfare is used to evaluate economic 
performance. By applying the principles of diminishing marginal benefits and increasing marginal cost at 
the macroeconomic level, EWM can be used to indicate the point beyond which economic growth becomes 
uneconomic growth, i.e. further growth brings more costs than benefits. Pursuing growth beyond this point 
is suboptimal. Due to the limits to growth, EWM are expected to indicate a threshold point in a time series 
of welfare results beyond which continued GDP growth reduces welfare. The EU-15’s results do not provide 
conclusive evidence for the threshold hypothesis from 1995 to 2018 as EWM only indicate that welfare has 
been stagnating after the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. After the financial crisis, as incomes grow, the 
growth in individual consumption is not translated into welfare. Our methodology that makes use of a 
sufficiency threshold thus signals there are social limits to growth: “keeping up with the Joneses” or 
aggregate consumption growth yields little welfare gains beyond a certain point because of the diminishing 
marginal utility of income. This stagnation in welfare is not caused by the existence of biophysical limits to 
growth, since the broader ecological costs have not increased substantially. Yet, as the EU-15 has 
transgressed planetary boundaries, one would expect that the broader ecological costs would have 
increased substantially. We believe the absence of clear biophysical limits is potentially a shortcoming of 
the current methodology since the number of ecological items is limited and the cost estimates of most 
ecological items do not change over time, which makes it difficult to capture deteriorating or improving 
environmental conditions. Yet, this absence is only partly a methodological shortcoming because the 
advances made in this dissertation tried to account for the biophysical limits by improving the valuation of 
the ecological costs, for instance, by updating and revising upwardly the cost estimates for climate 
disruption and nonrenewable energy resources depletion. Besides a potential shortcoming of the current 




Since evaluating economic performance should not be reduced to merely balancing the monetized benefits 
and costs, we suggested to be cautious about the aggregate welfare trend and to de-emphasize it. Instead, 
EWM should adopt a disaggregate approach to verify whether issues such as the welfare losses from income 
inequality and ecological costs are reduced. We proposed a user guide to facilitate EWM’s use and 
transformative potential. Finally, we articulated a narrative of living well within planetary limits, so that 





Het Bruto Binnenlands Product (BBP) is ‘het meest invloedrijke getal ter wereld’ (Fioramonti, 2013) en is 
‘waarschijnlijk de grootste informatiefaling in de wereld’ (van den Bergh, 2009). De reden hiervoor is dat 
het BBP ondanks wijdverspreide kritiek nog steeds belangrijk is in de politiek, de economie, beleidsvoering 
en de samenleving (van den Bergh, 2009). Volgens van den Bergh valt deze “BBP-paradox” te verklaren 
doordat vele economen de BBP-kritiek erkennen maar het belang ervan ontkennen. Het afgelopen 
decennium werd er dringend opgeroepen om voorbij het BBP te gaan aangezien het een slechte indicator 
is voor maatschappelijke welvaart, maatschappelijk welzijn en economische vooruitgang (Stiglitz et al., 
2009, 2018; Costanza et al., 2014, Kubiszewski et al., 2013; Hoekstra, 2019). Om de transitie weg van het 
BBP te begeleiden, dienen landen nieuwe maatstaven te omarmen (Costanza et al., 2014) om economische 
welvaart te meten. Deze thesis levert een bijdrage aan het gebied van (alternatieve) economische 
welvaartsmaatstaven (EWM) met een focus op de Index voor Duurzame Economische Welvaart (Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare, ISEW) en Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI). Hoofdstuk 1 gaat dieper in op 
hun theoretisch en conceptueel kader. Hoofdstuk 2 standaardiseert en verbetert de methodologie van 
EWM. Hoofdstuk 3 schat de welvaartsniveaus voor de EU-15 op basis van een vergelijkbare methodologie. 
Tenslotte, onderzoekt Hoofdstuk 4 of EWM een drempelpunt en sociale en biofysische grenzen aan de groei 
kunnen signaleren. 
Hoofdstuk 1 verkent de theoretische fundamenten van deze EWM. Er wordt vaak geargumenteerd dat de 
ISEW en GPI een gedegen theoretisch fundament ontbreken. Toch observeren we dat de initiële ISEW van 
Daly en Cobb (1989) gebaseerd was op zowel Hicksiaans als Fisheriaans inkomen. De ‘experientiële’ of 
ervaringsgerichte aard van welvaart komt van Fisher, terwijl het zien van de consumptie van 
gemeenschapskapitaal (bv. het ecosysteem) als een kost geïnspireerd is door Hicks. Aangezien de meeste 
welvaartsonderzoekers deze dubbele theoretische fundering niet erkennen, hadden ze het moeilijk om op 
een gepaste wijze om te gaan met de ruimte- en tijdsaspecten van welvaart. Verder bouwend op dit dubbel 
theoretisch fundament, hebben we twee welvaartsinterpretaties met verschillende ruimte- en 
tijdsdimensies vooropgesteld om de complexiteit van temporele en ruimtelijke welvaartsaspecten te 
omvatten. EWM kunnen gezien worden als de baten en kosten die ervaren worden (benefits and costs 
experienced, BCE) of als de baten en kosten van de huidige economische activiteiten (benefits and costs of 
present economic activities, BCPA). De eerste interpretatie brengt enkel in rekening wat er vandaag en 
binnen landsgrenzen ervaren wordt waardoor toekomstige kosten, de kosten doorgeschoven buiten 
grenzen en kapitaalaanpassingen niet opgenomen worden. BCPA registreert ‘alle’ kosten en baten van de 
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huidige activiteiten en hanteert bredere ruimte- en tijdsdimensies. Als een gevolg hiervan, worden de 
kapitaalaanpassingen en de kosten die doorgeschoven worden in tijd en ruimte in rekening gebracht. 
Recente evoluties illustreren dat EWM opschuiven naar de ervaringsgerichte Fisheriaanse fundering, die ex 
post gemaakt werd, en de BCE-interpretatie. Desalniettemin menen we dat dit niet de enige weg vooruit is 
aangezien de BCPA-interpretatie een alternatief perspectief biedt voor het in rekening brengen van de 
kosten van huidige activiteiten die naar elders of naar de toekomst doorgeschoven worden zoals het geval 
is bij klimaatverandering, ongeacht of deze kosten vandaag “ervaren” worden of niet.    
Het tweede hoofdstuk bouwt verder op de verschillende welvaartsinterpretaties die vooruitgeschoven 
werden in het eerste hoofdstuk. Twee EWM met verschillende tijds- en ruimte-aspecten worden berekend 
voor België: de ervaren baten en kosten en de baten en kosten van huidige activiteiten. Deze 
welvaartsberekening is de eerste die de welvaartsbijdrage van de schaduweconomie in rekening brengt en 
gebruik maakt van een sufficiëntiedrempel om de welvaartsverliezen van inkomensongelijkheid te meten. 
Andere methodologische nieuwigheden voor de bredere BCPA zijn een consumptievoetafdruk voor de 
uitstoot die in handel vervat zit en het meenemen van de klimaatimpact van de lucht- en scheepvaart. De 
Belgische welvaart, gemeten via beide indicatoren, verbeterde tussen 1995 en 2018: BCE per capita 
verbeterde met 15% en BCPA per capita steeg met 18%, wat ongeveer de helft is van de groei in het BBP 
per capita met 30%. Maar, deze geaggregeerde trend doorheen de tijd verhult dat de (per capita) 
welvaartsverliezen van inkomensongelijkheid en bredere ecologische kosten in BCPA toegenomen zijn met 
respectievelijk 89.9% en 6.8%. Deze tendensen werden echter overgecompenseerd door groeiende 
consumptiebaten. Aangezien er substantiële ecologische kosten doorgeschoven worden in tijd en ruimte, 
stellen we voor om het doorschuiven van ecologische kosten in rekening te brengen door de BCPA-
interpretatie te gebruiken bij het berekenen van EWM omdat dit informatiever is voor beleidsmakers. In 
toekomstige studies is het nodig om grondig te reflecteren over het ontwerp en gebruik van 
welvaartsmaatstaven om zo hun beleidsimpact en transformatiepotentieel te stimuleren.  
Vervolgens schatten we in Hoofdstuk 3 beide EWM voor de EU-15 in zijn geheel en voor alle individuele 
landen van 1995 tot 2018. Voor de EU-15 groeide het BBP per capita met 31% doorheen de tijd, maar de 
kloof tussen het BBP en EWM werd groter aangezien BCE en BCPA per capita met 13% en 17% toenamen. 
Tegen 2018 was de EU-15 volledig van de financiële crisis hersteld, bekeken vanuit een BBP-perspectief 
maar niet vanuit een welvaartsoogpunt. De financiële crisis en het herstel hiervan hadden een andere 
invloed op het BBP en EWM. In tegenstelling tot het BBP was de welvaartsrespons in sommige landen op 
de crisis in 2009 vertraagd: hun per capita BCPA daalde enkel tijdens het economische BBP-herstel in 2010 
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aangezien de bredere ecologische kosten toen stegen. Onze resultaten illustreren bijgevolg dat een post-
COVID agenda moet inzetten op een groen en rechtvaardig economisch herstel waarin welvaart centraal 
staat: een herstel dat voorbij het BBP gaat en menselijk welzijn binnen planetaire grenzen zonder groei 
vooropstelt. Ondanks de algemene BBP-groei doorheen de periode nam het BBP per capita amper toe na 
2007: het BBP per capita herstelde slechts in 2018 volledig van de financiële crisis, wanneer het BBP per 
capita van de EU-15 haar maximale niveau bereikte dat net hoger was dan het niveau van voor de crisis. De 
welvaart per capita in de EU-15 piekte voor de financiële crisis in 2006 voor BCE en in 2007 voor BCPA. In 
2018 waren BCE en BCPA per capita respectievelijk 1.5% en 1.8% lager dan hun maximale waarden. 
Bijgevolg vonden we voor de EU-15 als geheel geen sluitend bewijs voor de drempelhypothese (i.e. het 
bestaan van een drempelpunt vanaf wanneer verdere BBP-groei zich vertaalt in een welvaartsdaling). 
Desalniettemin vonden we bewijs voor het bestaan van drempelpunten in Griekenland, Ierland, Italië, 
Luxemburg, Nederland, Portugal, Spanje, Zweden en het Verenigd Koninkrijk, waar de per capita 
welvaartsniveaus minstens 5% lager waren in 2018 in vergelijking met hun maximale welvaartsniveaus. 
In Hoofdstuk 4, herbekijken we het debat over de drempelhypothese. Door bezorgdheden over sociale en 
biofysische grenzen aan groei menen onderzoekers dat de sociale vooruitgang, aangeduid door BBP-groei, 
zou verdwijnen wanneer een ruimere welvaartsmaatstaf gebruikt wordt om economische prestaties te 
evalueren. Door de principes van dalende marginale meeropbrengsten en toenemende marginale kosten 
toe te passen op macro-economisch niveau kunnen EWM gebruikt worden om het punt aan te duiden vanaf 
wanneer economische groei oneconomische groei  wordt en dus wanneer verdere groei meer kosten dan 
baten met zich meebrengt. Voorbij dit punt groei nastreven, is suboptimaal. Doordat er grenzen zijn aan 
groei wordt er van EWM verwacht dat ze in een tijdreeks van welvaartsresultaten een drempelpunt 
aanduiden vanaf wanneer verdere BBP-groei leidt tot een welvaartsdaling. De resultaten voor de EU-15 
geven geen sluitend bewijs voor de drempelhypothese van 1995 tot 2018 aangezien EWM enkel duiden op 
een welvaartsstagnatie na de financiële crisis van 2008 en 2009. Na de financiële crisis, wanneer de 
inkomens toenamen, vertaalde groei in individuele consumptie zich niet in welvaart. Bijgevolg duidt onze 
methodologie, die gebruik maakt van een sufficiëntiedrempel, aan dat er sociale grenzen zijn aan groei: 
“keeping up with the Joneses” of geaggregeerde consumptiegroei boven een bepaald punt brengt weinig 
welvaartswinsten met zich mee door het principe van het dalend marginaal nut van inkomen. Deze 
welvaartsstagnatie wordt niet veroorzaakt door biofysische grenzen aan de groei aangezien de bredere 
ecologische kosten slechts in geringe mate toenamen. Doordat de EU-15 planetaire grenzen overschreden 
heeft, zou men echter verwachten dat de bredere ecologische kosten substantieel toegenomen zouden 
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zijn. We menen dat het achterwege blijven van biofysische grenzen een mogelijke tekortkoming is van de 
huidige methodologie aangezien het aantal ecologische componenten beperkt is en de kostenschattingen 
van de meeste ecologische componenten niet wijzigen doorheen de tijd, wat het moeilijk maakt om slechter 
of beter wordende milieuomstandigheden te vatten. Toch is het uitblijven van biofysische grenzen slechts 
gedeeltelijk een methodologische beperking. In dit proefschrift werden immers stappen gezet om rekening 
te houden met biofysische limieten door de waarderingsmethoden voor ecologische kosten te verbeteren, 
bijvoorbeeld door de kostenschattingen voor klimaatverstoring en de uitputting van niet-hernieuwbare 
grondstoffen aan te passen en naar boven bij te stellen. Naast een mogelijke tekortkoming van de huidige 
methodologie kan de afwezigheid van biofysische grenzen ook gerelateerd zijn aan de manier waarop EWM 
gehanteerd worden.  
Aangezien het evalueren van de economische prestaties niet gereduceerd hoeft te worden tot het wegen 
van monetaire kosten en baten, stelden we voor om de geaggregeerde welvaartstrend voorzichtig te 
interpreteren en er minder belang aan te hechten. EWM moeten daarentegen een gedesaggregeerde 
aanpak hanteren om bijvoorbeeld te verifiëren of de welvaartsverliezen van inkomensongelijkheid en de 
ecologische kosten afnemen. We suggereerden een gebruikshandleiding om het gebruik en 
transformatiepotentieel van EWM te verhogen. Tot slot zorgden we voor een narratief goed leven binnen 






A. Beyond GDP 
In the 1930s, the predecessors of our current Systems of National Accounts (SNA) were established. Under 
the auspices of the United Nations, the SNA became the international statistical standard for economic 
accounting. These accounts provide the basic methodology and language to calculate an economy’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), which indicates the monetary value of final goods and services of domestic market 
production. Over the years several methodological revisions were carried out. In 2014, for instance, the 
inclusion of prostitution and drugs were standardized in the calculation of the GDP of the European Union. 
Yet, these revisions and updates sometimes can be seen as arbitrary or biased because, to date, other non-
market activities such as unpaid household work remain excluded from an economy’s production boundary 
when calculating GDP (DeRock, 2019). By dividing a country’s GDP by its population, one obtains the per 
capita GDP. When corrected for purchasing power differences between countries, this measure is often 
used to approximate social welfare and hence, GDP per capita often serves as a measure for the living 
standards in a specific country and to rank countries in terms of development. Nevertheless, Simon Kuznets 
warned from the very beginning of the use of the National Accounts that “the welfare of a nation can 
scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income” (Kuznets, 1934, p. 7). Also Moses Abramovitz 
(1958) came to a similar conclusion: “we must be highly skeptical of the view that long term changes in the 
rate of growth of welfare can be gauged even roughly from changes in the rate of growth of output”.  
In 1968, United States Senator Robert Kennedy warned in a memorable speech at the University of Kansas 
that the GDP measures everything, except that what makes life worthwhile – GDP “counts air pollution and 
cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our doors 
and the jails for the people who break them. It counts the destruction of the redwood and the loss of our 
natural wonder in chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and counts nuclear warheads and armored cars for the 
police to fight the riots in our cities. It counts Whitman's rifle and Speck's knife, and the television programs 
which glorify violence in order to sell toys to our children. Yet the gross national product does not allow for 
the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy of their play. It does not include the 
beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity 
of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, 
neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country, it measures everything in short, except that which 
makes life worthwhile.“ A  few years later, Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) emphasize that in the 1960s growth 
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in GDP has become dominant in economics, politics and society. As they write in 1972: “A long decade ago, 
economic growth was the reigning fashion of political economy. It was simultaneously the hottest subject 
of economic theory and research, a slogan eagerly claimed by politicians of all stripes, and a serious 
objective of the policies of governments.”  
Despite the warnings of Kuznets, Kennedy and many others on GDP’s deficiencies, GDP is today still widely 
used as a measure of social welfare by media, policy makers and economists, which is probably causing the 
‘largest information failure’ in the world (van den Bergh, 2009). According to van den Bergh, the key to 
understand this “GDP paradox” lies in recognizing that many economists accept the GDP-criticism but they 
refute its relevance. GDP is a flawed welfare indicator because it omits important aspects of welfare and it 
does not discriminate against the ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ of economic activity. Leisure, unpaid work, care work, 
household work and volunteering work are not counted. Moreover, GDP and per capita GDP give no 
indication about the distribution of income. Furthermore, the clean-up costs of plastic nurdles in the delta 
of a river enter positively in GDP, while a forest is only valuable from a GDP-perspective if it is cut down. 
Finally, the GDP fails to register externalities such as environmental degradation and pollution as a cost of 
the economic process. For all these reasons, the “Beyond GDP” literature emphasizes the need to measure 
economic performance and social progress differently by focusing on well-being and sustainability (Stiglitz 
et al., 2009, 2018; Costanza et al., 2014; Kubiszewski et al., 2013; Hoekstra, 2019; Coscieme et al., 2020). 
B. Economic welfare measures 
Within the “Beyond GDP” literature, many alternative indicators and methodologies have been proposed 
to measure the concepts well-being, welfare and sustainability such as life satisfaction, equivalent incomes, 
Environmentally Adjusted Net Domestic Product, Genuine Savings, Inclusive Wealth Index, composite 
indicators, ecological footprints and dashboards of sustainable development indicators. One particular part 
of this literature focuses on providing alternatives to GDP. From the 1970s onwards, economic welfare 
measures (EWM) were devised in response to GDP’s shortcomings when used as a welfare measure. 
Examples of such alternatives include Nordhaus and Tobin’s (1972) Measure of Economic Welfare, Zolotas’ 
(1981) Index of the Economic Aspects of Welfare and Daly and Cobb’s (1989) Index of Sustainable Economic 
Welfare (ISEW). Nowadays, the ISEW is also known as the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI). While there is 
a broader debate on the measurement of welfare, well-being or sustainable development – see, for 
instance, the approaches mentioned in Meadows (1998), Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), Dasgupta (2009), van 
den Bergh (2009), Fleurbaey (2009), Bleys (2012), O’Neill (2012), Munda (2015), O’Neill et al. (2018) and 
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Hoekstra (2019) – in this thesis we refer to welfare, economic welfare measures and alternative measures 
of economic welfare as what is being measured by the ISEW and GPI. 
We interpret EWM as macro-economic monetary welfare measures that capture the benefits and costs of 
economic activity. On the benefits side, EWM value the contributions from unpaid work, the market, state 
and shadow economy as they are all different means to satisfy people’s needs and wants. Here, the inputs 
used for the production of welfare such as individual consumption expenditures, collective government 
expenditures, estimates for unpaid household work and the shadow economy are valued and aggregated. 
Yet, EWM do not count all consumption expenditures as beneficial to welfare – consumption expenditures 
are, for instance, adjusted according to the principle of diminishing marginal utility of income since an extra 
dollar of income or consumption gives less satisfaction to people with high incomes than it does to people 
with low incomes. On the costs side, the social and ecological costs caused by the economic process are 
also included, since these indicators see the economy as embedded in society and in the Earth System. 
Accounting for ecological costs such as environmental degradation and natural capital depreciation serves 
as a way to factor in the ultimate costs of economy activity. This is considered necessary because the matter 
and energy obtained from the ecosystem are the ultimate means upon which economic activity depends 
on.  
The conceptual framework used in this dissertation to study EWM draws on the pre-analytic vision of 
ecological economics, in which the embeddedness of the economy takes centre stage. Fig. 1 gives a 
graphical illustration of seeing the economy as ‘embedded’: the economy-in-society-in-the-ecosystem. This 
figure also highlights how EWM take on a broader perspective on “the economy” by not only focusing on 
market activities (as is done in GDP), but by also including the contributions of unpaid work, the state and 





Figure 1: The embedded economy.  
 
Source: adapted from Raworth (2017). 
 
Over the last thirty years, the ISEW and GPI have been calculated for many countries, regions and cities all 
over the world including all countries in the EU-15, except for Denmark and Ireland – see Bleys and Van der 
Slycken (2019) for an overview of these studies. Fig. 2 illustrates that welfare studies have mostly been 
compiled for high-income economies, as welfare studies in the global South are scarce. Based on the 
empirical results of the first welfare studies for high-income countries in the early 1990s, Manfred Max-
Neef (1995), a renowned ecological economist, formulated the “threshold hypothesis” that states: “for 
every society there seems to be a period in which economic growth (as conventionally measured) brings 
about an improvement in the quality of life, but only up to a point – the threshold point – beyond which, if 
there is more economic growth, quality of life may begin to deteriorate.” Based on the outcomes of EWM 
studies in the Asia-Pacific region, the threshold hypothesis was reformulated by Lawn and Clarke (2010) 
into a “contracting threshold hypothesis” which states that: “as the economies of the Asia-Pacific region in 
the world collectively expand in a globalized economic environment, there is a contraction over time in the 
threshold level of per capita GDP.” Consequently, the threshold point of low and middle income countries 
occurs at a much lower welfare level than high-income countries are currently enjoying. A study estimating 
the global GPI based on the welfare results from 17 countries (containing 53% of global population and 57% 
of global GDP) from 1950 to 2003 found that global GPI per capita peaked in 1978 (Kubiszewski et al., 2013), 
as illustrated in Fig. 3. This welfare peak comes 8 years after that the global Ecological Footprint exceeded 
global biocapacity in 1970.  
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Figure 2: World map with the economic welfare measures compiled in this dissertation and in earlier studies (anno 
2021). 
 
Source: a list of the country studies was obtained from Bleys and Van der Slycken (2019), which was adapted and 
updated based on own findings. 
Note: This dissertation is the first study that has calculated economic welfare measures for Denmark and Ireland. 
 
Figure 3: Global GPI per capita and GDP per capital (in 2005 US dollars). 
 
Source: Kubiszewski et al. (2013).  
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Due to their specific design EWM are potentially capable of guiding economies and societies on a just 
transition toward living well within limits by providing an alternative to move beyond GDP. Yet, to date, the 
ISEW and GPI have had little impact on policy-making (Bleys and Whitby, 2015; Corlet Walker and Jackson, 
2019). However, small steps are being taken in economic analysis and policy-making in Germany, Maryland 
(US) and Flanders (Belgium), for instance. There is increasing political interest in EWM in Germany. In 2009, 
the National Welfare Index, which is a variant of the ISEW and GPI, was created with support of the Federal 
Ministry of Environment, while the NWI was compiled at the state level in 2011 in response to a political 
demand for it (Held et al., 2018). In the US state of Maryland the calculation of the GPI got high level support 
from its former governor so that Maryland’s GPI got compiled from 2010 onwards, yet, this support fell 
after a change of governor (Hayden and Wilson, 2018). While in Flanders, the northern Dutch-speaking part 
of Belgium, the ISEW was used as a headline indicator in Pact2020 to measure progress toward the goal to 
turn Flanders into a competitive and versatile knowledge economy that creates welfare in a sustainable 
way. There was no target set for 2020, but Pact2020 aimed to increase the Flemish ISEW per capita (Bleys 
and Whitby, 2015). In Canada, it was more difficult to move beyond GDP. The GPI was calculated for the 
provinces Nova Scotia and Alberta. Yet, Hayden and Wilson’s (2016) study about the Canadian experience 
of moving beyond GDP, which was broader than the GPI alone, suggests that alternative indicators are not 
a transformative force by themselves, since “the widespread use of new indicators is more accurately seen 
a product of political and social movement efforts to expand the role of non-economic values in policy-
making and in society more generally”. 
 
Over the years, a number of theoretical, conceptual and methodological shortcomings of the EWM have 
been identified. First, some scholars are critical of the monetization approach that EWM employ and the 
reductionism involved in combining different values in a single aggregate measure. Second, there are no 
generally accepted EWM, due to a lack of agreement on how to define and operationalize welfare. EWM 
are on some occasions seen as measuring current, experiential welfare, and on others as measures of 
sustainable economic welfare – see, for instance, the discussions in Neumayer (1999), Harris (2007), 
Brennan (2008, 2013), Lawn (2008, 2013) and Talberth and Weisdorf (2017). This lack of consensus and the 
related discussions are related to the rather ambiguous theoretical foundation of the original ISEW that 
was inspired both by Fisherian income and Hicksian income. A third shortcoming is related to the first one, 
namely that there is a lack of clear procedures to deal with forward-looking and beyond border issues. 
Different perspectives exist on economic welfare measures’ time and geographical boundaries, as 
illustrated by Fig. 4. Some authors want to measure ‘current  welfare’ and adopt a present-looking 
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perspective, while others adopt a more forward-looking approach by including the future benefits and costs 
of present economic activities such as the costs of climate disruption and net capital growth. When it comes 
to EWM’s geographical borders, some scholars suggest to only look within domestic borders, while others 
propose to adopt a broader viewpoint by also registering the environmental impacts that are caused by 
present economic activities, but shifted beyond geographical borders. Examples of these cross-boundary 
issues are the greenhouse gas emissions embodied in trade related to domestic consumption and the 
climate disruption damages caused to the rest of the world. Finally, almost all compilations of EWM to date 
are single country efforts that use slightly different methodologies regarding the items included and the 
valuation methods, which leads to conceptual vagueness. As a result, the comparability of EWM studies 
among different countries is low (Bleys and Whitby, 2015). 
Figure 4: Economic welfare measures’ time and boundary dimensions. 
 
C. Research questions 
This thesis focuses on economic welfare measures such as the ISEW and GPI, and contributes to the EWM 
literature by addressing theoretical, conceptual and methodological issues in four distinct ways. First, we 
will investigate how welfare measures should deal with welfare’s time and boundary issues by exploring 
the conceptual and theoretical framework behind economic welfare measures. Based on these theoretical 
and conceptual insights, a theoretically and conceptually sound “2.0” methodology for the EWM is 
developed in a second step. This framework will consist of a standard set of economic welfare components 
and up-to-date valuation methods for all of its items. Afterwards, the “2.0” methodology will be applied to 
the EU-15 and its countries to explore whether the EU-15 has been faring well with growth from 1995 to 
2018. Finally, we will investigate whether the EWM results of the EU-15 give evidence in favor of the 
threshold hypothesis, i.e. a point after which continued growth results in a diminution of welfare. The thesis 
will address the following four research questions:  
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• What are the different theoretical income concepts that inspire different views on economic 
welfare measures? What do these income concepts mean in terms of welfare interpretations? 
What are their implications for cross-time and cross-boundary issues?  
• How can these theoretical, conceptual and interpretational insights be translated into an applicable 
and standardized “2.0 methodology”? 
• Has the EU-15 been faring well with growth? Do the welfare results of the EU-15 give evidence in 
favor of the threshold hypothesis or not?  
• Are the ISEW and GPI able to reveal social and biophysical limits to growth? What can we learn 
from an in-depth analysis of the threshold hypothesis for the EU-15?  
 
D. Outline of the dissertation 
This dissertation consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 is a conceptual exploration and critical inquiry into the 
theoretical foundation(s) of economic welfare measures such as the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare 
(ISEW) and Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI). Fisherian income and Hicksian income are investigated and 
confirmed as theoretical foundations. Next, two different welfare interpretations – the benefits and costs 
experienced and the benefits and costs of present economic activities – are put forward to clearly define 
and distinguish welfare’s distinct time and boundary dimensions. Finally, the chapter concludes that recent 
developments toward the current experiential welfare interpretation that looks within borders are not the 
only way forward, since economic welfare measures can also be seen as capturing the benefits and costs of 
present economic activities, including the benefits and costs shifted in time and space. 
Based on these insights and the dual welfare interpretation, Chapter 2 calculates two different welfare 
measures with distinct time and boundary views for Belgium. One measure, the benefits and costs 
experienced, only includes the current ecological costs within borders and excludes capital change. The 
other welfare indicator, the benefits and costs of present economic activities, includes capital changes and 
the ecological costs shifted in time and space because these are benefits and costs originating from present 
activities. This chapter also introduces novel EWM items such as the shadow economy and proposes several 
methodological advances (e.g. accounting for the greenhouse gas emissions embodied in trade and a 
sufficiency threshold to account for the diminishing marginal utility of income).  
Chapter 3 calculates two welfare measures, the benefits and costs experienced and the benefits and costs 
of present activities, for the EU-15 and its countries from 1995 to 2018 using a comparable methodology 
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and standardized data. Moreover, the welfare evolution over time and the welfare drivers are discussed. 
Furthermore, it is suggested to adopt a disaggregated approach to analyze welfare results, since the 
aggregate welfare trend should be treated with caution, especially since the ecological costs within the EU-
15 increased (slightly) over time. 
In Chapter 4, the welfare results for the EU-15 are scrutinized to determine whether we find evidence for 
the threshold hypothesis. We cannot clearly determine a threshold point after which growth results in a 
diminution of welfare. Yet, we do observe that during the last decade a welfare plateau has been reached 
that is in particular due to the diminishing marginal returns to income. As a consequence, income increases 
lead to less than proportional welfare gains. This plateauing does, however, not imply that welfare cannot 
be improved in the future. In a just and sustainable transition, social and environmental policies can bring 
down the welfare losses from income inequality and the ecological costs, which could result in welfare 
improvements. Next, we conclude to be cautious while interpreting the aggregate welfare trend and put 
forward a “user guide” for  welfare measures, that will help to overcome problems with interpretation that 
are related to compensability and incommensurability. 
Finally, the findings of these four chapters are combined in the conclusion. It is suggested that in future 
studies should always report disaggregated data and that welfare measures should be complemented with 
a set of social and biophysical indicators to measure whether societies are living well within planetary limits. 
While economic welfare measures still struggle with methodological imperfections, they do provide 
important insights on the benefits and costs of economic activities and hence are to be preferred over GDP. 
Or, as Daly and Farley (2004, p. 243) suggest after Amartya Sen: “it is better to be vaguely right than 
precisely wrong”.  
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Chapter 1 : A conceptual exploration and critical inquiry into the 
theoretical foundation(s) of economic welfare measures.1 
1. Introduction 
In response to misuse of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a welfare indicator, Daly and Cobb (1989) 
developed the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) to provide better information on economic 
welfare.2 Economic welfare measures (EWM), such as the ISEW and the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), 
offer information on “the contribution of a nation’s economy to the overall level of well-being enjoyed by 
its citizens (Bleys, 2012). They typically do so by seeing the economy as ‘embedded’: the economy-in-
society-in-the-ecosystem. EWM do not only take a broader perspective on the economy subsystem 
compared to GDP (that only focusses on market activities), but EWM also make explicit the links between 
the economic subsystem and the social and ecological domains. Over the next thirty years, EWM have been 
compiled for countries, regions and cities all over the globe – see Bleys & Whitby (2015) and Long & Ji (2019) 
for an overview. Soon after the development of the first EWM, however, critics such as Neumayer (1999) 
pointed out that these measures were lacking a sound theoretical foundation, whereas Hanley et al. (1999) 
described the ISEW as making a number of ad hoc adjustments to the national income accounts to reflect 
a broader welfare concept. It was not until the turn of the century that the ISEW was connected to Fisher’s 
concepts of income and capital by Lawn and Sanders (1999) and Lawn (2003). 
                                                     
1 This paper is co-authored with Brent Bleys (Ghent University) and is published in Ecological Economics. We would 
like to thank our colleagues Bart Defloor and Freddy Heylen for their comments on earlier drafts of this work and two 
anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions to improve this article. Finally, we are grateful for the insightful 
discussions with the participants of the Belgian Environmental Economist Day in Ghent (2018), the conferences of the 
European Society for Ecological Economics in Budapest (2017) and Turku (2019), the International Forum for Well-
Being in Grenoble (2018), and the International Degrowth Conference in Malmö (2018). 
2 GDP, indicating the monetary value of goods and services of domestic market production, has been criticized from 
its start as being a social welfare proxy. Kuznets warned in 1934, the very beginning of the use National Accounts, that 
“the welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income…” (Kuznets, 1934, p. 7). 
Over the years, prominent economists further fueled this critique (Galbraith, 1958; Mishan, 1967, Nordhaus & Tobin, 
1972; Leipert, 1986; Daly & Cobb, 1989; Max-Neef, 1995; Fleurbaey, 2009; Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009; Kubiszewski 
et al., 2013; Costanza et al., 2014; Jackson, 2017). GDP (per capita) is dismal for approximating economic welfare, as 
it overlooks many important welfare aspects by only focusing on market activities. Despite GDP’s obvious and well-
known shortcomings, it is still widely used by economists, media and policy makers as a welfare indicator. GDP’s 
omnipresence is probably causing the ‘largest information failure’ in the world (van den Bergh, 2009). 
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In his seminal paper, Lawn (2003) meticulously explained how every item included could be consistent with 
Fisher’s concepts, thus potentially providing the ISEW and related measures with a theoretically sound 
foundation. However, EWM also have been defined as measures of sustainable economic welfare that are 
tightly linked to Hicks’ (1939) maximum sustainable consumption – e.g. Harris (2007) even considers 
Hicksian income to be superior compared to Fisherian income. To date, Fisherian psychic income is the most 
commonly used theoretical foundation to underpin EWM (in e.g. Lawn, 2003; Bleys, 2008; Brennan, 2013; 
Lawn, 2013; Talberth & Weisdorf, 2017; O’Mahony et al., 2018; Kenny et al., 2019; Long & Ji, 2019). Fisher 
(1906) stressed the psychic or experiential nature of income and relates income to the subjective 
satisfactions consumption causes in the human psyche. By turning to psychic income to underpin welfare 
exercises, EWM would reveal information about the net benefits a nation’s citizens are experiencing from 
economic activities, after deducting for instance the costs of air pollution, noise pollution and of commuting 
to work from the consumption benefits.  EWM do more than just registering the traditional net psychic 
income as they also account, for instance, for the costs caused to the ecosystem. In fact, EWM are based 
on an extended version of Fisher’s income-capital distinction (Lawn, 2008) or on the ‘entropic net psychic 
income’ (Brennan, 2008). This entropic extension results in registering the ecosystem services that are 
sacrificed in the economic process as a cost in EWM.   
Despite the theoretical debate moving in the direction of Fisherian income, a clear interpretational 
consensus on what EWM are capturing, is missing in the field. Table 1 illustrates this by outlining a number 
of welfare statements of leading scholars. The emphasis we added in this overview highlights that these 
scholars understand, define and explain EWM differently. Sometimes, EWM are said to capture what is 
being enjoyed at a particular point in time or as being related to the costs and benefits experienced at a 
particular point in time. Here, the experiential nature of EWM is stressed, which is directly related to Fisher’s 
psychic income. On other occasions, EWM are linked to the value added to nature, to counting the 
depreciation of community capital as a cost, to the impacts of economic growth or to the consequences of 
economic activity. In these diverse statements, two welfare interpretations can be detected. The first 
interpretation sees EWM as what is currently being experienced, whereas the second relates EWM to the 
costs and benefits caused by present economic activities. Current activities may bring (benefits and) costs 




Table 1: Various statements by key practitioners on what economic welfare measures are capturing. 
Lawn (2003) 
 
“The sustainable economic welfare implied here is the welfare a nation enjoys at a 





 “The GPI uses monetary valuation to assess the impacts of economic growth on 
sustainable welfare. GPI is an indicator that goes beyond measuring the quantity of 
economic activity to include details about quality, … ” (p. 2, emphasis added). 
  
Kubiszewski 





“…, the GPI is designed to measure the economic welfare generated by economic 
activity, essentially counting the depreciation of community capital as an economic 
cost.” (p. 57). “Economic activity, it should be recognized, is undertaken to generate a 
level of economic welfare greater than what can be provided by natural capital alone.” 







“The Genuine Progress Indicator is a monetary measure of economic welfare for a 
given population in a given year that accounts for benefits and costs experienced by 
that population in association with investment, production, trade, and consumption 
of goods and services” (p. 3, emphasis added). 
  





“Taking the deficiencies of GDP as a starting point for consideration, those indices try 
to capture the consequences of economic activities on current welfare in a more 
comprehensive way, especially with regard to social and environmental issues. 
Therefore, monetized costs and benefits are aggregated across social, environmental 
and economic dimensions into one single indicator.” (p. 392, emphasis added).  
 
To make things worse, many EWM studies avoid looking into the theoretical foundations of the measures, 
and focus exclusively on estimating an additional EMW time series. As a result, these studies make implicit 
and inconsistent time and boundary choices (i.e. deciding between forward-looking or present-looking 
perspective and between a within and beyond boundary view). This lack of standardization regarding time 
and boundary issues hinders the policy-impacting potential of EWM (Bleys & Whitby, 2015). Therefore, the 
purpose of this paper is to revisit the theory behind the EWM. Section 2 revisits the theoretical foundations 
of EWM and introduces with Hicksian and Fisherian income two concepts that provide EWM with a (double) 
theoretical underpinning. Section 3 relates this double theoretical foundation to the existence of two 
distinct ways to interpret EWM and connects each interpretation to a time and boundary perspective. The 
conclusion proposes a way forward towards a more consistent standardization in the field. 
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2. Revisiting economic welfare measures’ theoretical foundation(s) 
For terminological clarity, we want to stress the distinction between ‘income’ and ‘welfare’. In this paper, 
welfare is used to refer to practically compiled measures such as the ISEW and GPI, whereas income is 
related to the theoretical income concepts which provide EWM with a certain theoretical base. In this 
section we will scrutinize the theoretical foundations of EWM. First, we will introduce Hicks’ and Fisher’s 
income concepts, as they underlie the theoretical discussions on EWM. Afterwards we will explain how 
extended versions of these theoretical income notions are translated in EWM and explore the ex post 
theoretical foundation developed by Lawn (2003) based on Fisherian income. Finally, we will discuss the 
linkages between the ISEW, Hicksian and Fisherian income. 
2.1  Income concepts underlying EWM 
Daly and Cobb (1989) first turned to Hicksian income when developing the ISEW, while later on, Lawn (2003) 
connected EWM to Fisher’s psychic income notion and his distinction between income and capital. It is 
important to have a clear view on both income concepts in order to understand how EWM relate to these. 
2.1.1 Hicksian income 
In his book “Value and Capital”, Sir John Hicks explored the concept of income. Hicks (1939, p. 172) explains 
income as: 
 “The purpose of income calculations in practical affairs is to give people an indication of the amount 
which they can consume without impoverishing themselves. Following out this idea, it would seem that we 
ought to define a man’s income as the maximum value which he can consume during a week, and still 
expect to be as well of at the end of the week as he was at the beginning. Thus, when a person saves, he 
plans to be better off in the future; when he lives beyond his income, he plans to be worse off. 
Remembering that the practical purpose of income is to serve as a guide for prudent conduct, I think it is 
fairly clear that this is what the central meaning must be.” 
Hicks’ central income criterion is avoiding impoverishment to maintain consumption over time. The 
practical difficulty, however, lies in operationalizing this principle. A practical attempt to capture this central 
meaning can be found in his so-called ‘Income No. 1’, which is “…the maximum amount which can be spent 
during a period if there is to be an expectation of maintaining intact the capital value of prospective receipts 
(in money terms).” (p. 173). Hicks gives an example in which an individual with a capital sum only spends 
the interest yield on her capital. By limiting income to the yield on capital, the capital stock remains intact 
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over the considered time period. The importance to “keep capital intact" is derived from this income 
approximation.3 This ex ante income expectation has a counterpart that is realized ex post by including 
unexpected profits or losses. According to Hicks, especially the ex post variant of Income No. 1 is important 
and it equals consumption plus capital accumulation (Hicks, 1939). This version is commonly referred to as 
‘Hicksian income’, and it should be noted this is different from Hicks’ central income notion that is forward-
looking. 
2.1.2 Fisherian income 
Fisher (1906) defines psychic income as “the stream of consciousness of any human being. All his conscious 
life, from his birth to his death, constitutes his subjective income. Sensations, thought, feelings, volitions, 
and all psychical events, in fact, are part of this income stream. All these conscious experiences which are 
desirable are positive items of income, or services; all which are undesirable are negative items, or 
disservices.” (p. 168). Positive income is related to using wealth (i.e. consumption). However, economic 
activity is not only yielding desirable benefits or services (i.e. the enjoyment of psychic income), it also 
brings undesirable disservices or psychic outgo like the labor cost or effort. Fisher explains this cost item 
can be “labor, anxiety, trouble, annoyance, and all the other subjective experiences of an undesirable 
nature which are necessary in order that the experiences of an agreeable nature may be secured” (p. 175). 
This negative psychic income or psychic outgo is netted from the (positive) psychic income to obtain the 
‘net psychic income’.4, 5 The net income is what ultimately remains uncancelled in the human psyche and is 
labeled as ‘uncancelled benefits’. 
To determine what counts as psychic income, Fisher’s distinction between income and capital is crucial: 
psychic income flows should be recorded but not the changes in capital stocks. The basic premise is that 
consumption and not investment is important as it yields satisfactory services. Of course, investments also 
play a role but they will only help to maintain the stock from which consumptive services may flow in coming 
periods. While Fisherian income would count the entire amount of actual consumption as income, even 
though if this would be capital consumption (Mates, 2004), this would not be the case for Hicksian income. 
                                                     
3 In other income variants, No. 2 and No. 3, Hicks considered changing interest rates and price expectations. 
Throughout his quest to properly define income, Hicks pondered about ex ante expectations and ex post realizations 
of the maximum amount that can be consumed and about individual income and social income. 
4 In the dominant economic jargon psychic income and psychic outgo are known as utility and disutility. 
5 Psychic outgo items embodied in the ISEW are for instance noise pollution and the costs of commuting to work. 
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Hicksian income accounts for capital accumulation or decumulation and would not count capital 
consumption or depreciation as income, since Hicks’ stresses the importance to keep capital intact. 
2.2  An extended version of Hicksian income (EHI) 
In their book “For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and 
a Sustainable Future”, Daly and Cobb (1989) scrutinize the misplaced concreteness of GDP as a measure of 
economic success. In doing so, the authors propose to make two departures from GDP. The first departure 
involves turning to Hicksian income as a better income concept. GDP cannot serve as an approximation for 
Hicksian income since a nation will ultimately be impoverished if it consumes its entire GDP. Part of GDP 
simply serves to overcome depreciation of human-made capital and cannot be consumed without being 
worse off in the next period. By subtracting depreciation from GDP, Net Domestic Product (NDP) or its 
variant Net National Product (NNP) is obtained.6 This NNP is most commonly regarded as (a basic) 
approximation of Hicksian income as per Asheim (1994) and Hartwick (1994). Nordhaus (1995) explains this 
narrow Hicksian income can easily be expanded to incorporate natural capital by subtracting resource 
depletion and environmental degradation as is done in integrated environmental and economic accounts. 
The need to subtract the value of using raw materials and capital equipment to obtain a nation’s net product 
was already expressed by Kuznets (1934). 
Daly and Cobb (1989) go beyond the basic interpretation of equating Hicksian income to NNP. They argue 
that NNP is not capable of adequately reflecting the maximum amount of consumption that can be 
sustained over time since (a) the current produced NNP involves transformations in the biophysical world 
that are ecologically unsustainable, and (b) NNP includes defensive expenditures, which are intermediate 
expenditures to protect ourselves from the adverse, future impacts of economic production. Leipert (1989) 
defines defensive expenditures as “… outlays with which the attempt is made to eliminate, mitigate, 
neutralize, or anticipate and avoid damages and deterioration that the economic process of industrial 
societies has caused to living, working, and environmental conditions. They serve only to restore, 
reapproach, or defend a status (say, a specific environmental quality, secure income, or certain benefits of 
consumption) that has been lost or compromised by negative impacts of the economic and social process.” 
(p. 844). By including ecologically unsustainable transformations and defensive expenditures, the NNP thus 
overestimates the amount of ultimate, true consumption that is valued for its own sake. Therefore, Daly 
                                                     
6 In their writings Daly and Cobb (1994) still refer to Gross National Product (GNP) and NNP, which are two terms that 
were used before GNP was replaced by GDP. We prefer to stick to Daly and Cobb’s original terminology of NNP. 
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and Cobb propose to adjust NNP by (a) expanding depreciation to cover the depletion of natural capital 
stocks and (b) deducting defensive expenditures. The extended approximation of Hicksian income (EHI) can 
be represented as: 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 𝐺𝑁𝑃 − 𝐷𝐻𝐶 − 𝐷 − 𝐷𝑁𝐶                                                                      (1) 
In Eq. (1) GNP = Gross National Product, DHC = depreciation of human-made capital, D = defensive 
expenditures, DNC = depletion of natural capital. GNP minus DHC simply equals NNP.  
2.3  An extended version of Fisher’s distinction between income and capital   
Daly and Cobb (1989) move beyond the extended proxy of Hicksian income by addressing more of GDP’s 
deficiencies in a second departure from the measure. They develop the Index of Sustainable Economic 
Welfare as a new measure of economic welfare that aims to quantify “the positive contribution of the 
economy to social welfare” (p. 76). Although the authors did not relate their ISEW to Fisherian income, it 
was done so by Lawn (2003) in his ex post theoretical framing that he claimed to be superior to Hicksian 
income. In his work, Lawn puts forward an extended version of Fisherian income to take into account 
ecosystem services. 
2.3.1 The Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare 
A second departure from GDP in Daly and Cobb (1989) involves the development of a new measure of 
economic welfare: the ISEW. In doing so, the authors go beyond EHI by including additional welfare related 
items such as income inequality and the value of not commodified work. These ISEW items were not 
connected to Hicksian income by Daly and Cobb.    
 
When developing the ISEW Daly and Cobb drew on previous welfare compilations, i.e. Nordhaus and Tobin’s 
(1972) Measure of Economic Welfare (MEW) and Zolotas’ (1981) Index of Economic Aspects of Welfare 
(EAW). They selected items from both indices, while also incorporating new items in the ISEW. In line with 
the previous measures, the ISEW starts from personal consumption expenditures and adds the value of 
household work. Daly and Cobb’s measure is, however, the first to account for income inequality.7 In line 
with Zolotas, defensive private expenditures on health and education are subtracted while non-defensive 
                                                     
7 This section takes the second edition of Daly and Cobb’s “For the Common Good” in 1994 as a starting point. After a 
discussion and review of the original ISEW, Cobb and Cobb (1994) dropped a number of items in the 1989-ISEW, such 
as the cost of urbanization and advertising. Moreover, the 1994-version introduced the cost of personal pollution 
control and ozone layer depletion as new welfare items into the index. 
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public expenditures are added. Other private defensive expenditures that are deducted include 
expenditures on personal pollution control and car accidents.8 Daly and Cobb include numerous items 
related to environmental degradation and natural capital depreciation (i.e. air, water, and noise pollution; 
depletion of non-renewable resources; loss of farmlands and wetlands; long-term environmental damage; 
cost of ozone layer depletion). Similar to net investment in Nordhaus and Tobin’s sustainable MEW, Daly 
and Cobb account for net capital growth. Moreover, the change in the net international position is 
incorporated to indicate whether the source of a nation’s capital accumulation is domestic or foreign. Daly 
and Cobb assume that advanced capitalist societies require long-term national self-reliance to sustain their 
welfare levels.9 Finally, the ISEW also includes the services from consumer durables and the services from 
the public capital stock (‘services from highways and streets’). A way to mathematically represent the 1994-
ISEW, based on Jackson et al. (1997) can be found in Eq. (2): 
                                                   𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑊 =  𝐶𝑝 − 𝐼𝑁𝑄 + 𝐻 + 𝑁𝐷𝑔 − 𝐷𝑝 + 𝛥𝐾 − 𝐸 − 𝑁                                        (2) 
In Eq. (2) Cp = personal consumption, INQ = losses from income inequality, H = domestic labour, NDg = non-
defensive government expenditures, Dp = defensive private expenditures, ∆K = capital adjustments, E = 
environmental degradation and N = depreciation of natural capital. 
 
2.3.2 Lawn’s ex post theoretical framework 
Lawn and Sanders (1999) and Lawn (2003) related the items in Daly and Cobb’s second departure to Fisher’s 
concepts of income and capital. Lawn (2003) regards this Fisherian view to be logically superior to a Hicksian 
perspective that is used to calculate an adjusted GDP such as EHI. Lawn argues that the EHI is a better 
approximation of Hicksian income than GDP, but that it is not without its flaws. The EHI overlooks welfare 
aspects such as the cost of reduced leisure time, the cost of commuting, the cost of crime and family 
breakdown, the value of volunteer and non-paid household work and the welfare losses related to income 
inequality. Moreover, the EHI “… counts all additions to human-made capital as current income, it wrongly 
conflates the services rendered by capital (income) and the capital that renders them.” (Lawn, 2003, p. 
111).  
 
                                                     
8 Nonetheless, not all scholars agree that defensive expenses should be subtracted in a welfare measure (e.g. Mäler, 
1991 and Hamilton, 1996).  
9 This component would indicate whether a nation’s capital formation is based on net lending (if positive) or on net 
borrowing (if negative). A positive change means an increase in capital assets, whereas negative changes indicate 
capital formation is based on foreign wealth that must be repaid with interest (Daly & Cobb, 1994). 
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Lawn (2003) believes Fisher’s view is superior since Hicksian income is mistakenly connected to the quantity 
of production and consumption, whereas welfare depends on the ‘psychic enjoyment of life’ according to 
Lawn; a view for which Lawn finds support in the work of Georgescu-Roegen (1971) and Daly (1979). 
Nordhaus (2000) also favors Fisherian income, as he explains that while Hicksian income – consumption 
plus capital accumulation – is an important measure of current production, it has no clear welfare 
meaning.10 Daly and Cobb themselves did not relate the ISEW to Fisherian income as Lawn did in his ex post 
theoretical framing. However, Daly and Cobb did refer to Fisherian income as having some interesting 
welfare features: “In Fisher’s view nearly all consumer goods are classed as capital or wealth, and their 
consumption represents depreciation. For Fisher, welfare is the service (the psychic sense of want 
satisfaction) rendered by this wealth …” (1994, p. 67). Lawn (2013) states that Daly should be credited for 
having Fisher’s income-capital distinction in mind when developing the ISEW and for seeing Fisherian 
income as suitable for measuring a nation’s welfare. Lawn quotes Daly (1988, p. 54) to support his 
argument: “It seems to me that Irving Fisher’s way of looking at things is eminently sensible, coherent, and 
logical”. 
 
Yet, Lawn’s (2003) view on Fisher’s psychic income was criticized. Brennan (2013) reasoned that this 
approach is limited as EWM “do not prudently factor-in measures of investment and depreciation of 
‘human-health capital’”. Brennan argues that in a more advanced version of Fisher’s concept it is needed 
to account “for some sort of change in the stock (or ‘fund’) of human-health capital since type of capital is 
crucial for enjoying psychic services. Lawn (2013) in contrast, reasons that Brennan’s suggestion of 
accounting for changes in human-health capital would violate Fisher’s distinction between income and 
capital. According to Lawn, the failure of EWM to fully account for changes in human-health capital should 
not be compromised as it is not a theoretical weakness. This failure is at most a methodological shortcoming 
that can be addressed by some methodological improvements that would lead to more accurate Fisherian 
EWM (Lawn, 2013). 
                                                     
10 Among the most important drawbacks of Hicksian income Nordhaus states that it excludes nonmarket activity and 
a population’s health status and labels intangible investments in human capital and technology as consumption. Yet, 
it should be noted that Lawn (2003) and Nordhaus (2000) interpret and operationalize Fisherian income differently. 
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2.3.3 An extended version of Fisher’s distinction between income and capital 
As articulated in Section 2.1.2, Fisher stops his analysis after he obtained the net psychic income or the 
uncancelled benefits. Nevertheless, one could also account for the ‘uncancelled costs’ or ultimate costs of 
the economic process: the input of low entropic resources and the output of high entropic waste. One 
should not forget that the ecosystem is the ultimate source that makes economic activity possible. Nature’s 
stock of wealth is not only continuously delivering source services such as matter and energy, it also 
provides sink services to assimilate waste, and offers life-support services such as a stable climate.11 These 
ecosystem flows are necessary to maintain the ever depreciating human-made capital, and are lost, used 
up or sacrificed in the economic process (Lawn, 2003, 2008). For this reason, Daly’s (1979) view of seeing 
lost natural capital services needed to maintain human-made capital as uncancelled costs provides the 
rationale behind the environmental cost side of EWM (Lawn, 2008, 2013). By also accounting for 
uncancelled costs one does not arrive at the net psychic income, but one gets the ‘entropic net psychic 
income’, as Brennan (2008) calls it. By augmenting the net psychic income by this uncancelled cost account, 
Lawn (2008) explains that EWM are based on an extended version of Fisher’s income-capital distinction.  
 
The costs and benefits that ultimately remain in respectively the ecosystem and the human body are said 
to be ‘uncancelled’, because all in-between interactions cancel out as each transaction of primary 
resources, intermediate goods, or final products pair a buying with a selling act of the same monetary 
amount. Or in accounting terms: debit equals credit. The uncancelled benefits can be directly related to 
Fisher. However, the fact that EWM are based on an extended version of Fisher’s income-capital distinction 
raises the question whether the uncancelled costs are in line with Fisher’s original view. As explained 
before, in Fisher’s original writings, the only ultimate cost of production was the cost of labor and not the 
ecosystem services sacrificed. Fisher (1906, p.175) adds: “… if the term “labor” be not itself sufficiently 
broad, labor, anxiety, trouble, annoyance, and all the other subjective experiences of an undesirable nature 
which are necessary in order that the experiences of an agreeable nature may be secured.” Nonetheless, it 
should be noted that Tobin (2005, p. 211) clarifies Fisher’s concept of capital “… embraces all stocks of 
material objects that yield services that human beings like. Thus Fisher would include: land and other 
natural resources as well as reproducible goods; objects owned by households and governments as well as 
by businesses; houses and other consumer durable goods as well as producers’ durables; objects whose 
                                                     
11 Section 2.2 already introduced how Kuznets also would deduct the use of raw materials to arrive at a nation’s net 
product. Albeit limited in scope to only source services, the underlying rationale and procedure to calculate the cost 
account of EWM is comparable to what Kuznets proposed. 
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yields are always in kind, like houses occupied by their owners, as well as those yields are marketed for 
cash; the bodies of human beings – perhaps their minds too – as well as non-human objects.” The emphasis 
we added discloses Fisher would see the ecosystem as capital. As a consequence, the positive services 
flowing from the ecosystem’s functioning should be recorded from Fisher’s income-capital perspective.  
 
Today, it is impossible to know Fisher’s thoughts on which categories he would classify as costs of 
production. Fisher regrets in his memoir that his insistence of seeing income as actual consumption made 
him lose approval for his income concept and settled that consumption plus capital accumulation is a useful 
income definition (Tobin, 2005). Perhaps, now that biophysical limits to growth have been detected 
(Meadows et al., 1972) and planetary boundaries are being crossed (Steffen et al., 2015), Fisher might see 
ecosystem costs as ultimate uncancelled costs of the production process and may agree with the procedure 
of deducting lost natural capital services as a way to account for the accumulation or decumulation of 
natural capital in EWM. 
2.4  The Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare: a double theoretical foundation? 
Even though Daly and Cobb (1999) stated that their two departures from GDP should be kept separate, a 
comparison between the extended Hicksian income (EHI) in Eq. (1) and the ISEW in Eq. 2 learns that Daly 
and Cobb’s ISEW was at least partially inspired by the extended approximation of Hicksian income since the 
features they attribute to this version are mimicked in the ISEW. Firstly, the ISEW also subtracts defensive 
expenditures and adds non-defensive government expenditures. Secondly, the costs of environmental 
degradation and depreciation of natural capital are deductions within the ISEW, which corresponds to 
depletion of natural capital in Eq. (1). Thirdly, the ISEW captures net capital investment, just as EHI does. 
By deducting the depreciation of human-made capital from GNP in Eq. (1), the investments needed to 
overcome depreciation are not counted. However, if investments exceed capital depreciation, positive net 
investments contributing to the accumulation of the stock producer goods will be registered in EHI. As such, 
it accounts for ‘capital accumulation’. The ISEW traces changes in producer capital stocks by accounting for 
net capital growth. However, compared to EHI this item is calculated differently, “…as the increase in the 
stock of producer goods above the amount required to keep the quantity of producer goods per worker 
intact” (Lawn, 2003, p. 114). The above comparison illustrates that the ISEW shares characteristics with the 
extended version of Hicksian income. This, in turn, could explain why Talberth and Weisdorf (2017) regard 
sustainable economic welfare as tightly linked to Hicks’ (1939) maximum sustainable income and why 
Stockhammer et al. (1997) stated that “the ISEW follows Hicks … , but also goes further” (p. 22). The ISEW 
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goes further by accounting for the value of household labor, leisure, income inequality, commuting, etc. As 
explained in Section 2.3 these items and the psychic services from consumption are connected to Fisherian 
income. 
The analysis above demonstrates that EWM are no perfect replicas of either Fisherian nor Hicksian income 
as they incorporate more welfare items than one could expect based on each of these original income 
notions separately. EWM go beyond Hicksian maximum sustainable income and can be linked to an 
extended version of Fisher’s net psychic income. Nonetheless, we explained how certain items have been 
inspired by Fisherian or Hicksian income and can be seen from an experiential Fisherian view or from a 
Hicksian perspective. That is why we argue that Fisher’s income concept meets Hicks’ income notion in 
practice. This provides EWM with a double theoretical foundation, even though the Hicksian connection is 
often overlooked in recent work, as EWM are nowadays mostly entirely framed from a Fisherian 
perspective. 
3. A conceptual investigation of economic welfare measures   
The double theoretical foundation raises many questions. How can both income concepts be combined in 
EWM? Fisherian income is often regarded as being superior compared to Hicksian income, however, there 
are some difficulties with the Fisherian foundation. Should the ‘extended version of Fisherian income’, in 
which ecosystem services lost during the economic process (i.e. the uncancelled costs), be psychic and in 
line with Fisher’s income-capital distinction or not? Do defensive expenditures not yield positive 
experiences? Is accounting for capital changes such as net capital growth reconcilable with Fisherian 
income? These are issues that keep practitioners puzzling and divided, as already demonstrated by the 
different statements on what EWM are capturing in Table 1. We believe the double theoretical foundation 
is based on the existence of two different ways to interpret EWM with distinct time and boundary 
implications. As we will explain in Section 3.1, EWM can be seen as the benefits and costs experienced or as 
the benefits and costs of present economic activities. Both interpretations imply different time and 
boundary choices and would treat ecosystem costs, capital changes and defensive expenditures differently, 
as we will see in Section 3.2. Afterwards, we will discuss how recent 2.0 studies are converging toward the 
experiential interpretation as a way to comply with the ex post Fisherian foundation. However, based on 




3.1 Two distinct welfare interpretations  
In this section we will introduce two ways of interpreting EWM and link each approach to specific time and 
boundary dimensions. Welfare seen as benefits and costs experienced looks at what is experienced ‘here 
and now’. This implies a present and within border perspective. However, welfare understood as the 
benefits and costs of present activities has a contemporaneous and forward looking perspective, since 
present activities also bring costs and benefits in the future. Moreover, present activities cause costs to the 
rest of the world, so this approach takes a beyond boundary viewpoint. Fig. 5 illustrates each welfare 
interpretation’s time and boundary implications. 
Figure 5: Two types of economic welfare measures with their distinct time and boundary dimensions. 
 
Note: The vertical axis depicts the boundary perspective, whereas the horizontal axis reveals the time dimension. 
Benefits and costs experienced implies a within border perspective and takes a contemporaneous perspective on 
experiences: it registers what is experienced ‘here and now’. Whereas, the benefits and costs of present activities have 
a beyond boundary viewpoint and take a present- and forward-looking perspective by also incorporating the costs 
(and benefits) present activities cause to the ‘future and the rest of the world’. 
3.1.1 Benefits and costs experienced (BCE) 
The BCE-view is inspired by Fisher’s psychic income and reveals information about the welfare citizens 
experience at this moment. Lawn (2003), for instance, states that EWM are defined as ‘the welfare enjoyed 
at a particular point in time’, and that they “convey useful information about the current manifestations 
and immediate effects of present and past activities, [while] they reveal much less about the future impact 
of current activities” (p. 116). As Lawn (2008, p. 71) clarifies: “… future consumption possibilities locked up 
in current wealth are not part of a nation’s current welfare.” Therefore, it might be useful to have a 
supplemental index that incorporates the future costs and benefits of present economic activities (Lawn, 
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2003; Lawn & Clarke, 2008). Here, welfare has a contemporaneous perspective; it is thus not forward-
looking and it does not include future costs and benefits of present activities, since the focus is on present 
experiences (see Fig. 5). This means that costs and benefits should only be registered when they are 
experienced. Recording psychic flows is based on the idea that (a) EWM should only trace services from 
capital stocks and not mere additions to or subtractions from stocks, and (b) the (dis)investments that are 
affecting the stocks (e.g. investments in the stock of producer goods), will impact on future flows of services 
that will be registered in next periods. 
 
This experiential perspective takes an inward perspective when it comes to the boundary dimension (see 
Fig. 5). The BCE-view only looks at the effects felt within domestic borders, since the impacts of present 
activities that are shifted beyond borders are not experienced by a nation’s citizens. Bagstad et al. (2014), 
for instance, argue that a within border perspective would “… be more consistent with the aims of the GPI 
to capture the true costs and values of economic activity within a political or geographic boundary” (p. 481). 
These authors suggest to account for ecological, social and economic costs of imported hazardous and 
radioactive waste. By doing so EWM would reveal what is experienced within a certain region. 
 
3.1.2 Benefits and costs of present activities (BCPA) 
The BCPA-approach focuses on present economic activities and accounts for both the present and future 
benefits and costs of these activities. It follows a(n) (extended) Hicksian view, since the consumption of 
community capital (i.e. human-made or natural capital) is labelled as a cost (Kubiszewski et al., 2013) 
instead of registering social and ecological costs positively (as in GDP and NNP). This view does not 
discriminate against future costs and benefits of present activities that violate Fisher’s distinction between 
income and capital such as investments since future costs and capital changes should be seen as the costs 
and benefits of present economic activities. As a consequence, the BCPA-perspective has both a 
contemporaneous view on present activities and a forward-looking perspective (see Fig. 5). This forward-
looking perspective is not be confused with reflecting future consumption possibilities since EWM (both 
BCE and BCPA) do not try to capture future consumption.12 
                                                     
12 One exception can be found in Stockhammer et al. (1997), who tried to connect net capital growth to the increase 
in future consumption possibilities by multiplying net capital growth with the productivity of capital. As a result, future 
consumption (im)possibilities are allocated to the present period. 
24 
 
In a similar way that economic activities bring costs that are not necessarily experienced in the present, 
present activities also causes costs beyond domestic borders since the effects of certain items (e.g. resource 
depletion and climate disruption) do not discriminate against borders. In a global, entangled economy, 
nations are no closed economies. Countries trade not just goods and services, but also transboundary 
‘externalities’. For instance, the United Nations Handbook on National Accounting on Integrated 
Environmental and Economic Accounting (SEEA) (UN, 1993, p. 77) recognizes that: “Exports include not only 
cross-boundary product flows to foreign economies (as in SNA) but also flows representing the uses of, and 
the effects on, the natural environment of other countries by the domestic economy”.  
The BCPA-view looks beyond boundaries (see Fig. 5) and would account for the costs that present activities 
cause in other regions, just as the Ecological Footprint framework does (see e.g. Wackernagel & Rees, 1996). 
Clarke (2007), for instance explains: “As with GDP, the GPI is concerned only with a particular physical 
location. Yet, it may be more effective if the GPI was freed from these physical boundaries in a similar 
manner to GNI [Gross National Income]. The GPI should be concerned more with the ‘ownership’ of the 
costs and benefits associated with economic growth than with the ‘location’ of those costs and benefits. 
Those that derive the most benefit from exploitation of the environment are often physically removed from 
the location of that damage. The GPI does not consider the net consumers of the negative externalities of 
environmental costs, merely the producers. Currently, however, the structure of the GPI allows a nation to 
enjoy, without penalty, the benefits of importing goods from countries which bear a disproportionately 
large cost of environmental degradation. This results in an overstatement of the real progress experienced 
by the country importing ‘dirty goods’.” (p. 91, emphasis added). 
Several scholars (e.g. Lawn & Clarke, 2008; Posner & Costanza, 2011; Kubiszewski et al., 2013) have pointed 
out that EWM fail to properly tackle transboundary issues. Hong Kong’s upward welfare trend, for instance, 
can be partially explained by the relocation of heavily polluting industries to China (Delang & Yu, 2014), 
while Japan’s case illustrates that heavily depending on imports results in low costs of domestic resource 
depletion (Makino, 2008) even though Japan and other resource-poor countries deplete global stocks. From 
a within boundary perspective, the welfare of these countries is higher than if they would account for 
environmental costs shifted beyond boundaries. Therefore, the BCPA-perspective with its beyond boundary 




3.2 Welfare items seen from two interpretational perspectives: an application 
This conceptual exploration illustrates the need to reflect on where to draw EWM’s time and geographical 
boundaries. Clearly considering and stating which welfare interpretation and thus which time and boundary 
perspectives are chosen, is vital to know how EWM are operationalized. Both welfare interpretations and 
their time and boundary implications are not perfectly replicated in welfare studies since scholars often 
have to make pragmatic choices because of data availability, practitioners could (unknowingly) try to 
combine experiential welfare elements and cost-benefit aspects of present activities in a single welfare 
study. Using a marginal social cost of carbon to estimate the cost of climate disruption, for instance, is not 
compatible with an experiential, ‘here and now’ view since this cost estimate embodies future and global 
costs. In order to illustrate both interpretations, we will explain how the items net capital growth, climate 
disruption, resource depletion and defensive expenditures would be dealt with differently from a BCE- and 
BCPA-perspective. Table 2 gives an overview.  
• Net capital growth aligns with the BCPA-interpretation: a negative (positive) net capital adjustment 
is a(n) decrease (increase) of a nation’s productive capacity and to be seen as a cost (benefit) of 
present economic activities. Lawn (2003) argued that an increase in a nation’s productive capacity 
(i.e. investments in human-made capital above the minimum requirement to keep the stock of 
producer goods per worker intact) is a benefit. This is a benefit of present activities and does, 
however, not constitute a present experience since this increased productive capacity will lead to 
future consumption experiences registered in the future, as pointed out by Bleys (2008). Yet this 
adjustment does not matches the BCE-view. To be in line with the ex post established Fisherian 
income-capital distinction, one should report psychic income flows but not changes in capital 
stocks. Therefore, it is no surprise Bleys (2008) pointed out that capital change items like net capital 
growth (and change in net international position) are inconsistent with Fisher’s income-capital 
distinction. That is why, these items should not be included in BCE-studies.  
• The costs of climate disruption, previously referred to as long-term environmental damage, can be 
calculated in two ways. The BCPA-perspective would account for the costs that present activities 
cause today and in the future, both domestically and in the rest of the world. These damages are 
linked to the current emissions of greenhouse gasses (GHG), either domestically emitted, or, 
preferably, also taking into account the net GHG imports or exports related to international trade. 
The BCE-interpretation, on the other hand, would incorporate only the costs that are already 
experienced at this moment and within domestic borders. These costs are typically linked to the 
impacts of climate disruption that are currently felt (e.g. extreme weather events, droughts, …).  
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• The rationale for including non-renewable resource depletion is evident from a BCPA-view since it 
is a cost of present activities as the natural capital stock is being depleted by these activities. This 
depletion can be seen from two viewpoints, depending whether the country involved has resource 
endowments or not. Resource-rich countries deplete their national energy stocks via present 
extraction activities, whereas resource-poor countries’ present activities are depleting global 
energy stocks via the domestic combustion of imported fossil fuels. Yet, in both cases, resource 
depletion is a cost of present activities and should be accounted for. However, the inclusion of 
resource depletion is less evident from a BCE-perspective: what is currently experienced from the 
ongoing depletion of non-renewable energy (and by extension of arable land, water, etc.)? Will 
resource depletion not result later on in reduced consumption and lower experiences?  
• Deducting defensive expenditures classifies them as a cost of present economic activities instead of 
counting them positively in GDP or NNP. Leipert (1989) explains that defensive expenditures are 
additional macroeconomic costs and should be registered as such in the GNP. Nonetheless, 
defensive expenditures “… are certainly not superfluous in the short term. They are under the given 
socio-economic and ecological conditions, both necessary and useful” (Leipert, 1986, p. 116). This 
would imply that defensive expenditures on for instance personal pollution control, air filters, locks 
could be part of an EWM from a BCE-perspective. Yet, from a BCPA-view, defensive expenditures 
should be deducted in EWM as they should be regarded as costs of current activities. 
  
Table 2: Welfare items seen from two interpretational perspectives. 
 Welfare items 
  
Benefits and costs experienced (BCE) 
  
Benefits and costs of present 
activities (BCPA) 
Net capital growth Omit Include 
Climate disruption  
Damages currently experienced within 
borders 
Damages caused to the future 
and rest of the world 
Resource depletion  
What is currently experienced within 
borders? 
Depletion is a cost of present 





Subtract defensive expenditures 
of present activities, since they 




3.3 Puzzling time and boundary issues: ‘experientisation’ or ‘Fisherisation’ is not the 
only way forward 
The contribution of our paper is to point to the existence of two distinct ways of interpreting EWM: as the 
benefits and costs experienced or as the benefits and costs of present economic activities. Yet, since EWM 
were ex post connected to an extended version of Fisherian income by Lawn’s (2003, 2008) seminal work, 
most scholars are trying to make EWM compatible with the ex post theoretical foundation by stressing 
item’s experiential nature or making items more experiential, which aligns with the BCE-perspective. This 
turn to Fisher’s income and capital concepts or ‘Fisherisation’ (as explained in Section 2.3) is leading to quite 
some confusion on what EWM are actually measuring and to the use of a wide variety of (sometimes 
inconsistent) valuation methods in the literature as most scholars are not explicit about the time and 
boundary perspective they take. In this section, we will critically assess the Fisherisation in the EWM 
literature by focusing on discussions within the GPI 2.0 process on the following items: net capital growth, 
climate disruption and resource depletion and for the method of subtracting ecosystem costs. Yet, this 
Fisherisation or ‘experientisation’ may not be the only way forward. In line with our BCPA-view this is not 
the only way to deal with these items’ time and boundary issues since the BCPA-interpretation deals with 
them differently as argued in Sections 3.1. and 3.2. 
The ‘Fisherisation’ is probably most clear in Talberth and Weisdorf (2017), who try to frame welfare losses 
caused by present activities in an experiential perspective. The authors account for the ‘benefits and costs 
experienced’ including the welfare losses caused to the future and the rest of the world (emphasis added). 
They register the disutilities associated with externalities caused to future generations and the rest of the 
world since “most people also care about adverse effects local economic activity may have on other 
communities” and as “people also care about conditions and trends facing their children and future 
generations” (p. 4).13 Their focus on experiential costs and benefits indicates they are inspired by Fisher’s 
psychic income. Nevertheless, without denying that present generations care for the future and for the rest 
of the world, it can be questioned to what extent welfare losses caused to future eras and other regions 
are “experienced” today? Kapp (1950, 1978), for instance, regards externalities as cost-shifting of economic 
activities, so that one could wonder whether shifting these losses is not simply a way to inflate the own 
presently enjoyed welfare flow at the expense of others? Passing on costs may increase currently 
                                                     






𝑖=1 (𝐶𝑖) + 𝑈𝑖(?̂?(𝐾)) − 𝑑𝑈𝑖((𝑈𝐶𝑇) + (− △ 𝑊𝑅𝑂𝑊) + (−𝜙 △ 𝑊𝑡+1))]. 
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experienced welfare, yet, from a holistic perspective, the costs are not eliminated, nor reduced. These costs 
will eventually be paid by someone in society or by the ecosystem. That is why, it would be good accounting 
to not only register future costs, but also the costs caused abroad in the BCPA-view. Furthermore, evidence 
from the pro-environmental behavior literature indicates that there is a gap between the environmental 
knowledge, attitudes, values and awareness people have and actually behaving pro-environmentally (see 
e.g. Vermeir & Verbeke, 2006). To put it differently, people may care for the environment but 
simultaneously behave or act in environmentally harmful ways. As such, caring for the future generations 
or the rest of the world is not enough since actual behavior brings inescapable socio-environmental costs. 
This makes Talberth and Weisdorf’s reasoning potentially flawed, especially from a BCPA-view. The 
rationale for including resource depletion further exemplifies this point. As explained in Section 3.2 
resource depletion is a clear cost of present activities that should be included in BCPA-studies, however, 
including this item is less evident from a BCE-view. Talberth and Weisdorf are aware of this issue and 
associate the depletion cost with the disutility from passing costs to future generations or from being an 
undesirable trend or condition. The authors try to relate resource depletion to current experiential welfare 
by stating some people care for this disutility and have willingness to pay to prevent this loss (e.g. the 
premium for goods sustainably produced). Nevertheless, these scholars also wonder if the depletion 
adjustment should still be included in future studies if it is not better linked to a current [experiential] 
welfare loss. Pushing this argument further, resource depletion will later on result into reduced 
consumption and thus lower experiential welfare levels in future periods.  
Other scholars also have tried to align the items included in welfare studies with Fisher’s income-capital 
distinction. Net capital growth and change in net international position were gradually removed in more 
recent studies (e.g. Bleys, 2008; Talberth and Weisdorf, 2017; O’Mahony et al., 2018; Held et al., 2018) to 
strengthen EWM experiential base as they are inconsistent with Fisher’s income-capital distinction (Bleys, 
2008). It is interesting to note that Lawn (2013) also abandoned his initial position of including productivity 
increases and proposes to capture stocks of human-generated capital in satellite accounts. At the same 
time, other EWM scholars continue to include one or both of these items which is consistent with the BCPA-
view.  
Calculating the costs of climate disruption is to some extent also prone to experientisation. Most authors 
(e.g. Jackson, Marks, Ralls, & Stymne, 1997; Talberth et al., 2007; Bleys, 2008; Talberth & Weisdorf, 2017; 
Held et al., 2018; O’Mahony et al., 2018) calculate this item using a marginal social cost of carbon (MSC). 
This is related to a BCPA-view since the MSC entails future costs (i.e. global future damage costs caused are 
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discounted to the present). The MSC is multiplied by the current or cumulative emissions related to the 
domestic combustion of fossil fuels. Yet, Bagstad et al. (2014) suggest to replace this valuation method by 
other items like the costs of natural disasters, water scarcity, extreme weather events, or other region-
specific impacts. This replacement is to be seen from a BCE-view since it focuses on items threatening 
welfare experienced locally and right now, and not climate related costs caused in time or beyond borders. 
Next, we believe that the climate disruption item could be improved in future BCPA-studies by accounting 
for the emissions embodied in trade, in a footprint-like manner. The European Union, for instance, has net 
embodied imports for carbon (Tukker et al., 2016), while two thirds of the carbon footprint of Flemish 
consumption is located outside Flanders (Vercalsteren et al., 2017).  
Most scholars subtract the costs of lost ecosystem services in EWM. The studies in which the flows from 
the ecosystem are positively counted for – in line with Fisher’s view – are rare. Recently, however, scholars 
tend to move in the direction of Fisher by experimenting with positively valuing ecosystem services: 
O’Mahony et al. (2018) value protected Spanish wetlands in a positive manner, Talberth and Weisdorf 
(2017) value the services offered by natural capital positively by the management cost made to conserve 
and improve protected terrestrial and aquatic areas, whereas Berik and Gaddis (2011) list the ecosystem 
services from forests, wetlands, croplands and desert grassland and scrubland in the state of Utah 
positively. 
3.4 Discussion: toward a 2.0 methodology 
So far, we put forward a dual welfare interpretation that reveal different perspectives – the experiential 
interpretation gives information about how well off a region is at the present by looking at what is 
experienced here and now, while the benefits and costs of present activities interpretation yields 
information about present economic activities including their future consequences and the costs shifted in 
time and space. Yet, in future studies, we would suggest to use the benefit and costs of present activities 
for their policy-guiding potential. If policy-makers would only look at current experiences, then this could 
mistakenly lead to the conclusion that one can happily enjoy experiences in the present while depleting 
physical capital and plundering the planet. Our preferred welfare interpretation would be more in line with 
an ecological economics viewpoint of not restricting the ecological scope to the here and now. This is 
needed to signal the importance of taking actions in the present to address ecological and climate 
breakdown and of devising policies such as a carbon border adjustment mechanism to reduce the impact 
domestic consumption has abroad. Furthermore, it would also treat physical capital consumption as 
detrimental to welfare.  
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A comparison of both indicators would thus give an indication of the extent of ecological cost shifting in 
time and space and of physical capital consumption. Nonetheless, looking at the aggregate level of the 
BCPA-interpretation alone may not be enough to prevent these adverse trends, as ecosystem destruction 
and physical capital consumption could be overcompensated by welfare gains recorded elsewhere in the 
index, for instance by growth in personal consumption expenditures. In this aggregation procedure, crucial 
welfare information may be lost. Therefore, we suggest to not only look at the aggregate level, but to adopt 
a dashboard-like approach by also looking independently at the various big welfare categories to verify the 
trends of consumption, the welfare losses from income inequality, capital adjustments, ecological costs, 
etc. As such, a dashboard-like approach of the BCPA-interpretation would be best suited to debunk GDP as 
a policy guide and stimulate prioritizing well-being economies that are faring well without growth, socially 
just and ecologically healthy. 
4. Conclusion 
Economic welfare measures (EWM) have been around for over thirty years. Even though voices were raised 
for a more robust, standardized set of the items included (Lawn, 2003) and for some convention in the 
valuation of environmental items (Forgie, 2007), EWM’s lack of standardization is hindering their policy-
making impact (Bleys & Whitby, 2015). We found that this lack of consistency is related to scholar’s different 
understanding and operationalization of what welfare is. Nevertheless, there is consensus among 
practitioners that EWM provide better welfare information than GDP by distinguishing between the costs 
and benefits, by extending the analysis beyond market activities and by also looking at the social and 
ecological spheres in which the economy is embedded. By doing so, proponents argue that EWM are able 
to debunk (Daly & Cobb, 2007) or dethrone (Stockhammer et al., 1997) GDP as an economic policy indicator. 
For instance, Ziegler (2007) considers EWM to play a crucial role in undermining the belief large systems of 
governance have in certain statistics such as GDP that serve as a tool to establish legitimacy and 
accountability. 
In this paper we have revisited EWM’s theoretical foundations to foster standardization. The critique that 
EWM are lacking a solid theoretical foundation is related to the fact that Hicksian income meets Fisher’s 
income concept, which gives EWM a double theoretical foundation. Welfare’s experiential nature is derived 
from Fisher, whereas treating the consumption of community capital as a cost is Hicksian. The novelty of 
our paper is that we disentangle both income notions and identify two distinct ways to interpret EWM. One 
interpretation sees welfare as the costs and benefits experienced and does not include capital changes nor 
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future costs, whereas these elements could be registered when EWM are thought of as the benefits and 
costs of present economic activities. Designing EWM also implies choices on boundary issues, for instance 
looking within or beyond boundaries regarding the impacts of ecosystem costs. We articulated that a within 
border view aligns with an experiential welfare standpoint, whereas a beyond boundary perspective 
matches welfare seen as the costs and benefits of present activities. That is why, our distinction between 
both interpretations helps to structure the theoretical and conceptual debate and helps to understand the 
diversity of choices regarding time and boundary issues. Nonetheless, more research is needed to analyze 
the compatibility between welfare items and each of these welfare interpretations, and to verify which 
valuation methods need further refinement. 
It is ill-acknowledged that EWM have a double theoretical foundation and two different welfare 
interpretations with distinct time and boundary implications. Most practitioners aim for compatibility with 
the ex post established Fisherian income theoretical framework and thus with the experiential 
interpretation (e.g. by omitting capital changes). Yet, following our interpretational understanding, 
compliance with current experiential welfare is not the only way forward since EWM can also be understood 
as the costs and benefits of present economic activities. Therefore, it can be seen as artificial when future 
costs and impacts abroad are explained from an experiential view as in Talberth and Weisdorf (2017). If 
EWM are a tool for accountability and for disclosing ‘invisible’ costs caused abroad and in future eras, then 
there is no logical reason to overlook these costs from a cost-benefit perspective of present activities. 
Including these costs would be good accounting and would follow Kapp’s (1950, 1978) view by framing 
externalities as cost-shifting. 
The diverse welfare interpretations each visualize alternative economic viewpoints. Depending on the 
purpose of EWM alternative perspectives can be identified. If the goal is to reveal the welfare level domestic 
citizens are enjoying today, then current experiential welfare can be estimated without taking into account 
the costs inflicted upon other communities and future generations. This contemporaneous perspective 
reduces the ‘forward-looking’ policy-guiding potential of EWM. However, if the purpose is to account for 
the benefits and costs of present activities and disclose the costs shifted, then good accounting requires an 
analysis that does not discriminate against jurisdictional boundaries, nor against the future. Here, the BCPA-
perspective could broaden the scope of ex ante policy evaluations. This perspective is a better guide to 
policy-making as it includes the costs shifted in time and space and accounts for the consumption or 
accumulation of assets. Therefore, the BCPA-interpretation is preferable over the experiential 
interpretation in future compilations.  
32 
 
In theory, it is clear to define these dimensions and interpretations. However, in practice we see that 
scholars make inconsistent and pragmatic choices depending on the data and estimates available. In order 
to improve future studies, it is crucial for scholars to properly reflect on the interpretation taken and to 
clearly mention which perspectives they take on time and boundary dimensions and where deviations 
occur. Additionally, these statements would (a) make clear which valuation methods should be used, (b) 
make welfare studies more consistent and comparable, (c) foster the standardization process, (d) legitimize 
the use and (e) improve the policy-guiding relevance of EWM. Furthermore, we believe that future studies 
should adopt a disaggregated dashboard-like approach to monitor welfare categories independently in 
order to avoid that certain adverse welfare trends are compensated by other welfare gains. Finally, these 
evolutions could provide economists, media and decision-makers with better welfare information than 
GDP. As such, standardizing the measurement and reporting of EWM may help to go beyond GDP and 
promote faring well within planetary limits in a beyond GDP and post-growth transition.  
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Chapter 2 : Cost-shifting versus “full” accountability: Dealing with 
cross-time and cross-boundary issues in the ISEW and GPI for 
Belgium.14 
1. Introduction 
Among economists it is widely acknowledged that GDP is a poor indicator to measure social welfare or 
social progress (Kuznets, 1934, Max-Neef, 1995; Jackson, 2004; Fleurbaey, 2009; van den Bergh, 2009; 
Stiglitz et al., 2009, 2018; Costanza et al., 2014; Raworth, 2017; Hoekstra, 2019). Yet paradoxically, GDP is, 
to date, very influential in economics, public policy, politics and society (van den Bergh, 2009), making it 
the ‘most powerful number’ in the world (Fioramonti, 2013). Parallel to the theoretical and empirical 
criticisms of GDP as a welfare indicator, voices have been raised to adopt alternative measures to evaluate 
economic performance. Many alternative “Beyond GDP” indicators have been developed over the past 
decades that aim to measure welfare, well-being, wealth and social progress differently – see, for instance, 
the approaches mentioned in Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), Dasgupta (2009), van den Bergh (2009), 
Fleurbaey (2009), Bleys (2012), O’Neill (2012), O’Neill et al. (2018) and Hoekstra (2019). 
There is a long tradition of calculating alternative measures of economic welfare. In 1972, Nordhaus and 
Tobin (1972) constructed a Measure of Economic Welfare, while Daly and Cobb (1989) elaborated on this 
effort to develop the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) – a monetary welfare indicator that 
accounts for the benefits and costs of economic activity. By doing so, it accounts for many of GDP’s welfare 
deficiencies. The ISEW does so by making visible elements that remain hidden from a narrow GDP lens such 
as unpaid work, inequality and ecological destruction. Over the last thirty years, welfare indicators such as 
the ISEW and the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) have been calculated for many countries and regions all 
over the world. Yet, to date they have had little impact on policy-making because of their lack of 
standardization (Bleys and Whitby, 2015). Currently, Economic Welfare Measures such as the ISEW and GPI 
are being updated and improved to a “2.0 methodology” (Bagstad et al., 2014; Talberth and Weisdorf, 
2017).  
One of the important issues that remains unresolved is the way(s) to account for cross-time and cross-
boundary issues such as ecological costs and physical capital changes (Van der Slycken and Bleys, 2020a). 
                                                     
14 This paper is co-authored with Brent Bleys (Ghent University). 
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The climate change item, for instance, is treated differently in different studies: some scholars suggest to 
look at the present impacts of climate change within domestic borders, whereas others include future costs 
and costs abroad. Mostly, EWM do not register cross-boundary issues (well). Yet, scholars have argued to 
account for the environmental costs that are outsourced to other regions. Furthermore, different views 
exist on how to account for investments and capital changes: some only register current consumption 
services flowing from capital stocks, while others also include investments or changes in capital stocks 
which will contribute to future consumption flows. In order to overcome the existing conceptual unclarity 
and methodological shortcomings, the ISEW/GPI community needs to scrutinize how to account for cross-
time and cross-boundary issues in EWM.15  
The novelty of this paper is that it calculates two types of EWM for Belgium based on different views of 
dealing with ecological costs and investments, both with different time and geographical boundaries as 
introduced in a previous paper (Van der Slycken and Bleys, 2020a). Experiential welfare or the benefits and 
costs experienced only look at the present ecological costs that fall within domestic borders and exclude 
physical capital changes, while the benefits and costs of present economic activities (BCPA) include capital 
changes and also account for the ecological costs shifted in time and beyond borders. The BCPA are argued 
to provide policy-makers, politicians, economists, media and the broader public with more detailed welfare 
information as substantial ecological costs are shifted in time and space. Furthermore, other 
methodological novelties are introduced in this article as it is the first welfare study that includes: (1) the 
value added by the shadow economy, (2) an inequality adjustment for the diminishing marginal utility of 
income that is based on a sufficiency threshold, (3) a consumption footprint view for the emissions 
embodied in trade, and (4) the climate impacts of aviation and shipping. This study primarily develops and 
sets forth a “2.0 methodology” that deals with the cross-time and cross-boundary issues in EWM in an 
application to Belgium as a first step to calculate economic welfare in a standardized way for the EU-15 
countries in future research. 
Section 2 defines indicators of economic welfare and introduces with the benefits and costs experienced 
and the benefits and costs of present economic activities two different welfare interpretations with distinct 
time and boundary dimensions. Section 3 translates these welfare interpretations in two corresponding 
welfare measures, elaborates on the methodology used to calculate these measures and explains other 
methodological novelties and improvements. Section 4 discusses Belgium’s overall per capita welfare 
                                                     
15 In this paper we refer to ‘economic welfare measures’ and ‘indicators of economic welfare’ as the overall, general 
category of welfare indicators that includes the ISEW, GPI and variants such as the German National Welfare Index.  
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improvements by 15% and 18% between 1995 and 2018 and its driving trends: growing individual 
consumption expenditures and increasing welfare losses from income inequality. Since caution is warranted 
when interpreting the aggregate welfare trend, Section 5 discusses the need to adopt a disaggregated 
approach. Section 6 illustrates in a sensitivity analysis that our results are robust to different methods and 
parameter estimates. The paper concludes by discussing that future EWM should account for cost-shifting 
in time and space in order to guarantee that policy-makers are also informed about the fact that physical 
capital is being consumed or that economic activity is fueling ecological breakdown. 
2. What are alternative indicators of economic welfare measuring? 
2.1 Defining economic welfare 
While there exist many approaches to measure economic welfare, we refer to economic welfare in this 
paper as what is measured by the ISEW and GPI. Scholars have defined and interpreted welfare – as implied 
by the ISEW and GPI – differently (Van der Slycken and Bleys, 2020a). Some believe EWM capture 
sustainable economic welfare or genuine progress, while others argue they allow us to track experiential 
welfare. We define EWM as macroeconomic monetary welfare measures that account for the benefits and 
costs of economic activity. They do so by valuing the contributions from unpaid work, the market, state and 
shadow economy as they are all different means to satisfy people’s needs and wants. Furthermore, the 
social and ecological costs caused by the economic process are also included, since these indicators see the 
economy as embedded in society and in the Earth System. As a consequence, EWM are potentially capable 
of guiding economies and societies on a just transition toward living well within limits by providing an 
alternative to move beyond GDP. 
2.2 Dealing with cross-time and cross boundary issues 
Designing EWM involves making choices on where to draw the system’s boundaries, choices that are ideally 
made by relying on a theoretical or conceptual framework. It is important to scrutinize the choices made 
on time and boundary issues in EWM, because a recent theoretical and conceptual review found that the 
EWM community holds different views on how to deal with cross-time and cross-boundary issues such as 
ecological costs and capital changes (Van der Slycken and Bleys, 2020a). Without going into detail on the 
theoretical foundation(s), we will summarize this review’s key findings here and propose a boundary 




The different views the EWM community holds on dealing with cross-time and cross-boundary issues is 
related to the fact that EWM have a double theoretical foundation. Van der Slycken and Bleys (2020a) 
articulated how Daly and Cobb were jointly inspired by both Hicksian and Fisherian income when creating 
the first ISEW. Broadly speaking, Fisher emphasizes the experiential nature of income while for Hicks capital 
consumption does not count as income. This theoretical duality helps to explain the different views scholars 
have regarding accounting for ecological costs and capital changes and their time and boundary dimensions. 
Although Daly and Cobb did not explicitly link their ISEW to either Fisher or Hicks, the ISEW was ex post 
connected to Fisherian income by Lawn (2003). In his seminal paper, Lawn argued that the ISEW is solidly 
based on Irving Fisher’s concepts of income and capital. According to Fisher’s psychic or experiential income 
concept, only the current experiential consumption services that are flowing from capital stocks count as 
income. Based on this Fisherian concept, one can see EWM as a specific type of a cost-benefit analysis, 
namely as the benefits and costs experienced (BCE). After the establishment of this ex post theoretical 
Fisherian foundation, the methodology of EWM was revised – i.e. some ‘Fisherisation’ or ‘experientisation’. 
First, physical capital changes were removed from EWM as accounting for capital changes is not compatible 
with Fisherian income. Experiential EWM should only capture current services flowing from capital stocks 
and thus exclude current additions to capital stocks that will lead to services experienced in future periods. 
Second, ecological items’ boundaries were shifted: scholars aimed for maximum compatibility with Fisher’s 
experiential concept by only including the ecological costs that are currently experienced and felt within 
domestic borders. Nonetheless, not all authors follow these steps as some still include capital changes and 
include ecological costs caused beyond borders and in the future. 
  
The ‘Fisherisation’ of only looking at what is experienced in the present and within domestic borders is not 
the only way forward, as we argued in our previous paper, since EWM can also be interpreted as the 
benefits and costs of present activities (BCPA). Following this interpretation, EWM can look at the impacts 
of present activities by adopting a forward-looking view that also looks beyond borders. This broad 
interpretation includes capital changes as these are future benefits (or costs if negative) originating from 
present activities. Including capital changes violates Fisher’s distinction between income and capital, yet it 
aligns with Hicksian income, which can be approximated as the sum of consumption and capital 
accumulation, i.e. C + ΔK (Hicks, 1939). By deducting the depreciation of manufactured capital from the 
gross national product, one obtains the net national product (NNP) that is often seen as a basic version of 
Hicksian income. Next to this basic version of Hicksian income, there also exists an extended version of 
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Hicksian income, i.e. green NNP, that also deducts the depletion of natural capital. This extended Hicksian 
income helps to explain why ecological costs are deducted in EWM. Since the ecological costs of economic 
activity are not necessarily experienced, the broader welfare interpretation should account for the 
ecological costs shifted in time and space – here we build on Kapp’s (1950) work of seeing externalities as 
“cost-shifting” to the poor, future generations and the ecosystem. Fig. 5 gives an overview of the benefits 
and costs experienced and the benefits and costs of present activities and their different time and boundary 
implications. 
3. A “2.0 methodology” 
These two types of EWM differ for the categories ecological costs and capital adjustments. The benefits and 
costs experienced only include current ecological costs that are experienced within borders and excludes 
capital adjustments. While the benefits and costs of present activities include capital changes and also the 
ecological costs shifted in time and space. As a consequence, BCE can be seen as a narrow EWM, while 
BCPA is a broad EWM. Yet, as the general representation of both EWM in the following equations illustrate, 
they have most of the welfare categories in common: 
BCE = UW + Ci + S + Gc – DIREp – INQ – NEC         (3) 
BCPA = UW + Ci + S + Gc – DIREp – INQ – BEC + ΔK                               (4) 
In Eqs. 3 and 4: UW = unpaid work, Ci = individual consumption, S = shadow economy, Gc = non-defensive 
collective government consumption, DIREp = defensive, intermediate and rehabilitative private 
expenditures, INQ = welfare losses from income inequality, NEC = narrow ecological costs that are 
experienced in the present and within domestic borders, BEC = broad ecological costs, including current 
costs within domestic and the costs shifted in time and space, ΔK = capital adjustment. UW, Ci, S, Gc are 
valued positively; INQ, DIREp, NEC and BEC are deducted, whereas ΔK can be either positive or negative. 
Table 3 gives an overview of the used calculations methods and rationale for every item for both welfare 
indicators. 
In this methodological section, we will comment on the methods employed and methodological 
improvements for unpaid work (Section 3.1), actual individual consumption (Section 3.2), the shadow 
economy (Section 3.3), the inequality adjustment (Section 3.4), climate breakdown (Section 3.5), the 
depletion of non-renewable energy resources (Section 3.6) and net capital growth (Section 3.7). We will not 
go into detail on every item’s valuation method explained in Table 3. A detailed explanation for all items 
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(including data sources) can be found in Appendix A. In Section 6 we will perform a sensitivity analysis for 
the main methodological changes that we propose. 
Table 3: Methodological overview and additional information on two welfare interpretations. 
 Items (category) Method of calculation and additional information 
A Unpaid work (UW) Total hours of unpaid work x market wages 
  Unpaid work covers routine housework, shopping, care for household members, 
care for non-household members, volunteering, travel related to household 
activities and other unpaid work and is valued using the replacement cost 
method to find a market substitute. 
B Actual individual 
consumption (+) (Ci) 
B is the sum of the individual consumption expenditures by households and the 
individual consumption expenditures made by Non-Profit Institutions Serving 






C involves subtracting the following from B: 25% of food and alcohol 
expenditures, 100% of tobacco and narcotics expenditures, 100% of insurance 
and financial services expenditures and the cost of road accidents. The latter is 
calculated by using direct and indirect costs estimates for fatalities and injuries 
in road accidents. 
Defensive expenditures such as insurance expenditures are deducted because 
they merely serve to defend oneself from the unwanted effects of other 
economic activities. Intermediate expenditures such as financial services are 
deducted too, because they are not ultimate consumption. Financial services are 
at best an intermediate means to final consumption but are by themselves not 
the ultimate end of economic activity. Rehabilitative expenses after a car 
accident, for instance, are undertaken to restore to previous, more healthy 
conditions and are deducted because they are to be seen as costs, not benefits. 
D Cost of consumer 
durables (-) (Ci) 




E Services of consumer 
durables (+) (Ci) 
∑ previous 8 years' consumer durables expenditures x 0,2 
  The services are equal to the depreciation and an imputed interest value of the 
stock of consumer durables. 
F Shadow economy (+) 
(S) 
F approximates the value of the shadow economy. Only 50% is included as 
welfare-enhancing, to exclude illegal activities and avoid double counting with 
actual individual consumption and unpaid work. 
G Net consumption  Actual individual consumption – defensive, intermediate and rehabilitative 
private expenditures – cost of consumer durables + services of consumer 
durables + shadow economy (B-C-D+E+F) 
H Welfare losses from 
income inequality (-) 
(INQ) 
Inequality adjustment index x net consumption 
  H uses an inequality adjustment index that is based on the diminishing marginal 
utility of income and normalizes the correction at a sufficiency threshold. 
I Non-defensive 
government 
expenditures (+) (Gc) 
100% of government expenditures on general public services, housing and 
community amenities and recreation, culture and religion are included. 
J Cost of air pollution (-) 
(NEC & BEC) 
J is calculated by multiplying annual emissions with cost estimates. 
  J compiled from a within border (i.e. production) view captures the costs related 
to the following pollutants PM 2,5, NOx, NH3, SO2 and NMVOC. It is assumed 
the direct disamenity cost of air pollution in the narrow ecological costs is equal 
to 20% of this within border cost. In the broader perspective on air pollution, the 
costs of air pollution embodied in trade from the pollutants PM 2,5 fossil, PM 2,5 




K Ecosystem costs of 
nitrogen pollution (-) 
(NEC & BEC) 
K is calculated by linking cost estimates to annual emissions of NO2 and NH3 
and with the use of inorganic fertilizer. 
  The cost estimates for NO2 and NH3 only cover ecosystem costs in order to avoid 
double counting of health costs, which are already registered in the costs of air 
pollution. The ecosystem cost for reactive nitrogen measures the run-off from 
agricultural sources to rivers and seas. This item is included in both NEC and BEC, 
as it reflects current ecosystem costs within domestic borders. 
L Cost of climate 
breakdown (-) (BEC) 
L captures the damages related to climate breakdown and is calculated by 
multiplying a time-varying marginal social cost by the amount of greenhouse 
gas emissions. The emissions included are domestic emissions, CO2-emissons 
embodied in trade, emissions from international navigation and aviation, 
domestic LULUCF-emissions, the emissions related to global land use changes, 
and biomass emissions. 
  L is forward looking and looking beyond borders. It is only included in the broad 
ecological costs.   
M Cost of extreme 
weather events (-) 
(NEC) 
M is equal to the total amount of uninsured losses as insurance (subtracted as 
defensive expenditures) helps to 'reduce' the costs from extreme weather 
events. 
M covers uninsured losses to approximate the damages suffered in the present 
from extreme weather events for the narrow ecological costs. 
N Depletion of non-
renewable energy 
resources  (-) (BEC) 
N is calculated by multiplying the primary energy consumption by a transition 
cost that is needed to replace non-renewable resources and achieve an energy 
efficiency target of 33% by 2030.  
  N is only included in the broad ecological costs. Using non-renewable energy 
resources means that resource stocks are being depleted. This item tries to proxy 
this depletion by using transition costs to replace non-renewable energy 
resources with a renewable substitute. 
O Costs of use of nuclear 
power (-) (BEC) 
O is calculated by multiplying the amount of nuclear electricity generated by a 
cost estimate from the German welfare study. 
O is forward looking and only fits in the broad ecological costs. 
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P  Net capital growth  (+) 
(ΔK) 
P is calculated by taking the difference between this year's and previous year's 
net capital stock. 
P only fits in BCPA as net capital growth is seen as a benefit (or cost if negative) 
of present economic activities. 
 
3.1 Unpaid work 
Economists have long expressed their dissatisfaction with the exclusion of unpaid household work from the 
System of National Accounts (see, for instance, Waring, 1999, 2003). To date, unpaid household services 
remain invisible, even though the production boundary of GDP has expanded over time to also include 
financial services and the informal sector (DeRock, 2019). In contrast to GDP, unpaid household work is 
included in EWM since the first attempts to measure economic welfare by Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) and 
Daly and Cobb (1989). EWM typically account for unpaid work as activities like cooking, cleaning or giving 
childcare as they are also benefits of economic activity. These activities often remain outside formal 
markets, although they can be commodified as market activities. 
Similar to GDP, private consumption expenditures take a central place in EWM. Most EWM take final 
consumption expenditures as a starting point after Daly and Cobb’s (1989) initial compilation. Yet, Ziegler 
(2007) argues that Daly and Cobb proposing an index centered around personal consumption in the 
appendix of a book in which they describe humans as persons-in-community is paradoxical as increasing 
consumption and commodification in market societies not only tends to erode social relationships, but also 
reduces them to merely monetary exchanges (Polanyi, 1957). Therefore, we propose to go beyond GDP by 
also going beyond consumption as a baseline for EWM. The consumption paradox is addressed in this paper 
by taking unpaid work as baseline to reveal its pivotal role in a society’s welfare. Jochimsen and Knobloch 
(1997) argue that the “maintenance economy”, consisting out of the productive and creative (reproductive) 
activities like ecological processes and the maintenance of physical and social relationships (i.e. “caring 
activities”), is a key foundation of the current industrial economic system. Proposing an indicator based on 
unpaid (care) work would be more consistent with seeing humans as “persons-in-community”, as caring 
activities are about maintaining physical and social relationships.16  
We are interested in the output services of unpaid work, yet, because of data availability issues time-use 
inputs are used to calculate this item. The time-use of unpaid work that is included in this study is broader 
                                                     
16 Furthermore, unpaid work plays a significant role in a person’s well-being (Nierling, 2012). 
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than merely household work as it covers routine housework, shopping, care for household members, care 
for non-household members, volunteering, travel related to household activities and other unpaid work. 
Most studies value unpaid work at a replacement cost, i.e. the hourly wage to find a market substitute. 
However, Brown and Lazarus (2018) use the opportunity cost method, in which unpaid work is valued at 
average wages. In the replacement cost method, unpaid work is treated as another tradeable commodity, 
while the opportunity cost method rather values unpaid care work as a valuable, average economic activity 
as such. We will use the replacement cost method but will perform a sensitivity analysis on the results in 
Section 6 for the opportunity cost method. Our final replacement cost estimates can be thought of as 
conservative because low market wages are used, which devalues the importance of unpaid work. 
Moreover, it assumes the availability of a market substitute, which is not necessarily the case. Feminist 
economists have critiqued this low replacement cost method as anti-female and anti-care work (Berik, 
2018).17 Fig. 6 illustrates that the opportunity cost method values unpaid work almost twice as high as the 
replacement cost method but that the trend over time is comparable as they respectively increase by 26.6% 
and 25.6%. 
Figure 6: The value of unpaid work using the opportunity cost and replacement cost method (million, 2010 prices). 
 
3.2 Actual individual consumption  
To this base, actual individual consumption (AIC) is added. Previous studies mostly started from household’s 
individual consumption expenditures, which is equal to household’s final consumption expenditures on 
individual services and goods, deducted half of the private expenditures on health and education, and 
                                                     
17 The replacement cost method is anti-care and anti-feminist since Belgians, for instance, performed on average more 
unpaid work compared to paid work and women perform more unpaid work than paid work, in contrast to men who 
spend more time on paid work. 
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added half of the public expenditures on health and education.18 Yet, subtracting (adding) a certain fraction 
of these private (public) expenditures on health and education may be seen as arbitrary. Therefore, this 
study measures consumption by using the amount of AIC instead of households’ individual consumption 
expenditures.  
AIC is defined as individual consumption expenditures made by households plus individual consumption 
expenditure by government plus individual consumption expenditures by Non-Profit Institutions Serving 
Households (NPISHs) (see Fig. 7). AIC is equal to what households actually consume to meet their individual 
needs. Using AIC has several advantages. First, it is a better measure of material well-being compared to 
GDP and household’s individual consumption expenditures, because it captures all of the goods and 
services consumed by the households, irrespective of whether households pay for it themselves or benefit 
from it via the expenditures made by NPISHs or the government (Eurostat, 2012). Second, it fosters 
comparability between countries. This is needed because of country differences in who pays for health and 
education, for instance. In some countries individuals mostly pay for health and education expenses, 
whereas in other countries these services are provided to households as social transfers in kind by 
government in NPISHs (Eurostat, 2012). Finally, it avoids making arbitrary decisions on the defensive 
fraction of health and education expenses. The defensive expenditures that we deduct from AIC to obtain 
the welfare category individual consumption are, however, determined based on a more solid rationale as 
explained in Appendix A. 
Figure 7: From final consumption expenditure to actual final consumption. 
 
Source: Eurostat (2012). 
                                                     
18  See, for instance, the welfare measures in Daly and Cobb (1989) and Bleys (2008). 
44 
 
3.3 Shadow economy 
So far, while EWM made unpaid work visible, the shadow economy remained invisible although Daly and 
Cobb (1994) admit that they would like to include the shadow economy (excluding illegal activities) in EWM. 
From a welfare perspective, it is important to also account for informal market activities because these 
activities also create value in the form of consumption benefits. Including the item shadow economy is 
needed for meaningful welfare comparisons over time and between countries since the size of the shadow 
economy declined over time and since there are substantial differences in the size of the informal economy 
between countries (Kelmanson et al., 2019).  
This item is estimated based on a study by Kelmanson et al. (2019), in which the size of the Europe’s shadow 
economy is estimated as a percentage of GDP. Yet, a correction is needed for double counting. Medina and 
Schneider (2019) illustrate that between 2009 and 2015 35.7 % Germany’s shadow economy consists of 
legally bought material for shadow economy and do-it-yourself activities, illegal activities (smuggling etc.) 
and do-it-yourself activities and neighbors’ help. In order to conservatively approximate the welfare 
contribution of the shadow economy, we have halved the size of the shadow economy, which we believe 
is better than taking 100% or excluding the shadow economy altogether. This can be thought of as a 
conservative estimate to exclude illegal activities, avoid double counting with actual individual consumption 
and unpaid work and exclude defensive expenditures. As the shadow economy is also treated as 
consumption and included in net consumption, the value of the shadow economy is also corrected for 
income inequality using the adjusted Atkinson Index.19  
3.4 Welfare losses from income inequality 
EWM account for the welfare losses from income inequality. Daly and Cobb (1989) build on the principle of 
diminishing marginal utility of income to argue that a redistribution of income from a rich family to a poor 
family would benefit overall welfare as the reduction of the rich’s utility levels would be lower than the 
increase in the poor’s utility levels.20 Since EWM measure consumption and not income, this adjustment 
can be thought of as capturing the use value of consumption by accounting for the diminishing marginal 
                                                     
19 Future research could investigate ways of refining this item’s valuation methods, for instance distinguishing between 
consumption and investment. Part of the shadow economy that is included as consumption here, but that is in fact an 
investment in the physical capital stock should be factored back in as a capital adjustment in BCPA in a similar was as 
is done with net capital growth in Section 3.7. 
20 What is more, evidence shows that more equal societies perform much better compared to unequal ones 
on public health, education, well-being, mental ills, violence, etc. (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009, 2018). 
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utility of consumption. A more equal distribution of consumption would hence also be beneficial for 
welfare.  
Many welfare studies account for income inequality by weighing consumption expenditures via an index 
based on the Gini coefficient.21 Yet, this procedure has been criticized as being ad hoc, for not making 
explicit the scholars’ assumption on a society’s aversion to inequality (Neumayer, 2000) and for lacking a 
clear welfare-theoretical interpretation (Dietz and Neumayer, 2006). In contrast, the Atkinson index does 
take into account society’s aversion to inequality, which is why weighing consumption expenditures using 
the Atkinson Index is the preferred procedure to account for income inequality in welfare measures 
(Neumayer, 2000; Stymne and Jackson, 2000; Dietz and Neumayer, 2006). This suggestion has been picked 
up by some scholars (Jackson et al., 1997; Bleys, 2008; Bleys and Van der Slycken, 2019). Recently, Talberth 
and Weisdorf (2017) proposed another method using an explicit correction for the diminishing marginal 
utility of income (DMUI). In what follows, we will first discuss the inequality correction based on the 
Atkinson Index and then the DMUI-adjustment. Both approaches are based on the distribution of income 
and not on the distribution of consumption because of data availability issues. It is thus assumed that the 
former distribution is indicative for the latter. Afterwards we will build on Talberth and Weisdorf to present 
what we believe is the most appropriate way to estimate welfare losses from income inequality in EWM. 
3.4.1 The Atkinson Index 
A first approach to calculate the welfare losses from income inequality is based on the Atkinson Index (AI). 
The main advantage of this method over previous methods centered on the Gini coefficient is that the AI is 
expressed directly in terms of well-being (Stymne and Jackson, 2000) as the AI is based on a social welfare 
function (Atkinson, 1970). The Atkinson index can be interpreted as “the proportion of the present total 
income that would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare as at present if incomes were 
equally distributed” (Atkinson, 1975). Atkinson’s (1970) index is calculated as follows: 








                                                                                                         (5) 
In Eq. 5, 𝑦𝑖 is the mean income of the i-th group, μ is the mean income of the total population, 𝑓(𝑦𝑖) is the 
proportion of the population of the ith group, and ε is the weight society gives to the inequality of the income 
                                                     
21 See, for instance, the recent studies by Kenny et al. (2019) and Held et al. (2018). 
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distribution.22 A value of ε equal to 0 would mean that society does not care for inequality, while positive 
values indicate that society is averse to inequality. A value for AI of 15% indicates that the same level of 
social welfare could be achieved with only 85% (1-0.15) of the present total income, if incomes were equally 
distributed. In previous welfare studies a value for ε of 0.8 was used (Jackson et al., 1997; Stymne and 
Jackson, 2000; Bleys, 2008). Jackson et al. (1997) used 0.8 as a central value as suggested by Pearce and 
Ulph (1995) based on a study for the UK in which the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption over time 
was estimated.23 Yet, in a review of various methods to estimate ε, Latty (2011) suggests that a mid-point 
value of 1.5 is consistent with estimation methods coming from literature on intertemporal consumption 
behavior and consumer demand.24 These values of ε are consistent with what most sociologists would 
suggest. Schwartz and Winship (1980) articulate that “after reflecting on the different interpretations of ε, 
most sociologists would agree that when using Atkinson’s measure to address normative questions, ε 
should be between -0.5 and 2.5”. 
So far, only the direct effects of income inequality on welfare are discussed. Next to these effects, indirect 
effects such as relative and positional dynamics also affect the welfare level obtained from a given income 
distribution. An individual’s level of well-being does not only depend on one’s absolute level of consumption 
or income, but also on the relative position compared to others. Easterlin (2003) explained that due to 
social comparison, the effect of consumption increases on well-being are lower than expected. Since each 
individual's consumption impacts the reference frame others use to compare their consumption, this frame 
can be thought of as a public good (Frank, 1997). Therefore, it is important for EWM to account for relative 
income effects. A second benefit of the AI is that it can be adjusted to also account for these effects. 
Howarth and Kennedy (2016) propose using an adjusted Atkinson index (AAI) that not only corrects for 
inequality in itself, but also for the impacts of relative income on social comparison and individual well-
being. This approach involves a slight expansion of Eq. (5): 
                                                     
22 As we use income decile data in this study, the number of groups n is equal to 10. As a consequence Eq. 5 can be 










23 It is noteworthy that we are interested in the marginal utility of consumption over income groups, rather than over 
time. 
24 Besides these two estimation methods coming from these two fields, Latty (2011) also investigated estimates for ε 
based on taxation progressivity and surveyed and revealed risk aversion. However, Latty argues that intertemporal 













                                                                                       (6) 
In Eq. 6, α is a parameter that reflects the weight people give to relative income. It is clear from this equation 
that if a society gives no weight to relative income and α is 0, Eq. (6) collapses to Eq. (5). In a relative income 
experiment among Swedish students, Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) found that the median weight given 
to positionality lies between 0.2 and 0.5. Howarth and Kennedy (2016) use the center of this range, i.e. 
0.35, as value for α in their numerical illustration of the AAI. By departing from an equally distributed income 
equivalent, the AAI thus captures two separate effects that lead to social welfare losses from income 
inequality: (1) the absolute effect, captured by the AI, measuring “the failure to direct resources toward 
individuals with the highest marginal utility of income; and (2) the relative or positional effect, captured by 
adjusting the AI, recording “the loss of utility that relatively poor individuals experience when their relative 
social status is reduced” (Howarth and Kennedy, 2016).   
To date, no welfare study has made deductions for the diminishing marginal utility of total income growth. 
Yet, the subjective well-being literature indicates that higher incomes and increases in consumption of 
goods do not always lead to improvements in well-being (Easterlin, 2003; Frank, 2000; Frey and Stutzer, 
2002). This welfare study calculates the AAI to account for relative income effects in a sensitivity analysis 
for the welfare losses from income inequality in Section 6. The procedure that is used – reducing total 
consumption expenditures to account for relative effects – is explicit and less arbitrary compared to 
labelling and deducting a certain fraction of all consumption categories as defensive (see Appendix A). Our 
preferred estimate in the sensitivity analysis for the AAI uses, after Latty (2011) and Howarth and Kennedy 
(2016), values for respectively ε and α of 1.5 and 0.35 and is calculated using decile data on household’s 
disposable incomes (as explained in Appendix A). Fig. 8 gives an overview of the effect of these parameter 
choices on the Atkinson index, and provides a sensitivity analysis compared to the values that were 
previously used (ε = 0.8 and α = 0). Putting ε equal to 1.5 results in a comparable, yet slightly higher value 
for the index compared to the case where ε = 0.8 and α = 0.35. Including the parameter α leads to a larger 
increase: the index rises more sharply when ε = 1.5 compared to when ε = 0.8 because of the relative income 
parameter. Throughout the studied period, the AI and AAI for Belgium decrease as incomes are more 
equally distributed. The decreases in these indices imply that smaller fractions of consumption 




Figure 8: The Atkinson Index given various parameter choices for Belgium. 
 
3.4.2 Talberth and Weisdorf’s correction for the diminishing marginal utility of income 
The adjustment based on the Atkinson Index helps EWM to take inequality into account by indicating how 
much lower incomes could be if they were equally distributed. Yet, this rationale and method is not so 
equipped to trace the diminishing marginal utility of income, which was the key motivation for Daly and 
Cobb (1989) to take inequality into account in the original ISEW. By using the income distribution to weigh 
consumption, Daly and Cobb (1994, p. 459) acknowledge to implicitly assume that “marginal increases in 
consumption by the poor are of greater value than marginal increases by the rich”. Daly and Cobb deemed 
this was needed because “it seems likely that marginal increases in consumption bring diminishing returns 
to satisfaction”. 
 
Recently, Talberth and Weisdorf (2017) introduced a new correction in the GPI based on the diminishing 
marginal utility of income that corresponds to Daly and Cobb’s (1994) reasoning. Talberth and Weisdorf 
make use of an iso-elastic utility function for this adjustment. The authors do so by building on Layard et al. 
(2008), who estimated the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to income at the individual level using 
subjective happiness surveys covering 50 countries and time periods between 1972 and 2005. Layard et al. 
argued that in normative public economics it is important to know how fast the marginal utility of income 
declines as income increases. This effect is captured by the elasticity, ε, of marginal utility to income. Layard 




, 𝜀 ≠ 1                                                                                                                                                               (7)




In Eq. 7 y is income. In the classical hypothesis where ε = 1, utility declines in proportion of income. Yet, 
Layard et al. (2008) estimate that ε is equal to 1.26, indicating that the marginal utility of income declines 
faster than the log of income. ε in Eq. 7 is the same ε as in Eqs. 5 and 6. Layard et al.’s (2008) final estimate 
of 1.26 is thus slightly lower than Latty’s (2011) of 1.5. 
 
Talberth and Weisdorf (2017) use the more conservative ε = 1 to calculate the inequality adjustment. Next, 
Talberth and Weisdorf’s approach introduces an adjustment to Eq. 7. Due to the arbitrariness of the unit of 
income or utility, Talberth and Weisdorf have normalized utility to the median of income. This introduces a 
discontinuity in the utility from consumption: persons earning the median of income or less are assumed 
to enjoy utility equal to their consumption expenditures, however, from the median income onwards utility 
declines logarithmically. As a result, Talberth and Weisdorf adjust the top two income quintiles 
logarithmically and use the following formula to obtain the median-income normalized diminishing 
marginal utility of income adjustment (DMUI): 
 
DMUI(𝑥𝑖,𝑡, 𝑚𝑡) = 𝑚𝑡 ∗ ln (
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑚𝑡
) + 𝑚𝑡                                                                                                (8) 
In Eq. (8), xi,t is the income of household i at time t, mt is median income at time t and ln is the natural 
logarithm. By taking the sum of the unadjusted incomes of the first three quintiles and the adjusted incomes 
from the top two quintiles, Talberth and Weisdorf obtain an adjusted income aggregate. This aggregate is 
divided by the total unadjusted income to obtain the fraction of consumption that remains after inequality 
adjustment in EWM, while 1 minus this fraction is the share of consumption expenditures that is deducted 
as welfare losses from income inequality. In their paper, Talberth and Weisdorf articulate that the 
adjustment could be normalized using other thresholds, such as the poverty threshold (or some multiple 
thereof), but they do not further pursue these avenues. 
 
3.4.3 Our correction for the diminishing marginal utility of income 
We build on Talberth and Weisdorf’s approach but we suggest to normalize the data on a sufficiency 
threshold. We adjust all income deciles greater than the sufficiency threshold and call this adjustment 
DMUIs. Introducing a sufficiency threshold that has a fixed absolute value (in constant prices) is a crucial 
requirement to properly account for the diminishing marginal utility of total income. If one would follow 
Talberth and Weisdorf’s (2017) approach of normalizing at (median) incomes that vary (increase) over time, 
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then this has the effect that the threshold increases as incomes rise such that the proposed adjustment fails 
to properly correct for the diminishing marginal utility of income. 
 
We use a sufficiency threshold of $20,000 in 2011 prices in line with Hickel (2020) who set forth this 
threshold in the calculation of his Sustainable Development Index. For Belgium, the threshold is equal to 
€16,377.88 in 2010 prices, or 53.7% of the median income in 2010.25 The sufficiency threshold falls for the 
majority of the study period (1995-2018) within the second decile. As a result, in 2010 – sufficiency 
threshold in second decile – the top eight deciles are adjusted according to Eq. (9). 
 
DMUI(𝑥𝑖,𝑡, s) = s ∗ ln (
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑠
) + s                                                                                                          (9) 
 
In Eq. (9), s is a constant sufficiency threshold and xi,t is the average income per decile for decile i at time t. 
In line with Talberth and Weisdorf (2017) we use the more conservative ε = 1 or the natural logarithm. Fig. 
9 graphically illustrates how the income deciles in 2010 are adjusted using our DMUI-adjustment with 
sufficiency threshold. The adjustment ratio for the diminishing marginal utility, is equal to the ratio between 
the adjusted average incomes per decile (blue bars) and the unadjusted average incomes per decile (orange 
bars).  
 
Figure 9: The adjusted and unadjusted average incomes per decile in 2010 for Belgium. 
 
Note: For the first and second decile the ‘adjusted’ and unadjusted average income are equal because these deciles 
are not adjusted as the sufficiency threshold lies in the second decile. 
                                                     
25 Due to data availability issues, we approximated the median income as the mean of the fifth and sixth income decile. 
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Next, we will also perform a sensitivity analysis scrutinizing the impact of s and ε. First, we make use of a 
higher sufficiency level – i.e. a constant threshold equal to the median income in 2010 (DMUIs,m2010) of 
€30,485.28 (2010 prices). Next, we will verify the effect of a higher elasticity of marginal utility to income 
with ε = 1.26. Finally, in order to investigate the impact of working with a fixed threshold instead of a time-
varying one, we will compare our method with Talberth and Weisdorf’s approach (DMUIm) that normalizes 
at the median income level in each year and adjusts the top five income deciles. Fig. 10 illustrates that the 
evolution of DMUIs, DMUIs,m2010 and DMUIm and of their variants with ε = 1.26. 
 
Figure 10: The adjustment for the diminishing marginal utility given various parameter choices for Belgium. 
 
 
First, using a fixed versus time-varying threshold results in a different trend over time. The time-varying 
DMUIm declines during the considered time period by 37.4%, while DMUIs and DMUIs,m2010 increase by 
respectively 40.4% and 59.8%. Second, the absolute value of a fixed threshold also impacts the DMUI-
adjustment. DMUIs involves a higher adjustment as on average 20.3% is deducted versus only an average 
reduction of 5.8% for the higher sufficiency threshold in DMUIs,m2010. Third, as expected, using a higher 
elasticity of ε = 1.26 results in higher proportions of consumption that are deducted. The trends over time 
are very similar to when the lower elasticity ε = 1 was used – in this case, DMUIm_1.26 declines during the 
considered time period by 36.6%, while DMUIs_1.26 and DMUIs,m2010_1.26 increase by respectively 39.7% and 
59.5%. Finally, it may be concluded that using a fixed threshold to normalize the data captures the 
diminishing marginal utility of income as total income grows best – this is illustrated by the upward sloping 




In our calculation of BCE and BCPA, we use the DMUIs-adjustment with the lower threshold (s = €16,377.88) 
and the low elasticity (ε = 1). We use a constant sufficiency threshold in EWM because it is essential to 
account for the diminishing marginal utility of income (and consumption). We believe that our approach 
captures the DMUI-effect better compared to the approaches by Talberth and Weisdorf and the (adjusted) 
Atkinson Index. In the sensitivity analysis in Section 6, we will compare the welfare results from our DMUIs-
adjustment with the other methodological and parameter choices for the AI, AAI, and DMUI-adjustments 
depicted in Figs. 8 and 10.  
 
The DMUI-approaches make use of the distribution of incomes, but it does only do so to measure the 
diminishing marginal utility of income. The DMUI-corrections do, however, not incorporate a correction for 
societies’ aversion for income inequality as the corrections based on the Atkinson Index do. It is left for 
future research to determine whether EWM aim to capture societies’ aversion for income inequality in 
addition to the DMUI-correction. Nonetheless, since the DMUI-adjustment also builds on the distribution 
of income, we continue to label this item welfare losses from income inequality. 
 
3.5 Costs of climate breakdown 
This item, previously referred to as the ‘costs of climate change’, has been modified significantly over the 
years – see O’Mahony et al. (2018) for an overview.26 Most studies valued this item by linking the emissions 
related to the domestic consumption of fossil fuels with a social cost of carbon (SCC). Since this SCC 
measures the damages per metric ton of CO2 emissions due to associated climate change (Ackerman and 
Stanton, 2012), most studies thus measure the total climate damages caused by the emissions originating 
from current economic activity. Nevertheless, in line with EWM’s Fisherisation (see Section 2.2), scholars 
are still discussing how to properly account for ‘climate change’. Bagstad et al. (2014) suggested to leave 
out this item and use substitutes linked more directly to climate change impacts (e.g. the costs of natural 
disasters and water scarcity), whereas O’Mahony et al. (2018) stipulated the need for a separate approach 
to distinguish between the future global impact costs related to current domestic emission activities and 
the current national impacts stemming from past global emissions. 
                                                     
26 We prefer to use the term climate breakdown instead of a mere change in climate as recent evidence on climate 
tipping points indicates the threat of rapid and irreversible changes in the climate system that would severely disrupt 
ecosystems, societies and economies. 
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The appropriate approach to account for climate breakdown depends on the welfare interpretation and 
measure used. BCPA includes future and distant costs and thus can make use of a SCC to capture climate 
change related damages caused by current emissions. However, BCE measures experiences and should only 
focus on the local and current costs arising from climate change, i.e. the damages suffered. That is why, the 
item costs of climate breakdown is only included in the broader ecological costs. Yet, the new item costs of 
extreme weather events, which approximates the damages suffered ‘here and now’, is to be included in the 
narrow ecological costs (see Table 3). The latter item is excluded from BCPA to avoid double counting with 
the cost of climate breakdown. Neither measures do not account for the costs or investments to adapt to 
climate change because of a lack of available data. Yet, in theory climate adaptation costs should be 
deducted from consumption expenses because adaptation costs are a key example of defensive 
expenditures. 
Other methodological novelties regarding the calculation of the cost of climate breakdown are a broader 
set of emissions beyond territorial GHG-emissions. The quantity of emissions is based on the data countries 
send to UNFCCC and includes: territorial GHG-emissions (with Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
(LULUCF), without indirect CO2), the emissions from international bunkers (aviation and navigation), and 
CO2 emissions from biomass. Furthermore, two types of footprint emissions are added to register the 
emissions beyond domestic borders that can be related to national consumption. The first type involves the 
carbon dioxide emissions embodied in goods and services.27 The second type of footprint emissions relates 
the land-use change emissions from the Global Carbon Project to Belgium’s share in the global land-use 
consumption footprint using the SCP-HAT provided by UN Environment (2020). A detailed explanation on 
the quantity of emissions can be found in Appendix A. Fig. 11 provides an overview of the emissions from 
these different sources and illustrates that total emissions do not follow the steadily decreasing trend of 
territorial emissions. 
  
                                                     




Figure 11: Greenhouse gas emissions by category (in MT CO2 equivalent). 
 
These broader set of emissions are linked to a SCC estimate to calculate the damage caused by climate 
disruption. The SCC estimates available in literature differ significantly. Ackerman and Stanton’s (2012) 
estimates of the SCC in 2010 vary between $28 and $892 in 2007$ per tonne depending on the specific 
parameter choices such as damage functions, discount rate and climate sensitivity. Climate sensitivity is a 
parameter that captures the expected long-term temperature increase based a doubling of the 
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Ackerman and Stanton provide different scenarios with 
average versus 95th percentile climate sensitivity, Nordhaus versus Hanemann damage estimates at low 
temperatures, Nordhaus versus Weitzman damage estimates at high temperatures and 3.0 versus 1.5-
percent discount rate. There are two ways to obtain discount rates: a descriptive and a prescriptive 
approach. The former uses an appropriate market interest rate, while the latter sees the discount rate as 
the sum of a pure time preference and the growth rate of per capita consumption (Ackerman and Stanton, 
2012). The link between discount rates, time preferences and consumption growth rates are given by the 
“Ramsey rule” – see Ackerman et al. (2009) for a comprehensive derivation of this rule. In the absence of 
uncertainty, the Ramsey rule and discount rate can be obtained from this formula: 
                                                    1 + 𝑟 = (1 + 𝑔)𝜀(1 + 𝜌)  ⇒ 𝑟 ≈ ρ + 𝜀𝑔                                                             (10) 
In Eq. 10 r is the discount rate, ρ is the “rate of pure time preference” that is used to discount utility, g is 
the growth rate of consumption, while ε is the “coefficient of relative risk aversion”. The approximation for 
r holds for small ρ and g. It should be noted that ε is the same parameter ε as was used for the inequality 
aversion parameter to calculate the Atkinson Index in Section 3.4.1 and for the elasticity of marginal utility 
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to income in Section 3.4.2. So ideally, the assumption on ε used for the inequality correction(s) should be 
the same as the one used for the SCC. 
In the Spanish ISEW-study, O’Mahony et al. (2018) based their estimate on the study by Ackerman and 
Stanton. O’Mahony et al. used an estimate of $232 in 2010$ or €175.37 in 2010€ per tonne of CO2 
(equivalent), which is based on a 3% discount rate, 95th percentile climate sensitivity and Hanemann-
Weitzman damage functions. Stern (2006), however, argues in favor of a lower discount rate based on 
intergenerational equity. In order to suitably measure the future costs and thus discount future costs less, 
we suggest to use a lower discount rate than O’Mahony et al. We decide to stick to Hanemann-Weitzman 
damage functions, because the Nordhaus damage functions are severely underestimating the cost of 
climate change (Keen, 2020). Using the same damage functions, a 1.5% discount rate would lead to SCC-
estimates of $445 and $892 in 2007$ (or €340.23 and €681.98 in 2010€), for respectively average and 95th 
percentile climate sensitivity (Ackerman and Stanton, 2012). As the lowest of these SCC’s is almost the 
double of O’Mahony et al.’s estimate, we use the 2010-estimate based on average climate sensitivity and 
apply an annual growth rate of 1.45% to obtain time-varying estimates for the years before and after 2010.28 
The discount rate of 1.5%, is similar the 1.4% discount rate proposed by Stern (2006).29 Fig. 12 illustrates 
the cost of climate breakdown given various parameter choices. 
  
                                                     
28 The annual growth rate of 1.4452407% is obtained by interpolating Ackerman and Stanton’s (2012) 2010 values to 
2050.  
29 Stern (2006) obtained a 1.4% discount rate as the sum of a 0.1% pure time discount rate and the growth rate of per 
capita consumption. According to Stern (2006) a 0.1% discount rate indicates a 91% probability for humanity to survive 
100 years. Given that more consumption is not desirable from a well-being perspective, one could use Stern’s case to 
argue for using a discount rate of 0.1%. As Ackerman and Stanton (2012) only provide 1.5% and 3% discount rates, 
this is left for future refinements. 
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Figure 12: Comparison of the effect of alternative approaches to the cost of climate breakdown (million, 2010 prices). 
 
3.6 Depletion of non-renewable energy resources 
The item depletion of non-renewable energy resources aims to capture the depletion of non-renewable 
energy stocks. While the item costs of climate breakdown measures the damages caused from greenhouse 
gas emission related to the combustion of fossil fuels, this item measures the depletion of the natural 
capital resource stock. The former looks at sinks, while the latter focuses on sources. In the past, scholars 
have adopted either a production or a consumption perspective in order to calculate the depletion of non-
renewable resources. The former traces the depletion related to the extraction of a country’s domestic 
energy stocks, while the latter measures how a country’s domestic resource consumption contributes to 
the depletion of global energy stocks. The production view looks within borders, whereas the consumption 
counterpart looks beyond borders. Yet, the key difficulty lies in connecting this item to the experiential 
welfare interpretation. Talberth and Weisdorf (2017), for instance, wonder if future studies should still 
include this item if it is not better linked to current experiential welfare. Hence we omit this item in the BCE. 
Nonetheless, including resource depletion is needed in the BCPA as it is a cost originating from present 
activities that is passed on to the future.  
The common methodology to value this item employs the replacement cost method that captures the 
investments needed to replace non-renewable energy resources with a renewable substitute – see, for 
instance, Bleys (2008, 2013) and Held et al. (2018). Yet, Neumayer (2000) was critical of this method 
because it assumes that all resource depletion needs to be replaced annually. In a response to address this 
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criticism, O’Mahony et al. (2018) put forward the transition cost method, in which the depletion issue as a 
gradual transition away from non-renewable energy resources in order to meet the climate targets agreed 
upon in the Paris Agreement.30 We build on this transition cost method, yet, O’Mahony et al.’s cost estimate 
is updated as their estimate is based on a not so ambitious scenario to halve global CO2-emissons by 2050. 
A recent report by the IPCC (2018) illustrates that more drastic emission cuts are needed in the near present 
to limit global warming to 1.5°C: global net emissions need to decline by 45% in 2030 (compared to 2010) 
and the net zero target should be reached in 2050.31  
The valuation of this item is based on the total energy investments expenditures needed in the European 
Union under the requirement of meeting certain climate goals agreed upon by the European Council. These 
targets include an overall GHG emission reduction of at least 40% compared to 1990 and a share of 
renewable energy in final energy consumption of at least 27%. Moreover, the European Council agreed on 
the following minimum ambition level for the energy efficiency target: a 27% reduction of primary energy 
consumption compared to 2007. The investments needed are calculated, given the various policy options 
for 2030 energy efficiency targets (European Commission, 2016). A mid-value of 33% efficiency target was 
chosen, which leads to an investment cost of €797.45 (in 2010 prices) per ton of oil equivalent of primary 
energy consumption. Fig. 13 compares this updated method with the transition cost method by O’Mahony 
et al. (2018).  
  
                                                     
30 Recent evidence has shown that the remaining carbon budget related to climate change goals of limiting global 
heating to 1.5 or 2 °C – see, for instance, McGlade and Ekins (2015) and IPCC (2018) – imposes a more imminent limit 
on using non-renewable resources compared to their depletion. Achieving climate goals requires drastic and rapid 
reductions in human carbon emissions and phasing out fossil fuels (Rockström et al., 2017; Jackson, 2019), which can 
be met by an expansion of renewable energy resources (Rockström et al., 2017) together with a lower energy demand 
(Grubler et al., 2018), or a degrowth scenario (D’Alessandro et al., 2020; Victor, 2012). 
31 As early-industrialized countries have a higher historical responsibility, their net zero targets should be sooner. 




Figure 13: Comparison of the updated and previous transition cost method for the depletion of non-renewable 
resources (million, 2010 prices). 
 
3.7 Net capital growth 
As explained in Section 2, BCPA should include changes in physical capital stocks like net capital growth as 
this is a benefit (or cost if negative) originating from present activities. In contrast to previous studies, this 
study’s net capital growth only traces mere capital adjustments: it breaks with taking 5-year rolling averages 
and by omitting the growth requirement in this item. Following Hicks’ income concept, capital changes 
should be counted as income. However, by taking 5-year rolling averages to smooth out fluctuations, one 
is actually treating this item as the services flowing from a stock that would last five years. Furthermore, 
the net capital growth required to keep the capital stock per worker intact is removed as this procedure is 
inconsistent with Hicksian income in which raw capital changes are counted. Daly and Cobb (1994) included 
the capital requirement as they assumed that economic sustainability requires that the amount of capital 
available for each worker remains constant or even increases. We believe the growth requirement can be 
omitted based on the grounds that we are not trying to capture sustainability but merely the benefits and 
costs of present activities and that Hicksian income only includes ‘raw’ capital changes. Fig. 14 gives on 




Figure 14: Comparison of the effect of an alternative valuation method to net capital growth (million, 2010 prices). 
 
4. Results 
This section presents Belgium’s economic performance from 1995 until 2018 using BCE and BCPA and 
analyses the relative importance and changes over time of the various welfare categories. The per capita 
results of Belgium’s  BCE, BCPA and GDP are shown in absolute and indexed values in Fig. 15. Hereafter, we 
will only focus and report per capita values without explicitly referring to it. Hereafter, we use lower case 
to refer to per capita values, while we use capital letters for aggregate numbers. Throughout the entire 
period, bcpa is lower than gdp. Bce, in contrast is higher than gdp from 1995 to 2004 and from 2009 until 
2013. The absolute difference between bcpa and bce indicates that there are substantial broader ecological 
costs that are shifted in time and space – without adding the positive capital adjustment to bcpa, the 
difference would even have been higher. Over the entire period all indicators increased: gdp improved by 
30.1%, bcpa by 17.9% and bce by 14.9%, while on average per year gdp grew by 1.31% versus 0.78% for 
bcpa and 0.65% for bce. 
At different time periods, however, there are marked differences between gdp and the welfare indicators 
as indicated in Table 4. From 1995 to 2007, gdp grows on average by 1.9% per year, versus only 0.86% for 
bce and 0.24% for bcpa. During and after the financial crisis from 2007 to 2010, bce and bcpa outperformed 
gdp: gdp declined by 0.46% per year, while bce and bcpa grew by respectively 1.37% and 1.9%. This welfare 
trend was driven by the fact that individual consumption per capita grew. For bcpa, the higher average 
annual growth rate comes from the lower starting point to evaluate this consumption growth since the 
combined effect of the broader ecological costs and capital adjustment per capita was slightly negative (i.e. 
the declining broader ecological costs per capita were overcompensated by a reduction in the capital 
adjustment per capita). If we scrutinize the years 2009 and 2010, we observe a lagged effect on bcpa while 
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gdp fell already in 2009. This lag was caused by the fact that the broader ecological costs fell dramatically 
in 2009, resulting in an upward bcpa-trend, while the economic gdp-recovery in 2010 and the corresponding 
rising ecological cost made bcpa go down. In constrast to gdp and bcpa, there was not a negative crisis 
effect on bce, which stagnated at its 2009-level for five years. 
During the subsequent eurocrisis from 2010 to 2014, gdp and bce only grew by respectively 0.41% and 
0.04% per annum whereas bcpa increased by 1.98% per year because broader ecological costs (per capita) 
fell dramatically. After the eurocrisis from 2014 to 2018 gdp grew by 1.47% per year, yet, this growth was 
is lower than the annual growth rate of 1.89% from 1995 to 2007. Contrarily to gdp, bce and bcpa barely 
improved: bce decreased by 0.02% per year, while bcpa increased by 0.11% per year. Since the financial 
crisis of 2009, gdp and bcpa grew by respectively 9.8% and 3.7% while bce decreased by 0.3%. These trends 
in  bce and bcpa are mainly caused by welfare growth in 2018. Bce remained almost constant between 2009 
and 2014 and fell in 2015, while bcpa diminished between 2014 and 2017. 
Figure 15: Welfare and GDP per capita for Belgium in prices of 2010 (left panel) and as index values with 2007 = 100 
(right panel). 




Table 4: Average annual and total growth rates of welfare and GDP per capita. 
Time period gdp bce bcpa 
1995-2007 1,89 0,86 0,24 
2007-2010 -0,46 1,37 1,90 
2010-2014 0,41 0,04 1,98 








Note: The brackets indicate the total trend over the entire period, in contrast to the average annual trends in the 
subperiods. 
 
Furthermore, one must be cautious of the fact that these aggregate welfare trends hide crucial information 
about evolutions in the different welfare categories (introduced in Eq. 3 and Eq. 4) – especially of those 
categories that are of minor quantitative importance. Fig. 16 illustrates that unpaid work and net 
consumption are the most important positive contributors to welfare, while the welfare losses from 
inequality and broader ecological costs (the latter only for bcpa) are the most important welfare deductions. 
The value of unpaid work per capita increased over the studied time period by 11.6% (as shown in Table 5) 
since increasing wages more than compensated a reduction in the time devoted to unpaid work. Individual 
per capita consumption outpaced unpaid work as it surged by 32.3% over time. Per capita shadow economy 
even grew by 37.1%, while per capita defensive, intermediate and rehabilitative expenditures only 
increased by 11.7%. Because of the sharp rise in the welfare losses from income inequality by 89.9%, an 
increasing part of individual consumption expenditures and the benefits from the shadow economy was 
not translated into welfare because of the adjustment for the diminishing marginal utility of income. The 
government’s per capita welfare contribution became less important (-23.4%), while for bcpa per capita 
the capital adjustment increased by 20%. Broad ecological costs per capita increased by 6.8%. This evolution 
was caused by increases in the time-varying cost estimate (+40%) and greenhouse gas emissions (+13%), 
which both made the cost of climate breakdown rise by +58%, which outweighed reductions in all other 
ecological costs. The overall increase in the aggregate broad ecological costs is higher than per capita 
increases since population grew too (by 12.5%): aggregate broad ecological costs increased by 20.2%. The 
increase in broad ecological costs contrasts heavily against the per capita narrow ecological costs in bce 





Figure 16: Positive and negative contributions of per capita welfare categories (2010 prices). 
 
Note: In this figure welfare deductions have been reclassified as negative numbers, even though these categories are 
deducted as positive numbers in Eq. 3 and 4 to calculate the aggregate welfare level. 
 
Table 5: Annual growth rates of per capita welfare categories during several time periods. 
Time period uw ci s gc direp inq nec bec Δk 
1995-2007 1,19 1,47 2,49 -1,16 
 
1,37 4,65 -2,57 1,84 1,78 
2007-2010 1,03 1,30 1,05 -0,44 
 
-2,56 1,04 -3,48 -1,75 -15,98 
2010-2014 -1,23  0,90 -0,37 -0,38 
 
-1,73 1,28 -4,48 -2,76 6,73 
2014-2018 -0,08 1,13 0,96 -2,11 
 


























The EWM compiled in this study (i.e. BCE and BCPA) employ different time and boundary views. If one 
“would only look at current experiences, then this could mistakenly lead to the conclusion that one can 
happily enjoy experiences in the present while depleting physical capital and plundering the planet” (Van 
der Slycken and Bleys, 2020a). Our results suggest, on the one hand, that the negligible narrow ecological 
costs have decreased. On the other hand, substantial broader ecological costs increased, which indicates 
that Belgium is increasingly shifting ecological costs in time and space. We would suggest to use the broad 
perspective on ecological costs as this is more consistent with seeing the economy as embedded in the 
ecosystem. This view helps to focus on the environmental impacts caused by present economic activities. 
Instead of overlooking broader ecological costs, “fully accounting” for these costs would better inform 
policy-makers about the adverse effects of economic activities. This position is shared by Clarke (2007), who 
argued that EWM should account for the environmental costs that are outsourced to other regions. 
Moreover, this way, attention is paid to the “margins”, that is to those who are marginalized in the growth 
economy, as recommended by Hanaček et al. (2020). Yet, this study does not account for the social costs 
shifted to the margins of the growth economy.  
Future research could explore various ways to improve the methodology by, for instance, including new 
components such as integrating the social costs caused abroad or a larger set of ecological costs as it is 
rather limited. Other ecological costs that could be included in future research are, for instance, noise and 
odor pollution, the ecosystem services lost due to land use changes or soil erosion and depletion. Future 
studies could make use of a hedonic model to determine the effect of noise pollution on housing prices 
(Franck et al., 2014) or of willingness-to-pay estimates for reducing the externalities of noise and odor 
pollution (Rousseau et al., 2020). The ecosystem services lost because of land use changes could be valued 
based on the study by Costanza et al. (2014) that values the ecosystem services for different biomes. 
Another approach to trace land use changes is the human appropriation of net primary production (Haberl 
et al., 2007; Gingrich et al., 2015), while in BCPA-studies the embodied human appropriation of net primary 
production can be used to analyze the disconnect between global biomass production and consumption 
and related land use changes (Erb et al., 2009; Kastner et al., 2015). Furthermore, future studies would also 
benefit from time-varying and country-specific estimates for the shadow economy, time use, ecological 
costs and the parameters for the inequality adjustments. Ecological costs are mostly valued using fixed 
monetary cost estimates, yet, the cost estimate should ideally reflect changing environmental conditions. 
Moreover, it could be explored what the welfare implications are when using Layard et al.’s (2008) estimate 
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of 1.26 for the elasticity of marginal utility to income, instead of the our more conservative logarithmic 
adjustment that assumes this elasticity is equal to one. Finally, future research that employs either the 
Atkinson Index or the adjustment for the diminishing marginal utility of income could try to harmonize the 
inequality aversion parameter used for the Atkinson Index, the elasticity of marginal utility to income for 
the adjustment for the diminishing marginal utility of income and the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
that is used for deriving the discount rate in the computation of the social cost of carbon because these 
three adjustments make use of the same parameter ε. 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
The aggregate results presented here should be treated with caution because the results and empirical 
trends depend on the benefits and costs included in the different components and their relative weights 
ultimately depend on methodological choices. Therefore, we will change the parameters and the items 
included to verify whether our results are robust to these changes. In this sensitivity analysis, we will build 
upon the individual sensitivity studies presented above, and investigate the impacts of including the shadow 
economy or not, using different valuation methods to value unpaid work, using high and low estimates for 
the social cost of carbon and adopting O’Mahony et al.’s (2018) transition cost method instead of our higher 
cost estimate, while we will explore the impact of using different methods and parameters for the inequality 
correction as explained in Section 3.4. We will focus on BCPA for our sensitivity analysis and we will take 
this as a benchmark in Table 6 and Fig. 17.  
Using the opportunity cost method for unpaid work and a higher SCC of €681.98 (2010 prices) results in the 
largest absolute changes of bcpa. What is striking is that all sensitivity cases mostly imply a vertically shifting 
curve and that the relative changes over time during the different time periods are relatively comparable. 
The only exception is the case where a higher SCC is used, since here the shape and evolution of the curve 
are different compared to the other cases. With a higher SCC, the effect of increasing and declining GHG 
emissions is more outspoken. When emissions rise from 1995 to 2007, bcpa declines by 1.39% per year 
because the costs of climate disruption grow, while all the other curves increase during that period. In the 
periods from 2007 to 2010 and from 2010 and 2014 bcpa increases on average per year by respectively 
1.9% and 1.98%. In the case of a higher SCC, declining emissions have a stronger effect on the declining cost 
of climate disruption. As a consequence, bcpa increases more rapidly in this case.  
Finally, our DMUI-correction with a constant sufficiency threshold (i.e. DMUIs, but also DMUIsh) yields 
different results compared to the other inequality adjustments as the average annual growth rates and 
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overall growth rates are lower when the sufficiency threshold is used. Yet, the results confirm our belief 
that using a constant sufficiency threshold is essential to account for the diminishing marginal utility of 
income (and consumption) since the other approaches fail to properly capture the DMUI-effect. 
Table 6: Average annual and total growth rates of various sensitivity checks for BCPA per capita. 
 
Note: The star (*) indicates the total trend over the entire period, in contrast to the average annual trends in the 
subperiods. The color scale gives per row an indication about the highest and lowest values. UW is the scenario with 
the opportunity cost method, S is without the shadow economy, SCCl uses a low social cost of carbon, SCCh employs a 
high social cost of carbon, DMUIm is the DMUI-adjustment with median incomes, DMUIsm is DMUIs,m2010, DMUIsh is 
DMUIs_1.26, DMUImh is DMUIm_1.26, DMUIsmh is DMUIs,m2010_1.26, in AAI1.5 ε = 1.5 and α = 0.35, in AI1.5 ε = 1.5 and α = 0, 
in AAI0.8 ε = 0.8 and α = 0.35, in AI0.8 ε = 0.8 and α = 0, TC is the scenario that employs the transition cost method by 
O’Mahony et al. (2018). 
  
Time period bcpa UW S SSCl SSCh DMUIm DMUIsm DMUIsh DMUImh DMUIsmh AAI1.5 AI1.5 AAI0.8 AI0.8 TC
1995-2007 0,24 0,32 0,03 0,66 -1,39 1,01 0,66 0,14 1,03 0,62 1,46 1,25 1,30 1,14 0,23
2007-2010 1,90 1,02 2,01 1,04 5,67 1,63 1,77 1,93 1,62 1,78 1,55 1,61 1,57 1,62 2,01
2010-2014 1,98 2,15 2,37 1,38 4,26 2,05 1,92 2,00 2,09 1,93 2,38 2,19 2,16 2,05 1,30
2014-2018 0,11 0,04 0,07 0,23 -0,54 0,71 0,43 0,01 0,72 0,39 0,65 0,65 0,66 0,66 0,16
1995-2018* 17,87 16,44 16,78 18,59 11,67 30,82 24,41 16,16 31,34 23,78 38,14 34,61 34,98 32,45 15,40
1995-2018 0,78 0,71 0,73 0,81 0,51 1,34 1,06 0,70 1,36 1,03 1,66 1,50 1,52 1,41 0,67
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Figure 17: A sensitivity analysis for BCPA per capita (2010 prices). 
 
Note: UW is the scenario with the opportunity cost method, S is without the shadow economy, SCC l uses a low social 
cost of carbon, SCCh employs a high social cost of carbon, DMUIm is the DMUI-adjustment with median incomes, 
DMUIsm is DMUIs,m2010, DMUIsh is DMUIs_1.26, DMUImh is DMUIm_1.26, DMUIsmh is DMUIs,m2010_1.26, in AAI1.5 ε = 1.5 and α 
= 0.35, in AI1.5 ε = 1.5 and α = 0, in AAI0.8 ε = 0.8 and α = 0.35, in AI0.8 ε = 0.8 and α = 0, TC is the scenario that 




7. Conclusion: toward a 2.0 methodology 
This paper contributes to the standardization of the methodology of economic welfare measures (EWM), 
such as the ISEW and GPI by addressing the cross-time and cross-boundary issues involved and the 
discussion on Fisherian versus Hicksian income as theoretical underpinnings. Two EWM with distinct time 
and boundary views to deal with ecosystem costs and physical capital changes are compiled for Belgium 
from 1995 to 2018: the benefits and costs experienced (BCE) only looks and the present and within domestic 
borders and the benefits and costs of present economic activities (BCPA) also looks at the impacts of present 
activities that are shifted in time and space. Other methodological novelties besides our dual welfare 
approach are that this study is the first to adopt a consumption footprint view for the emissions embodied 
in trade, to register the climate impacts of aviation and shipping, to include an approximation for the 
shadow economy and to introduce a sufficiency threshold for consumption expenditures when accounting 
for the diminishing marginal utility of income. 
The results indicate that there are substantial and increasing ecological costs that are shifted in time and 
space in the BCPA, while the present ecological costs within domestic borders in the BCE are negligible and 
decreasing. This study found that BCPA and BCE improved over time, just as GDP did. GDP per capita grew 
by 30%, while BCE per capita rose by 15% and BCPA per capita increased by 18%. We found a lagged effect 
of the 2009 crisis on BCPA, as it increased in 2009 and decreased in 2010 because ecological costs 
respectively fell and rose. Furthermore, the positive aggregate welfare evolutions hide that BCE per capita 
stagnated and then decreased between 2009 and 2017, while BCPA per capita fell between 2014 to 2017. 
Moreover, caution is needed against the aggregate welfare trend because the broader ecological costs have 
increased over time. Since important information might get lost during the aggregation procedure, we 
advise to also look at EWM’s disaggregated welfare categories to evaluate economic performance in greater 
detail. 
Future studies should carefully consider the time and boundary views because without careful a reflection, 
EWM may give the impression that it is possible to fare well while consuming physical capital and fueling 
ecological breakdown. We argued to use BCPA as it accounts for the ecological costs shifted in time and 
space, which is more compatible with an ecological economic position of seeing the economy as embedded 
in the ecosystem, and it accounts for the consumption of physical capital. Such a beyond border viewpoint 
would better inform policy-making about the impacts abroad and the importance not only to reduce 
domestic emissions but also to devise policies like a carbon border adjustment tax to reduce the emissions 
embodied in trade (Van der Slycken and Bleys, 2020a). The BCE are less useful for ‘full’ accountability or 
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policy-making as it only includes present ecological costs that happen within borders and regard physical 
capital consumption as beneficial to welfare. We believe that any 2.0 methodology for EWM should take 
these time and boundary issues into account when evaluating a country’s economic performance.   
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Chapter 3 : Is Europe faring well with growth? Evidence from a 
welfare comparison in the EU-15 from 1995 to 2018. 
1. Introduction 
After earlier warnings that GDP should not be used as an indicator to measure social welfare (Kuznets, 1934; 
Abramovitz, 1958; Okun, 1971), Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) wondered if pursuing growth had become 
obsolete. Nordhaus and Tobin developed an alternative measure of economic welfare to examine whether 
the progress indicated by GDP growth would disappear if a different welfare indicator was used. One the 
one hand, growth is not obsolete because economies are structurally dependent on growth (EEA, 2020). 
On the other hand, growth as measured by GDP is obsolete, because GDP is not an indicator for social 
welfare or social progress, which is acknowledged by most economists (van den Bergh, 2009). Without the 
structural dependence on growth, it makes little sense to continue growing an indicator that is a poor proxy 
for social welfare. In order to overcome this deadlock, voices have been raised to: (a) to move beyond 
growth and to redesign economies so they become less dependent on growth and can manage without 
growth (Raworth, 2017; Jackson, 2017; Victor, 2019) and (b) to move “beyond GDP” as we urgently need 
to measure what counts for social and economic performance and to focus on designing policies that 
stimulate well-being and economic welfare in a sustainable way (Stiglitz et al., 2009; Stiglitz et al., 2018).  
While there is a broader debate on the measurement of welfare, well-being or sustainable development – 
see, for instance, the approaches mentioned in Meadows (1998), Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), Dasgupta 
(2009), van den Bergh (2009), Fleurbaey (2009), Bleys (2012), O’Neill (2012), Munda (2015), O’Neill et al. 
(2018) and Hoekstra (2019) – we refer to welfare and economic welfare measures (EWM) as what is being 
measured by the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) and Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI). The 
ISEW and GPI were created more than thirty years ago as alternative welfare indicators in an effort to 
debunk GDP and its growth as a key economy policy goal. Nevertheless, to date their impact on policy-
making stays limited (Corlet Walker and Jackson, 2019; Bleys and Whitby, 2015). The lack of standardization 
does not only act as a barrier to impact policy-making, but also makes it difficult to compare welfare 
estimates across countries (Bleys and Whitby, 2015).  
In the past, scholars have made various suggestions to improve the standardization of the methodology of 
EWM. Some argued to calculate standardized EWM with a limited component list (e.g. Bleys, 2007; 
Menegaki, 2018) to deal with data constraints. Others tried to adapt the calculation method to the area 
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studied by including components of local importance (e.g. Clarke and Islam, 2005; Ostergaard-Klem and 
Oleson, 2014; Held et al., 2018) as this would give policy-makers more detailed region-specific information. 
In order to foster both comparability and customization, it was also suggested to have a core component 
list in the standard welfare measure that can be supplemented with a periphery of specific items for 
regional-specific measures (Brown and Lazarus, 2018; Kenny et al., 2019). 
In Europe no attempt has been made to date to measure welfare across European countries or at the 
European level (Schepelmann et al., 2010). In the past, welfare was compiled for 13 of the 15 EU-15 
countries: Austria (Stockhammer et al., 1997), Belgium (Bleys, 2008), Finland (Hoffrén, 2018), France 
(Nourry, 2008), Germany (Held et al., 2018), Greece (Menegaki and Tsagarakis, 2015), Italy (Armiento, 
2018), Luxembourg (Rugani et al., 2018), the Netherlands (Bleys, 2007), Portugal (Beça and Santos, 2014), 
Spain (O’Mahony et al., 2018), Sweden (Jackson and Stymne, 1996) and the UK (Jackson, 2004).32 Yet, these 
country-specific studies lack standardization. To date, Denmark and Ireland are the only EU-15 countries 
without country-specific welfare estimates.  
Some scholars have compiled EWM in a comparable way for a group of countries or states. Menegaki et al. 
(2017) computed a simplified ISEW for 33 European countries, however, this version differs significantly 
from the commonly used methodology (Bleys and Van der Slycken, 2019). In order to compile a 
“comparable GPI”, Pais et al. (2019) also used a simplified methodology for 28 OECD countries. 
Furthermore, Fox and Erickson’s (2019) GPI study for fifty states in the United States allows for 
comparability across states, but only covers one year. Notwithstanding these contributions, a standard 
study with a ‘full’ component list that is applied to a group of countries over a considerable time period is 
still missing. This study addresses this research gap as it is the first that calculates EWM for the group of EU-
15 countries over a considerable time period based on a consistent and standard methodology.33 This 
welfare study will allow us to explore whether GDP and welfare are coupled in these European countries 
before, during and after financial crisis. This research will also examine the main welfare drivers and the 
relative importance of the different welfare categories in economic welfare measures. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the methodology used to calculate welfare in the 
EU-15 from 1995 to 2018. The third section discusses each countries’ welfare evolution and compares it to 
its GDP, finds that the EU-15 recovered from the financial crisis from a per capita GDP view by 2018, but 
                                                     
32 I only listed each country’s most recent welfare study. 
33 In this paper, I will refer to these 15 countries as ‘EU-15’ despite the fact that the UK is no longer part of the European 
Union. ‘EU-15’ is to be seen as a mere reference to the fifteen countries that were originally part of the EU-15. 
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not from an economic welfare perspective. In Section 4 we revisit Max-Neef’s (1995) threshold hypothesis 
and argue that our results give no conclusive evidence regarding threshold hypothesis at the aggregate 
level of the EU-15, however, a welfare peak is found in a majority of the EU-15’s countries. Finally, as the 
ecological costs increased during the GDP-recovery from the financial crisis in 2010, the Section 5 concludes 
to prioritize a green recovery for a post-COVID transition. 
2. A standardized methodology for the EU-15 
This paper applies the same methodology as for the Belgian welfare study in Chapter 2, which should allow 
for meaningful comparisons across the EU-15 from 1995 to 2018. The methodology used can be seen as a 
core methodology using a full set of EWM-items. Similar to the Belgian study by Van der Slycken and Bleys 
in Chapter 2, I will calculate two EWM – the benefits and costs experienced (BCE) and the benefits and costs 
of present economic activities (BCPA): 
BCE = UW + Ci + S + Gc – DIREp – INQ – NEC         (3) 
BCPA = UW + Ci + S + Gc – DIREp – INQ – BEC + ΔK                               (4) 
In Eqs. 3 and 4: UW = unpaid work, Ci = individual consumption, S = shadow economy, Gc = non-defensive 
collective government consumption, DIREp = defensive, intermediate and rehabilitative private 
expenditures, INQ = welfare losses from income inequality, NEC = narrow ecological costs that are 
experienced in the present and within domestic borders, BEC = broad ecological costs, including current 
costs within domestic and the costs shifted in time and space, ΔK = capital adjustment. UW, Ci, S, Gc are 
valued positively; INQ, DIREp, NEC and BEC are deducted, whereas ΔK can be either positive or negative.  
Both EWM differ because they are based on two distinct welfare interpretations that are inspired by the 
income concepts of Fisher and Hicks – without being approximations of these income notions (Van der 
Slycken and Bleys, 2020a, 2020b). BCE has an experiential interpretation. Following Fisher’s psychic income 
concept, it traces the experiences that are currently experienced within domestic borders. As a 
consequence, it only includes current ecosystem costs within borders and does not include capital 
adjustments. Capital adjustments are excluded since Fisher distinguishes between income and capital and 
a measure based on his psychic income notion should only trace the current services following from capital 
stocks, but not additions to stocks. BCPA, in contrast, is broader as it accounts for a wider range of benefits 
and costs coming from present activities. BCPA registers the impacts of present activities, including the 
impacts shifted in time and space. Therefore, it accounts for the ecological costs shifted abroad and into 
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the future and includes a capital adjustment. Net capital growth is registered because it follows a Hicksian-
income view. A detailed explanation for all items (including data sources) can be found in Appendix A, while 
the monetary and population data used in the compilations can be found in Appendix B. 
3. Results 
First, I will present and discuss the welfare results for the EU-15 as a whole. In the next subsections, I will 
analyze and compare the welfare trends for each country.  
3.1 Welfare in the EU-15 
In order to analyze the overall economic performance of the EU-15 from 1995-2018, I calculated its 
aggregate GDP, BCE and BCPA by summing the corresponding individual measures across these countries. 
European aggregate numbers were divided by the EU-15’s total population to filter out population trends 
– the total population increased by 9.7% over the considered period – and obtain per capita figures, which 
are shown in Fig. 18. In what follows, the analysis focuses on per capita numbers, which are presented in 
lowercase (i.e. gdp, bce and bcpa), in contrast to aggregate numbers which are in capital letters. I will first 
elaborate on the EU-15’s overall economic performance and its driving factors and then discuss the welfare 
categories. Detailed growth rates of welfare indicators and categories for the EU-15 can be found in Tables 
7 and 8. 
During the considered period, gdp is in absolute values higher than both welfare indicators. Bce and bcpa 
are on average respectively 2.8% and 25.7% lower than gdp. From 1995 to 2018 all measures considered 
improved, albeit at different rates as shown in Table 7. Gdp outperformed both welfare indicators: gdp 
grew by 30.8%, bcpa increased by 17%, while bce improved by 12.9%. Over the entire period, gdp increased 
on average by 1.34% per annum (p.a.) versus 0.74% for bcpa and 0.56% for bce. Throughout the entire 
period, however, there are notable differences between the evolutions of ewm and gdp. By 2018, the EU-
15’s gdp had recovered from the financial crisis as it reached the same level as in 2017. Nonetheless, the 
EU-15 did not recover from the financial crisis from a welfare view as both bce and bcpa were below their 
2007-level. Bce reached its period welfare peak of €29,713 in 2006, while bcpa peaked at €22,995 in 2007. 
The studied period is split into five periods: 1) from 1995 to 2001 with rapid gdp and welfare growth; 2) 
from 2001 to 2007 when gdp and welfare improved at lower rates; 3) the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 
when gdp fell more sharply than both welfare measures; 4) the low growth period during the subsequent 
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Eurocrisis from 2009 to 2013 when gdp outperformed both welfare measures and 5) the post-crises period 
from 2013 to 2018 when gdp again outperformed bce and bcpa. 
Figure 18: Welfare and GDP per capita for the EU-15 in prices of 2010 (left panel) and as index values with 2007 = 100 
(right panel). 
 
Table 7: Average annual trends of welfare and GDP per capita for the EU-15 (in %). 
Time period gdp bce bcpa 
1995-2001 3,6 2,1 3,0 
2001-2007 1,3 0,2 0,2 
2007-2009 -4,9 -0,5 -1,7 
2009-2013 1,0 0,1 -0,1 








Note: The brackets indicate the total trend over the entire period, in contrast to the average annual trends in the 
subperiods. 
3.1.1 Period 1: 1995-2001 
In this first phase from 1995-2001 welfare and gdp rose sharply: gdp increased by on average 3.6% per 
annum (p.a.), bce by 2.1% p.a. and bcpa by 3% p.a. This welfare improvement was driven by an increase in 
individual consumption by €3,587 (i.e. on average +3.6% per year), yet, only a part of this consumption 
growth was translated into welfare since the welfare losses from income inequality increased by €1,578 
(i.e. an increase by 9.9% p.a.). The value of unpaid work is another important factor that helps to explain 
this period’s unique welfare improvement as it increased by €1,091 – on average +2% per year. 
74 
 
3.1.2 Period 2: 2001-2007 
In the build-up to the financial crisis from 2001 to 2007, gdp continued to grow, but its growth was slowing 
down as gdp only grew by on average 1.3% compared to 3.6% before. Welfare growth also slowed down as 
bce and bcpa only improved by on average 0.2% per year. Individual consumption was again the most 
important welfare driver: it increased by €1,381 (on average +1.1% p.a.). The value of the shadow economy 
also increased by €307 (on average +2% p.a.). Yet, the welfare improvements from consumption growth 
and the shadow economy were partly deducted as welfare losses from income inequality that increased by 
€934 or 3.7% per year. Gdp reached a peak right before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 at a level 
of €32,122 that was only reached again in 2018. Bce and bcpa, reached their period maximum in 
respectively 2006 and 2007. 
3.1.3 Period 3: 2007-2009 
During the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009, gdp and bcpa both dropped, but the crisis had a stronger 
negative impact on gdp than on bcpa. Gdp fell sharply by on average 4.9% p.a., while bcpa only dropped by 
on average 1.7% p.a and bce decreased on average by 0.5% per year. The trends in welfare were mainly 
caused by reduction in consumption expenditures by €1,307 (-3% p.a.), yet, this consumption decrease was 
to some extent compensated by reductions the welfare losses from income inequality by €906 (-8.8% p.a.). 
In the case of bcpa, plummeting capital adjustments strongly help to explain its fall as there was net capital 
declined by €1,097 (-27.2% p.a.). Yet, the drop in bcpa was tempered because broader ecological costs also 
fell by €642 (i.e. on average -3.6% p.a.). The narrow ecological cost fell at a higher rate of on average 4.1% 
per annum, however, this only resulted in a minor absolute reduction of by €34 as they are only a fraction 
of their broader counterpart. 
3.1.4 Period 4: 2009-2013 
In the period after the crisis from 2009 to 2013, the Europe’s gdp recovered and grew on average by 1% 
per year. In 2013, gdp, bce and bcpa all declined because of the European sovereign debt crisis. Welfare 
improved at a slower pace compared to gdp: bcpa decreased and bce increased by 0.1% per year. The 
welfare evolution was caused by increases in consumption by €599 (i.e. on average +0.7% p.a.), yet this was 
slightly compensated by increases in the welfare losses from income inequality by €344 or on average 2% 
per year. Bcpa growth was slightly lower than bce because the financial and Eurocrisis resulted in a capital 
adjustment that was €385 lower (-10.5% p.a.), however, this trend was tempered because during these 
crises the broader ecological costs also decreased by €200 (-0.6% p.a.).  
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3.1.5 Period 5: 2013-2018 
During the last period from 2013-2018, gdp again outperformed welfare: gdp increased by 1.3% p.a., while 
bcpa increased by 0.4% and bce decreased by 0.1% per year. Bcpa improved more than bce because capital 
adjustments surged by €504 (i.e. on average +18.8% p.a.). Other drivers in these moderate welfare 
improvements are consumption gains of €662 (+0.6% p.a.) and the increases in the welfare losses from 
inequality by €638 (i.e. +2.8% p.a.), which almost entirely compensated the consumption growth. It took 
until 2018 until gdp was recovered from the financial crisis by reaching its 2007-peak. Yet, bce and bcpa 
were by the end of the studied period 1.5% and 1.75% lower than their peak values in respectively 2006 
and 2007. 
3.1.6 A detailed breakdown of the welfare categories 
Detailed breakdowns of the EU-15’s welfare in absolute values in Fig. 19 and in relative weights of bcpa’s 
per capita welfare contributions and deductions in Fig. 20 illustrate that consumption and unpaid work are 
the welfare contributions of the highest quantitative importance, while the broader ecological costs and 
welfare losses from inequality are the largest welfare deductions. Over the studied period, consumption, 
the welfare losses from income inequality, the shadow economy and unpaid work impacted the welfare 
trend most. Consumption increased by €4,921 or 29.3%, which only increased its relative weight in the 
bcpa’s positive contributions from 52.2% in 1995 to 57.6% in 2018. The welfare losses from income 
inequality increased by €2,587 or 97.5%, which indicates that because of the diminishing marginal utility of 
income only 53.3% of the growth in consumption and the shadow economy is translated into welfare. The 
shadow economy and unpaid work had increasing positive welfare contributions as they respectively 
increased by €618 (+29.1%) and €589 (+6.4%) and due to its higher growth rate the shadow economy’s 
relative weight in bcpa’s positive welfare contributions increased from 6.6% in 1995 to 2018 7.3% in 2018, 




Figure 19: Welfare categories for the EU-15 in per capita values (2010 prices). 
 
Note: In this figure welfare deductions have been reclassified as negative numbers, even though these categories are 
deducted as positive numbers in Eq. 3 and 4 to calculate the aggregate welfare level. 
 
In contrast to bcpa’s broader ecological costs, bce’s narrow ecological costs are of negligible quantitative 
importance. Over time both costs fell: the narrow ecological costs decreased by €244 (-42.7%) versus €508 
(-5.9%) for their broader counterpart. Since the welfare losses from inequality rose and the broader 
ecological costs decreased, the former’s relative share in bcpa’s welfare deductions decreased from 66.3% 
to 53.2% while the latter’s weight increased from 20.69% in the initial year to 34.7% in the final year. The 
financial crisis made bcpa’s capital adjustment decrease, yet, although net capital growth increased by the 
end of the studied period, it was €313 or 23.1% lower in 2018 than it was in 1995 so that its share in bcpa’s 
positive contributions fell from 4.2% to 2.8%. Finally, government expenditures decreased over time by 
€318 or 11.6%, while defensive, rehabilitative and intermediate expenditures grew by €129 or 7.6%. The 
former’s share in the positive welfare contributions fell during the considered time period from 8.5% to 




Table 8: Average annual trends of welfare categories per capita for the EU-15 (in %). 
Time period uw ci s gc direp inq nec bec Δk 
1995-2001 2,0 3,6 3,1 -0,4 2,9 9,9 -2,9 0,2 5,4 
2001-2007 -0,5 1,1 2,0 0,1 1,1 3,7 -2,3 0,7 2,1 
2007-2009 -0,8 -3,0 -0,4 -1,4 -7,7 -8,8 -4,1 -3,6 -27,2 
2009-2013 0,0 0,7 -1,8 0,0 -0,2 2,0 -1,3 -0,6 -10,5 




















Note: The brackets indicate the total trend over the entire period, in contrast to the average annual trends in the 
subperiods. 
 
Figure 20: Relative weight of per capita BCPA’s welfare contributions (left panel) and welfare deductions (right panel) 





3.2 Welfare in the EU-15 countries 
In this section, I will discuss the EU-15-countries’ welfare and gdp trend for the period 1995-2018. Detailed 
calculations of bce, bcpa, welfare categories and individual items can be found in Appendix B. Table 9 gives 
an overview of the relative changes over time of each country’s gdp, bce, bcpa and its welfare categories. 
Table 9: Relative changes in percentage from 1995 to 2018 of gdp, bce, bcpa, and the welfare categories (per capita 
values, 2010 prices) for all countries and the EU-15. 
 
 
Note: The color scale indicates per column the highest values in shades of green and the lowest values in shades of 
red. 
  
gdp bce bcpa uw c s g dire inq new bec ca
EU-15 30,8 12,9 17,0 6,4 29,3 29,1 -11,6 7,6 97,5 -42,7 -5,9 -23,1
Austria 31,9 10,5 2,9 8,0 28,7 32,1 -19,4 4,1 97,3 -24,5 22,5 -13,6
Belgium 30,1 14,9 17,9 11,6 32,3 37,1 -23,4 11,7 89,9 -52,4 6,8 20,0
Denmark 27,4 14,3 24,4 24,1 23,1 30,7 -18,1 2,8 86,0 -33,7 -4,0 186,5
Finland 46,2 33,1 48,1 26,3 52,7 44,9 36,8 22,0 232,6 -38,0 23,1 538,2
France 27,7 18,0 28,0 14,1 28,2 24,8 9,3 18,0 83,4 -40,2 -7,5 23,5
Germany 29,5 7,3 7,5 -3,5 24,9 38,2 0,6 2,5 96,8 -33,4 -4,3 -40,6
Greece 4,8 2,4 -6,8 21,2 4,0 5,5 -44,4 0,9 3,9 -46,7 -7,5 -206,9
Ireland 180,7 42,4 45,7 47,8 73,4 178,0 29,2 3,1 522,4 -34,3 0,2 -111,2
Italy 18,7 5,2 2,0 1,1 21,8 19,6 -34,7 2,0 58,3 -42,6 -4,1 -93,9
Luxembourg 40,1 3,5 -47,1 6,0 8,2 36,5 38,4 0,8 49,3 -57,7 49,9 -3,6
Netherlands 35,7 -3,0 1,2 -16,6 32,3 34,7 -50,6 0,2 107,0 -57,3 -12,1 19,5
Portugal 29,8 35,5 31,5 72,1 27,8 29,1 0,7 32,2 63,9 -39,5 13,4 -97,1
Spain 35,9 10,4 4,7 -6,1 31,4 27,4 -5,7 3,3 112,5 -39,1 10,5 -37,0
Sweden 39,4 18,7 34,1 33,5 35,0 36,1 -18,3 12,4 160,0 -34,8 -5,8 109,0
UK 33,3 26,7 53,5 21,8 39,4 27,2 16,2 11,7 122,8 -59,4 -25,3 -8,3
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Austria’s bce increased by 10.5% and its bcpa only grew by 2.9% over the study period. This welfare 
improvement is much lower than its gdp growth (+31.9%). Gdp reached its maximum level in 2018, whereas 
bce and bcpa reached their period peak in respectively 2013 and 2000, as indicated in Fig. 21. Austria’s bcpa 
dropped in 2002 and 2003 by respectively 2.8% and 2.4% because the broader ecological costs (+13%) 
increased rapidly. The financial crisis had a strong impact on gdp that fell by 4.1% in 2009, but had no 
negative effect on bce (+1.75%) and bcpa (+1.05%). However, the crisis had a delayed impact on bcpa that 
decreased by 2.5% in 2010 mainly because the broader ecological costs increased by 4.9% during a polluting 
gdp-recovery. After recovering in 2010 and 2011, gdp stagnated from 2012 to 2015. Bce and bcpa declined 
from 2012 to 2017. In 2018, all three measures improved. Bcpa jumped up by 2.6% in 2018 since individual 
consumption grew by 1.1%, while the broader ecological costs decreased by 2.2% and net capital grew by 
8.2%. 
Figure 21: Austria’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 (right 






Belgium’s gdp increased by 30.1%, while its bce and bcpa improved by about half of that rate: bce increased 
by 14.9% and bcpa by 17.9%. The financial crisis made Belgium’s gdp decrease in 2008 (-0.3%) and 2009 (-
3%). The crisis did not negatively impact bce and bcpa as both measures grew by 2.4% and 5.1% in 2009, as 
illustrated in Fig. 22. The sharp rise in bcpa was mainly caused by decreasing broader ecological costs (-
7.4%). However, there was a delayed crisis effect for Belgium too as bce and bcpa decreased by respectively 
0.3% and 4.3% while gdp grew by 2% in 2010. The largest contributor to the deterioration in bcpa is an 
increase in the broader ecological costs by 5.8%. After the polluting recovery in 2010, gdp stagnated from 
2010 and 2013, while bcpa and bce declined between 2014 and 2017. In 2018, all three indicators increased 
so that gdp and bcpa reached their period maximum in 2018. Bce, in contrast, already peaked in 2009. 
Figure 22: Belgium’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 
(right axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right panel. All values 





Denmark’s bcpa and gdp followed a comparable trend over the entire period (see Fig. 23), the former 
improved by 24.4% and the latter by 27.4%. Bce only enhanced by 14.3% over the study period. Denmark 
was strongly impacted by the financial crisis in 2009 seen from a gdp-view but not from a welfare 
perspective: gdp fell by 5.4%, while bce and bcpa increased by 3.3% and 1.7% because the welfare losses 
from income inequality dropped by 5.3%. The evolution of bcpa was also driven by decreases in the broader 
ecological costs (-4.6%) and capital adjustment (-29.1%). The response in welfare was lagged. In 2010, bce 
stagnated, whereas bcpa diminished by 2.2% mainly due to rising broader ecological costs (+4.9%). By the 
end of the study period, gdp grew, bcpa fluctuated and increased too so that bcpa and gdp reached their 
maximum level in 2018, while bce slightly oscillated but decreased compared to its 2012 peak. 
Figure 23: Denmark’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 
(right axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right panel. All values 





Finland performed better than the EU-15 on average over the entire period: its gdp grew by 46.2%, its bcpa 
improved by 48.1% and its bce bettered by 33.1%. Notwithstanding these remarkable evolutions, its gdp 
level was 1.7% lower in 2018 compared to its peak in 2008, while its bce and bcpa were in 2018 respectively 
0.5% and 4.3% lower than their peak value in 2012. As shown in Fig. 24, The financial crisis impacted Finland 
strongly from a gdp-perspective, but not from a welfare view. In 2009, Finland’s gdp dropped by 8.6%, 
however, its bcpa improved by 7.3% due do sharply falling broader ecological costs (-13.4%). The 
subsequent gdp recovery by 2.7% in 2010 was polluting and detrimental to bcpa, which fell by 4.9% as the 
broader ecological costs rose by 16.5%. 
Figure 24: Finland’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 
(right axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right panel. All values 





From 1995 to 2018, France’s bcpa and gdp both improved by about 28%, while the increase in bce was 10 
percentage points lower. The financial crisis resulted in gdp decreases of 0.3 and 3.4% in 2008 and 2009, 
whereas bce and bcpa by 0.7% and 1.1% in 2008. Bce and bcpa increased by 2% and 0.7% in 2009, whereas 
there was no delayed response in ewm as both welfare indicators remained constant in 2011. The biggest 
explanatory factor for the welfare drop in 2008, is a rise by 7.7% in the welfare losses from income 
inequality. All three indicators gradually improved after the financial crisis, so that they reached their 
maximum level in 2018, as illustrated in Fig. 25. 
Figure 25: France’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 (right 






Germany’s improvement in bce and bcpa was only about a quarter of its gdp growth: gdp increased by 
29.5% versus an increase by 7.3% in bce and by 7.5% in bcpa. Bcpa peaked in 2000 and decreased the next 
four consecutive years because there was strong decrease in net capital growth (see Fig. 26). Germany’s 
bce fluctuated around its 2001-level and peaked in 2012. The financial crisis had almost no effect on 
Germany’s ewm, yet, bce and bcpa were more heavily impacted in 2013 when the former decreased by 
1.5% and the latter by 3.1%. 
Figure 26: Germany’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 
(right axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right panel. All values 
are in 2010 prices. 




Greece’s economic experience from 1995 to 2018 is bell-shaped: its gdp and bcpa increased from the 
beginning of the studied period and reached a peak in 2007 (see Fig. 27). The evolution of bce is similar, 
yet, bce reached its maximum in 2009. Gdp increased in 2007 by 34% compared to 1995, whereas its bce 
was 24.4% higher and its bcpa was even 39% higher in 2007 than it was in 1995 – yet, afterwards all 
measures decreased substantially. The financial crisis and the subsequent eurocrisis had dramatic effects 
on Greece’s economy. Greece lost 25.9% of its gdp in the five years from 2008 to 2013 – its gdp level in 
2013 was even 1.2% lower than it was in 1995 – whereas Greece’s bce and bcpa decreased by 17.4% and 
31% between 2008 and 2013. Contrarily to gdp, which started increasing from 2013, bce and bcpa 
continuously declined until 2016. During this welfare crash, net consumption plummeted, the value of 
unpaid work dropped as wages started falling, the shadow economy shrunk and government expenditures 
were reduced.34 More strikingly, Greece’s capital adjustments dropped dramatically too, which explains 
why bcpa fell more than bce. From 2011 onwards, Greece even had negative net capital growth, which 
indicates a declining capital stock. During the last two years of the study period Greece’s bce and bcpa 
stabilized at a much lower level. In 2018, bce, bcpa and gdp were respectively 20.1%, 32.9% and 21.8% 
below their peak value – bcpa was even still below its starting value in 1995. 
Figure 27: Greece’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 
(right axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right panel. All values 
are in 2010 prices. 
 
                                                     
34 The variability in the value of unpaid work depends entirely on changes in the wage rate. As I only have one 
datapoint, the number of unpaid hours worked is kept constant. Other countries have two datapoints, which allows 
me to interpolate the time use between both datapoints, which introduces time use variability too. 
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Ireland’s economy grew remarkably during the mid-1990s to the late-2000s, the period when Ireland’s 
economy was known as the ‘Celtic Tiger’. Ireland’s gdp almost doubled (+92.8%) between 1995 and 2007, 
as can be seen in Fig. 28. After a recession and stagnation from 2008 to 2013, gdp had grown by 180.7% 
over the entire study period. In 2018, Ireland’s gdp reached its maximum with a value of more than €60,000. 
Ireland’s improvement in bce and bcpa was about a quarter of its gdp growth: bce increased by 42.4% and 
bcpa by 45.7%. Its bce peaked in 2011, while its bcpa surged by 23.7% and peaked in 2016 after a strong 
increase in net capital growth by 376%. Bcpa by 9% and 13.6% in 2017 and 2018 because its capital 
adjustment plunged after its earlier spike and became negative in 2018. In contrast to the other countries, 
net capital growth is a quantitatively important welfare component that also introduces more variability in 
the Irish bcpa. Given the evolution of Irelands investments (in capital), the results of both bcpa and gdp – 
the Irish gdp grew by 24.5% in 2015 – are to be used and interpreted with caution. 
Figure 28: Ireland’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 (right 






Italy is an outlier compared to the other countries as its bce is higher than its gdp during the entire period 
(see Fig. 29). Italy had a double recession as it first suffered from the financial crisis and later from the 
eurocrisis. In 2009, its gdp fell by 6.1% while the negative effect of the crisis was less severe for its bce and 
bcpa as the former decreased by 1.9% and the latter by 2.3%. During the eurocrisis, gdp, bce and bcpa 
dwindled between 2012 and 2014. Yet, bce and bcpa continued decreasing until 2016. Similar to Greece, 
Italy also capital adjustment decreased substantially after the financial crisis and Italy also had negative net 
capital growth between 20113 and 2017. Italy’s gdp peaked right before the financial crisis in 2007 – it had 
grown by 28.6% compared to 1995 – and after the double recession, the Italian gdp was in 2018 18.7% 
higher than in 1995. Italy’s bce and bcpa peaked in 2006 and were in 2018, respectively 5.2% and 2% higher 
than their starting value. 
Figure 29: Italy’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 (right 
axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right panel. All values are 





Similar to Ireland, Luxembourg’s gdp is extremely high too: its 2018-level of €83,000 was 40.1% higher 
compared to the initial year when it was almost at €60,000, as illustrated by Fig. 30. Luxembourg’s bcpa 
was very volatile, with remarkable upturns and downturns between 2006 and 2008 and in 2011 and 2012 
because its broader ecological costs – and in particular the cost of climate disruption – fluctuated heavily 
during these years. Bce was more constant throughout the entire period. Over the entire period, gdp and 
bce improved by respectively 40.1% and 3.5% whereas bcpa decreased by 47.1%. Luxembourg did not cross 
its 2007-peak value again by the end of the period and neither did it transgress its maxima in bce and bcpa 
that peaked in respectively 2003 and 1999. 
Figure 30: Luxembourg’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 
100 (right axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right panel. All 





Netherlands’ gdp reached its maximum in 2018 when it had increased by 35.7% since 1995 (see Fig. 31). Its 
bcpa, in contrast, only increased by 1.2% over time, while bce even decreased by 3%. Both ewm peaked 
early: bcpa peaked in 2001 and bce one year later. After their peak, both ewm decreased gradually in the 
early 2000s. During the financial crisis in 2009, both gdp and bcpa decreased by respectively 4.1% and 0.4%, 
yet bce  improved by 1.8%. Also the Netherlands’ bcpa has a stronger lagged effect of this crisis in 2010 
mainly because the capital adjustment increased and to a lesser extent due to rising broader ecological 
costs. The crisis had a minor impact on the Dutch bce and bcpa, while Netherlands’ gdp only fully recovered 
from the financial crisis by 2016.  
Figure 31: Netherland’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 
100 (right axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right panel. All 





Similar to the Netherlands, Portugal’s bce was higher than its gdp throughout the entire period, as depicted 
in Fig. 32. Gdp grew by 29.8%, which is less than its welfare performance as bce and bcpa improved by 
respectively 35.5% and 31.5% over the study period. Portugal’s ewm were not negatively affected by the 
financial crisis between 2009 and 2010, however, the eurocrisis caused a decrease in bce and bcpa between 
2012 and 2017. Bcpa diminished more sharply than bce because the capital adjustment became negative. 
Parallel to Italy and Greece, Portugal also had negative net capital growth between 2012 and 2017. 
Figure 32: Portugal’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 
(right axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right panel. All values 





Spain is one of the few countries whose bce is higher than gdp during the largest part of the study period, 
as shown in Fig. 33. Spain’s gdp and bce peaked in 2018 at a level that was respectively 35.9% and 10.4% 
higher than in 1995. The Spanish bcpa only improved by 4.7% and reached its peak in 2008. The financial 
crisis had a stronger impact on gdp and bcpa than on bce. Its gdp fell from 2007 to 2013, but recovered 
afterwards and surpassed its pre-crisis maximum value in 2018. Bcpa by 8.7% between 2008 and 2012, 
primarily because net capital growth fell sharply. 
Figure 33: Spain’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 
(right axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right panel. All 





Sweden’s gdp, bce and bcpa follow a very similar path as indicated by Fig. 34 . All indicators dropped 
markedly after the financial crisis, but recovered quickly. The financial crisis and its recovery resulted in a 
V-shape for the Swedish bce, bcpa and gdp: these measures fell between 2007 and 2009 by respectively 
4.8%, 7.4% and 18.1% whereas they improved by respectively 14.6%, 17.9% and 30.3% between 2009 and 
2013. All measures peaked in 2013 and fell subsequently. In 2018, the Swedish gdp is 39.4% higher than it 
was in 1995, however, the end value was 8.4% lower than its peak. The Swedish bce and bcpa rose by 18.7% 
and 34.1%, which is respectively 9.3% and 6% than their peak in 2013. 
Figure 34: Sweden’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 2007 = 100 
(right axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right panel. All 





The UK’s gdp and ewm follow very parallel trajectories (see Fig. 35). The UK’s ewm and gdp improved 
immensely between 1995 and 2000. The UK’s gdp peaked in 2007 when it had increased by 64.2% 
compared to 1995. The financial crisis impacted the UK heavily: in just two years, gdp fell by 27.8%, while 
bce decreased by 11.6% and bcpa by 17%. Bce and gdp partially recovered towards 2015, while bcpa peaked 
in 2015. From 2015 onwards, all indicators started dwindling after the UK decided to leave the European 
Union – gdp fell by 15.5%, bce by 11.7% and bcpa by 13.2% in just two years. Despite this economic setback 
at the end, gdp, bce and bcpa still had improved over the study period by respectively 33.3%, 26.7% and 
53.5%. 
Figure 35: The United Kingdom’s GDP, BCE and BCPA per capita in absolute values (left axis) and index values with 
2007 = 100 (right axis) on the left panel and the evolution of the welfare categories in per capita values on the right 
panel. All values are in 2010 prices. 
 
 
3.3 Comparing peak values in the EU-15 
In the previous section, some country’s bce, bcpa and gdp reached a maximum value during and not at the 
end of the study period. We called this period maximum a peak. However, some peaks were only slightly 
higher than the value of these indicators in 2018, while other peaks were absolutely peaks in the sense that 
the peak value was much higher than the indicators’ level at the end of the study period. Here we will 
compare which countries end values are only slightly below their peak values and which countries are well 
below  their peak values. Table 10 gives an overview of the years in which gdp, bce and bcpa peaked and 
the relative difference of these indicator’s value compared to the peak value. 
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The EU-15’s bce and bcpa peaked in 2006 and 2007, however, their level in 2018 was only 1.5% and 1.8% 
lower than their peak value. Yet, the bce value in 2018 was at least 5 percent lower than its maximum value 
for Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands. The 2018-bce was much lower than peak-bce in Greece (-
20.1%), Sweden (-9.3%) and the UK (-13%). When we compare bcpa-values, then we observe that more 
countries are well below their peak-value. Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden are more than 5 
percent below their maximum bcpa-value in 2018, while the 2018 bcpa-value of Italy and the UK is 
respectively 10.4% and 13.7% lower than at the maximum value. The reduction in bcpa was worst in Ireland 
Greece and Luxembourg, where the 2018 bcpa-values were respectively 21.4%, 32.9% and 56% lower than 
their maximum bcpa-value. Finally, gdp reached a maximum for the EU-15 and most of its countries in 2018. 
Yet, gdp had decreased in Italy by 7.7%, in Sweden by 8.4%, in the UK by 18.8% and in Greece by 21.8% in 
2018 compared to their period maximum-gdp. 
Table 10: Year in which the EU-15-countries reached their peak or maximum GDP, BCE and BCPA (in per capita 
values, 2010 prices) and the relative difference between the value in the peak year and in 2018. 
 
 
Note: The color scale for the peak values indicates the most recent peak years in shades of green and the oldest peak 
years in shades of red. 
  
max year %Δ(2018-max year) max year %Δ(2018-max year) max year %Δ(2018-max year)
EU-15 2018 0 2006 -1,5 2007 -1,8
Austria 2018 0 2013 -1,2 2000 -3,1
Belgium 2018 0 2009 -0,3 2018 0
Denmark 2018 0 2012 -0,9 2018 0
Finland 2008 -1,7 2012 -0,5 2012 -4,3
France 2018 0 2018 0 2018 0
Germany 2018 0 2012 -0,9 2000 -1,7
Greece 2007 -21,8 2009 -20,1 2007 -32,9
Ireland 2018 0 2011 -5,2 2016 -21,4
Italy 2007 -7,7 2006 -6,7 2006 -10,4
Luxembourg 2007 -2,1 2003 -6,4 1999 -56
Netherlands 2018 0 2002 -5,2 2001 -5,6
Portugal 2018 0 2001 -0,6 2010 -5,7
Spain 2018 0 2018 0 2008 -5,3
Sweden 2013 -8,4 2013 -9,3 2013 -6




4. Revisiting the threshold hypothesis 
Our welfare results for the EU-15 as a whole do not indicate a strong decline compared to its peak value. 
Yet, our results clearly indicate that: (a) welfare has been stagnating after the financial crisis of 2008 and 
2009, (b) our welfare measures have not recovered from the financial crisis, while gdp has and (c) the 
economic welfare measures in majority of the EU-15 countries (i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) were more than 5% lower by the end of the study period 
in 2018 compared to their earlier welfare peak. 
Our results for the countries just mentioned gives evidence regarding Max-Neef’s (1995) threshold 
hypothesis, stating that “for every society there seems to be a period in which economic growth (as 
conventionally measured) brings about an improvement in the quality of life, but only up to a point – the 
threshold point – beyond which, if there is more economic growth, quality of life may being to deteriorate”. 
Yet, our findings for the EU-15 as a whole give no conclusive evidence regarding the threshold hypothesis, 
since the economic welfare per capita in the EU-15 as a whole is less than two percent below its period 
maximum. The reason that the threshold hypothesis fails to materialize for the EU-15 as a whole could, 
however, be methodological as the EWM only include a limited amount of ecological items. The 
methodology that is currently used, for instance, does not include the losses in agricultural land, forests, 
grasslands and wetlands, because of a lack of available data. Chapter 4 will look into this in greater detail. 
Max-Neef (1995) thought of the threshold as indicating the point “in a country’s economic evolution where 
quantitative growth must be metamorphosed into qualitative development”, yet, he acknowledged that 
welfare could still increase. If we acknowledge that (a) ever increasing incomes will lead to increasingly 
smaller additions to welfare due to the correction for the diminishing marginal utility of income, (b) 
economic growth is ecologically costly and (c) many economists argue that we are in a situation of Secular 
Stagnation, in which economic growth rates have declined and are not likely to return to their earlier higher 
growth rates (Summers, 2016; Jackson, 2018), then policies that empower economies and societies to fare 
well without growth will become increasingly important in the future. With effective social and 
environmental welfare policies in place, EWM could increase beyond their earlier welfare peak or threshold 
point. Examples of these policies, could be a Green New Deal without growth (Mastini et al., 2021), 
measures that make social security and welfare systems less dependent on growth (Bohnenberger and Fritz, 
2020), or a post-COVID economic agenda that takes into account inequality (Ashford et al., 2020) and 
biodiversity (McElwee et al., 2020) to build back better. More concretely, Büscher et al. (2021) outline five 
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priorities for a post-COVID development pathway: (1) a move away from development focused on 
aggregate economic growth, (2) an economic framework focused on redistribution and care, (3) a 
transformation towards regenerative agriculture and convivial conservation, (4) reduction of consumption 
and travel, and (5) debt cancellation. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper is the first to calculate welfare for the EU-15 as a whole and for its 15 original members using a 
comparable methodology. Two economic welfare measures were calculated, the benefits and costs 
experienced (BCE) and the benefits and costs of present economic activities (BCPA). The former only looks 
at what is experienced here and now: it only includes present ecological costs within borders and excludes 
capital adjustments. The broad measure looks at the impacts of present activities and, as a consequence, it 
includes capital adjustments and also contains the ecological costs that are shifted in time and space. Since 
there are substantial costs shifted in time and space, we argued that the broad welfare measure is to be 
preferred to inform policy-makers about the (need to tackle the) climate and ecological crisis.  
For the EU-15, GDP per capita increased by 30.8% between 1995 and 2018, while its BCE and BCPA improved 
by respectively 12.9% and 17%. These trends in per capita BCE and BCPA were driven by individual 
consumption growth (+29.3%) and the welfare losses from income inequality (+97.5%), yet, since the 
welfare losses from income inequality increased, part of the growth in consumption is not translated into 
welfare because of the diminishing marginal utility of income. Despite these overall improvements over the 
entire period, GDP per capita barely improved after 2007: it only fully recovered from the financial crisis in 
2018, when the EU-15’s GDP per capita reached its maximum value that was slightly higher than its pre-
crisis level. The EU-15’s economic welfare per capita already peaked right before the financial crisis in 2006 
for BCE and in 2007 for BCPA. In 2018, BCE per capita and BCPA per capita were respectively 1.5% and 1.8% 
below their maximum values. As a consequence, we found no conclusive evidence regarding the threshold 
hypothesis for the EU-15 as a whole. However, we found evidence of threshold points in Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK, where the welfare levels were at least 
5% lower by the end of the study period in 2018 compared to their maximum welfare value. 
Finally, the financial crisis and its recovery had a different impact on GDP and economic welfare measures. 
In contrast to GDP, the response in economic welfare measures to the financial crisis of 2009 was delayed 
in some countries: their per capita BCPA only fell during the economic GDP-recovery in 2010 as the broader 
ecological costs increased. At the level of the EU-15, the broader ecological costs decreased in 2009 but 
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increased again in 2010 during an environmentally more polluting recovery in GDP per capita. Our results 
thus indicate in a post-COVID agenda it is needed to aim for a green and just economic recovery that is 
centered around welfare and a move beyond GDP that prioritizes human well-being within planetary 
boundaries without growth.  
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Chapter 4 : Are the ISEW and GPI able to reveal social and biophysical 
limits to growth? An in-depth analysis of the threshold hypothesis for 
the EU-15.35 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, calls have been made to urgently move beyond GDP as it is a bad indicator for social 
welfare, societal well-being or economic progress (Stiglitz et al., 2009, 2018; Costanza et al., 2014, 
Kubiszewski et al., 2013; Hoekstra, 2019). As a way to guide the transition away from GDP toward 
sustainable well-being, countries should adopt new metrics (Costanza et al., 2014). The Index of Sustainable 
Economic Welfare (ISEW) or its variant, the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), are potential candidates to 
do so, because they account for many of GDP’s deficiencies when used as a welfare indicator. These 
economic welfare measures (EWM) register the monetary benefits and costs of economic activities and 
make adjustments for the value of unpaid work, the diminishing marginal utility of income, the consumption 
of physical and natural capital and the externalities or costs shifted to society and the ecosystem. Other 
attempts to guide the transition beyond GDP toward well-being and sustainability also favor a move beyond 
a single indicator by focusing on a set or dashboard of indicators – see, for instance, Meadows (1998), 
Stiglitz et al. (2009), O’Neill (2012), Raworth (2017) and O’Neill et al. (2018). The key advantage of EWM is 
that they provide a direct alternative to GDP to evaluate economic performance in a broader way. In order 
to overcome the criticisms regarding the one-dimensionality of and monetary valuation in EWM, Berik 
(2018) suggested to complement the welfare measurement approach with a narrative approach in a plural 
policy-input process.  
Despite the fact that GDP is widely criticized, it is still influential in politics, economics, policy-making and 
society (van den Bergh, 2009). According to van den Bergh, this “GDP paradox” can be explained by 
recognizing that many economists accept the GDP-criticism but refute its relevance. Daly and Cobb (2007) 
thought that a conservatively estimated ISEW that is no longer correlated with GDP would help to persuade 
economists to no longer deny the relevance of the GDP-criticism, and consequently facilitate the move 
                                                     
35 This paper is co-authored with Brent Bleys (Ghent University). 
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beyond GDP. Therefore, several authors claim that the ISEW can best be seen as an indicator to ‘debunk’ 
GDP as a policy guide and objective (Ziegler, 2007; Daly and Cobb, 2007).  
The first welfare studies in the early 1990s confirmed this divergence between GDP and the ISEW, which 
led Max-Neef (1995, p. 117) to formulate the threshold hypothesis: “for every society there seems to be a 
period in which economic growth (as conventionally measured) brings about an improvement in the quality 
of life, but only up to a point – the threshold point – beyond which, if there is more economic growth, 
quality of life may begin to deteriorate.” Nonetheless, authors such as Neumayer (1999, 2000), for instance, 
were critical of the materialization of the original threshold hypothesis as the results were highly dependent 
upon methodological choices for the valuation of non-renewable resource depletion and long-term 
environmental damage such as accumulating environmental costs over time. Max-Neef (1995) alluded the 
threshold point may be the vindication of John Stuart Mill’s (1848) stationary state or Herman Daly’s (1974) 
steady-state economy. A study estimating the global GPI based on the welfare results from 17 countries 
(containing 53% of global population and 57% of global GDP) for the period 1950-2003 found that global 
GPI per capita peaked in 1978 (Kubiszewski et al., 2013). Kubiszewski and co-authors argued that the focus 
in development policies needed to shift “away from maximizing production and consumption (GDP) and 
towards improving genuine human well-being (GPI or something similar). This is a shift that will require far 
more attention to be paid to environmental protection, full employment, social equity, better product 
quality and durability, and greater resource use efficiency (i.e., reducing the resource intensity per dollar of 
GDP).” Also Max-Neef (1995) thought of the threshold as indicating the point “in a country’s economic 
evolution where quantitative growth must be metamorphosed into qualitative development”, yet, he 
acknowledged that welfare could still increase.  
The threshold hypothesis is based on the common economic principles of decreasing marginal benefits and 
increasing marginal costs. Based on these principles one would expect as production and consumption grow 
over time that the additional benefits of growth would be decreasing due to the diminishing marginal utility 
of income and that the additional costs caused to the ecosystem would be increasing because infinite 
growth on a limited planet is ecologically destructive. Or in other words: there are social and biophysical 
limits to growth. Since, few studies have investigated the empirics behind the threshold hypothesis, this 
study explores whether the recent welfare study for the EU-15 from 1995 to 2018 in Chapter 3 gives 
evidence in favor of decreasing marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the welfare methodology used for the EU-15, while 
Section 3 articulates the rationale and expectations behind the threshold hypothesis. Section 4 examines 
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the existence of social and biophysical limits to growth in the EU-15’s welfare and while we find no clear 
threshold point for the period from 1995 to 2018, we do observe that welfare per capita has been 
stagnating after the financial crisis. Section 5 outlines that we have to interpret the aggregate welfare trend 
with caution as the current EWM methodology only is able to capture the effect of social limits to growth 
but less so when it comes to capturing the unprecedented scale and urgency of the ecological challenges 
(i.e. biophysical limits to growth). This section also proposes different ways in which EWM could be used to 
increase their transformative potential. Finally, we will also suggest a “living well within limits” narrative to 
accompany EWM as a concrete alternative to move beyond GDP. 
2. Two economic welfare measures with two distinct interpretations 
EWM were historically developed as a response to account for GDP’s deficiencies as a welfare measure by 
tracking both the monetized benefits and the costs of economic activities. Yet, as argued by Van der Slycken 
and Bleys (2020a) there are two different ways to look at these benefits and costs. One perspective sees 
welfare as the benefits and costs experienced today (BCE), while the other views welfare as accounting for 
the current and future benefits and costs of present economic activities (BCPA). The corresponding welfare 
measures both include welfare categories that account for unpaid work, individual consumption, non-
defensive government expenditures and the shadow economy as benefits, while defensive, intermediate 
and rehabilitative expenditures, ecological costs and the welfare losses from income inequality are 
deducted. However, the ecological costs of economic activities are included differently in both measures. 
BCE only includes the narrow ecological costs experienced here and now, i.e. present ecological costs within 
domestic borders, while BCPA incorporates broader ecological costs that additionally include those costs 
that are shifted in time and space. Finally, BCPA also includes net capital growth as it can be regarded as a 
benefit from present activities. BCE does not include this capital adjustment since it does not yield present 
experiences. As explained in Chapter 2, both EWM can be mathematically represented as: 
 
BCE = UW + Ci + S + Gc – DIREp – INQ – NEC         (3) 
BCPA = UW + Ci + S + Gc – DIREp – INQ – BEC + ΔK                               (4) 
In Eqs. 3 and 4: UW = unpaid work, Ci = individual consumption, S = shadow economy, Gc = non-defensive 
collective government consumption, DIREp = defensive, intermediate and rehabilitative private 
expenditures, INQ = welfare losses from income inequality, NEC = narrow ecological costs that are 
experienced in the present and within domestic borders, BEC = broad ecological costs, including current 
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costs within domestic and the costs shifted in time and space, ΔK = capital adjustment. UW, Ci, S, Gc are 
valued positively; INQ, DIREp, NEC and BEC are deducted, whereas ΔK can be either positive or negative. 
BCE only includes NEC, while BCPA incorporates BEC. NEC includes the current cost of air pollution, the cost 
of extreme weather events and the cost of nitrogen pollution. BEC additionally incorporates the future cost 
of air pollution and the cost of air pollution embodied in trade, the cost of climate disruption, the cost of 
use of nuclear power and the depletion of non-renewable energy resources, while it excludes the cost of 
extreme weather events in order to avoid double counting with the cost climate disruption. 
For the remainder of this paper, we will reorganize the categories in Eqs. (3) and (4) into a benefit and cost 
account. The costs of economic activity mainly relate to the ecological costs, i.e. the costs related to 
environmental pollution, environmental degradation and natural capital depletion. The costs caused to the 
ecosystem are taken into account in EWM because nature is the ultimate means or the ultimate source of 
wealth that provides the economy with low entropy materials and energy as inputs, assimilates high 
entropy waste outputs and provides the necessary conditions for a life-sustaining planet such as a benign 
climate. Since human-made capital depreciates, a continuous flow of matter and energy (‘throughput’) 
from nature to the economy is needed to fuel economic activity and maintain human-made capital. In this 
process, part of nature’s source, sink and life-support services are lost or sacrificed. That is why, the ISEW 
registers these losses as the ultimate costs of economic activities. Lawn (2008) explains that these 
ecosystem costs or these natural capital services lost in the economic process go back to Daly (1979). The 
benefits of economic activity is the sum of all the other categories. Although defensive, intermediate and 
rehabilitative expenditures are deducted, we do not classify them as a cost because they merely serve to 
know what part of consumption expenditures should count as a net benefit. In conclusion, the benefits and 
cost account for BCE and BCPA are thus equal to: 
BBCE = UW + Ci + S + Gc – DIREp – INQ                                  (11) 
CBCE = NEC                                     (12) 
BBCPA = UW + Ci + S + Gc – DIREp – INQ + ΔK                               (13) 
CBCPA = BEC                                   (14) 
where BBCE = the benefits of the BCE-interpretation, CBCE = the costs of the BCE-interpretation, BBCPA = the 
benefits of the BCPA-interpretation and CBCPA = the costs of the BCPA-interpretation. 
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3. The rationale behind the threshold hypothesis 
The main reason why welfare practitioners expect a threshold and why GDP would at some point no longer 
be correlated with welfare can be linked to the principle of the decreasing marginal utility of income and 
the principle of increasing marginal cost. These principles make it for an enterprise only optimal to expand 
its scale or to grow up to the point where the additional benefits are equal to the extra costs. If it expands 
its scale any further, then it becomes suboptimal. While these are a common microeconomic principles, 
Daly and Farley (2004) argue that in ecological economics, the logic of the optimal scale also applies to the 
entire macroeconomy and its parts. At the macroeconomic level, it is only desirable to expand the physical 
scale of the economy (i.e. to grow or to increase production and consumption), if the additional benefits 
are larger than the additional costs. In this case growth is economic because it brings more benefits than 
costs. If the additional costs outweigh the benefits, than growth is ‘uneconomic’ (Daly, 1996) or ‘anti-
economic’ (Lawn and Sanders, 1999). At the macroeconomic level, the principles of diminishing marginal 
benefits and increasing marginal costs are known as, respectively, social limits to growth (Hirsch, 1976; 
Kallis, 2015) and biophysical limits to growth (Meadows et al., 1972). 
Since EWM measure the difference between the benefits and costs of economic activities, it is expected 
that economic welfare will start to decrease once marginal costs exceed marginal benefits (Lawn and 
Sanders, 1995) and, as a consequence, the threshold hypothesis will be confirmed. For Lawn (2008, p. 71) 
the switch from economic to uneconomic growth is “an inevitable outcome given the applicability of the 
principles of diminishing marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs in a finite world subject to the first 
and second laws of thermodynamics and where human beings possess a limited physiological capacity to 
experience well-being”. According to Lawn (2008) EWM are capable to signal whether growth is economic 
or uneconomic and whether an economy has exceeded its optimal macroeconomic scale. Yet, although the 
issue of scale is a central element in Daly and Cobb’s (1989) book For the Common Good, in which the ISEW 
was introduced in the appendix, they did not explicitly connect the ISEW to the optimal scale. This was only 
done later on by Lawn and Sanders (1999) and Brennan (2008). Nonetheless, the elaboration of the ISEW 
was motivated by the problem of scale between the economy and the ecosystem (Daly and Cobb, 1989; 
Brennan, 2008; Ziegler, 2007). 
The principles of diminishing marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs enter EWM via adjustment 
for the welfare losses from income inequality and via the ecological costs. Income growth is subject to 
diminishing marginal utility. The extra benefit of an extra dollar for wealthy people is much lower than 
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giving an extra dollar to people in need. Furthermore, there is also a diminishing marginal utility of total 
income growth over time. Because of the existence of status or positional goods and phenomena such as 
“keeping up with the Joneses” (e.g. larger houses and expensive cars), the gains from possessing these 
goods disappear as incomes grow and give more people access to them, which illustrates that there are 
certain social limits to what growth can deliver in terms of social welfare or well-being (Hirsch, 1976; Kallis, 
2015). Or to put it in other words: when a rising tide lifts all boats, no one notices that the tide is rising. 
Since EWM deduct the welfare losses from income inequality as a way to account for the diminishing 
marginal utility of income, it is expected that net consumption after the inequality correction is subject to 
diminishing marginal benefits. As a consequence, the benefits of economic activity (i.e. BBCE and BBCPA) 
should also be subject to diminishing marginal returns. 
The costs of economic activity (i.e. CBCE and CBCPA) mainly relate to the ecological costs, as already explained 
in Section 2. After the Limits to Growth report in 1972, an increasing number of studies indicates that 
economic growth comes at an enormous ‘ecological cost’. The life-supporting Earth System has already 
been severely impacted by human activities. In a recent paper titled ‘Scientists’ warning on affluence’, 
Wiedmann et al. (2020) illustrate that environmental impacts are mainly driven by affluence: “for over half 
a century, worldwide growth in affluence has continuously increased resource use and pollutant emissions 
far more rapidly than these have been reduced through better technology”. Steffen et al. (2015) found that 
several planetary boundaries have already been crossed, which means that humanity may push itself out 
of a ‘safe operating space’ (Rockström et al., 2009). Climate change, for instance, poses an increasing threat 
of unexpected and irreversible changes in the climate system (Lenton et al., 2019). If climate tipping points 
are crossed, the Earth System would be on a “Hothouse Earth” trajectory that is likely to lead to severe 
disruptions ecosystems, societies and economies (Steffen et al., 2018). Since economic activities and 
economic growth are closely linked to an acceleration in climate change, environmental degradation and 
the loss of biodiversity and natural capital (EEA, 2020), there are increasing ecological costs associated to 
growth and economic activities. Incessantly pursuing infinite growth on a finite planet will eventually make 
the ecological costs rise exponentially and go to infinity as the ecological catastrophe limit is being 





4. A threshold point for the EU-15? 
In order to verify the existence of a threshold point for the EU-15, we will investigate whether an expansion 
of the scale of the macroeconomy measured by GDP is coupled with welfare or not by using the data from 
Chapter 3. We will focus on per capita data of GDP, BCE and BCPA (in lower case) to filter out the population 
trend. Over the entire period from 1995 to 2018, gdp grew by 30.8%, while bcpa and bce improved by 
respectively 17% and 12.9%. During this period, the correlation between gdp and bce and gdp and bcpa 
was high with respectively R2 = 0.858 and R2 = 0.865. Fig. 36 illustrates that growth in gdp is coupled to 
welfare improvements in bce and bcpa during the first period right before the global financial crisis. Yet, 
during after the crisis in 2008/2009 and its aftermath, welfare and gdp seem to have decoupled. From 2008 
to 2018 the correlation between gdp and bce dropped to 0.018 versus 0.623 between gdp and bcpa. Bce 
and bcpa are stagnating after a gdp per capita level of € 29,000 has been reached. Since the results do not 
give evidence of a clear deterioration of welfare, we conclude that there is not enough evidence in the EU-
15 data to support the threshold hypothesis. 
Figure 36: Welfare and GDP per capita for the EU-15 in prices of 2010 (left panel) and as index values with 2007 = 100 
(right panel). 
 
Nonetheless, since bce and bcpa have reached a plateau, we will scrutinize the benefits (B) and costs (C) 
accounts of bce and bcpa to investigate what is driving this stagnation. Over the period 1995-2018, both 
the Bbce and Bbcpa increased – respectively by 11.7% and 10%. Yet, this aggregate trend hides that already 
before the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, Bbce and Bbcpa reached a period peak in respectively 2006 and 
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2007, as shown in Fig. 37. While gdp is 0.08% higher in 2018 than in 2007, Bbce and Bbcpa have not recovered 
from the financial crisis: in 2018 Bbce and Bbcpa are respectively 1.35% and 4.32% lower than their 2007 peak. 
Figure 37: GDP per capita and the per capita benefit accounts of BCE and BCPA (in prices of 2010). 
 
A detailed breakdown of the benefit accounts in Fig. 38 illustrates that individual consumption expenditures 
have steadily increased from 2009 onwards, offering no explanation for the stagnation of Bbce and Bbcpa. Yet, 
the welfare losses from income inequality have increased toward the end of the study period. As a 
consequence, the ‘consumption after adjustments for inequality’ (i.e. individual consumption expenditures, 
the shadow economy and the non-defensive government expenditures minus defensive expenditures and 
the welfare losses from income inequality) remains almost constant at €20,000 from 2006 onwards. In the 





Figure 38: Components of the benefit account of BCE and BCPA (per capita values, in prices of 2010). 
 
In 2018, Bbce and Bbcpa were respectively €405 and €1,382 lower than they were in 2007. These decreasing 
benefits were caused by a decreases in non-defensive government expenditures (-€277), the value of 
unpaid work (-€218), the shadow economy (-€89) and individual consumption expenditures (-€47). These 
decreases in positive welfare contributions more than compensated a decrease in the defensive, 
intermediate en rehabilitative expenditures by €301. The downward trend can additionally be explained by 
a slight increase in the welfare losses from income inequality by €75. The stronger decrease of Bbcpa is caused 
by a decline in the capital adjustment by €977, which almost halved net capital growth. The increase in the 
welfare losses from income inequality is noteworthy. Based on the methodology of this component, one 
would expect the welfare losses to decrease as individual consumption, the shadow economy and also the 
defensive expenditures dropped. Yet, the welfare losses increased because the inequality adjustment factor 
increased over time, as shown in Fig. 39. The inequality adjustment factor is calculated based on the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility of income, and adjusts the incomes higher than a certain sufficiency 
level downward. The increasing inequality adjustment, thus indicates that incomes are more unevenly 
distributed. As a consequence, a higher portion of incomes is subject to the diminishing marginal utility of 
income such that the growth in individual consumption is not translated into welfare. Our methodology 
that makes use of a sufficiency threshold is thus capable of signaling the fact that there are social limits to 
growth or that aggregate consumption growth yields little welfare gains beyond a certain point, especially 




Figure 39: Evolution of the inequality adjustment factor for the EU-15 from 1995 to 2018. 
 
The benefit accounts of bce and bcpa already give evidence on why welfare has stagnated after the financial 
crisis. Yet, now we will turn to the question whether the ecological costs in the cost account of bce and 
bcpa also help to explain this plateauing. Cbce and Cbcpa both decreased over time, the former dropped by 
42.7%, while the latter decreased by 5.9% (see Fig. 40). Note that, on the aggregate level the evolution of 
ecological costs was different: CBCE still decreased by 37.2%, however, CBCPA actually increased by 3.1%. 
These aggregate numbers might give a better indication on the EU15’s total ecosystem impacts compared 
to per capita numbers as it is the total environmental impact that counts to evaluate the impact on the 
ecosystem.  
Since the amount of ecological items is only limited in the narrow ecological costs of CBCE and thus will be 
less appropriate to evaluate whether the ecological costs increase as the economy grows, it is better to 
investigate the broader ecological costs of CBCPA, which are substantial. CBCPA was positively coupled to gdp 
before the financial crisis, which may point us in the direction of increasing ecological costs of growth. 
Nevertheless, the costs fell together with GDP during the crisis. In the economic recovery in 2010s, gdp and 
CBCPA increased simultaneously. Yet, from 2011 onwards there was some decoupling (i.e. divergence) 
between GDP and CBCPA, which illustrates that continued gdp growth was not associated with increasing 
broader ecological costs.  
The overall increase in the broader ecological costs (that are included in our methodology) by 3.6% is mainly 
driven by a rise in the costs of climate disruption by 24.7%, which outweighed the reduction by 16% in the 
other ecological costs (i.e. the cost of air pollution, the cost of nitrogen pollution, the depletion of non-
renewable resources and the cost of using nuclear energy) – see Fig. 41 for an evolution of the broader 
ecological cost items. Although the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions decreased by 10.6% from 
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1995 to 2018, the costs of climate disruption did actually rise because the social cost of carbon increased 
by 39.5% over time as the social cost of carbon grew annually by 1.457%. To conclude, the slight increase 
in CBCPA indicates that ecological costs have increased over time. Yet, from 2006 onwards the broader 
ecological costs have decreased. That is why, the reduction in the broader ecological costs offers no 
explanation for the decrease and stagnation of bcpa during and after the financial crisis. The fact that the 
cost accounts are not increasing goes against what could have been expected based on the principle of 
increasing ecological costs if environmental conditions worsen. In the next section, we will discuss the 
reasons why this is the case.  
Figure 40: Gdp per capita and the cost account of bce and bcpa for the EU-15 from 1995 to 2018. 
 
Note: Gdp, Cbce and Cbcpa are per capita values in 2010 prices, whereas the aggregate CBCPA are in billion euros in 2010 




Figure 41: The items of the broader ecological costs for the EU15 from 1995 to 2018 (million euros, in prices of 2010). 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Caveats of the current methodology 
We observe no clear threshold point, which may be a peculiar finding after decades of economic growth 
and overshooting the Earth’s biocapacity. Against the background of decades of growth and the current 
ecological crisis in Europe, welfare practitioners would expect that Europe would have crossed the 
threshold. Are our EWM poorly reflecting there are social and biophysical limits to growth or is the way we 
are interpreting the data flawed or is it a combination of both? To answer this question, we will scrutinize 
the methodology used for the ecological costs and inequality adjustment and the state of the environment 
in Europe. 
5.1.1 Social limits to growth 
In Section 4, we found evidence that there are social limits to growth, which is related to our methodology 
in which a sufficiency threshold is introduced as a way to capture the diminishing marginal utility of income 
(see Chapter 2). We assumed a threshold of $20,000 (in 2011 prices) so that beyond this point, increases in 
incomes – average income measured by GDP per capita in the EU-15 increased from €24,583 in 1995 to 
€32,147 in 2018 – and consumption contribute less than proportional to welfare. This adjustment helps to 
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explain why the benefit accounts of bce and bcpa were stagnating after the financial crisis. Yet, the 
methodology that we used in Chapter 2 assumes an elasticity of the marginal utility to income equal to one, 
which is rather conservative. If we would have used an elasticity equal to 1.26, which is consistent within 
the well-being literature as shown in Chapter 2, then we would have found more profound evidence in 
favor of the threshold hypothesis. 
5.1.2 Biophysical limits to growth 
As highlighted in the previous section, BCPA’s broader ecological costs did not increase substantially. Given 
the current state of the environment in Europe one would expect that the broader ecological costs would 
have increased more than they actually did. Europe consumes more resources and contributes more to 
environmental degradation than other regions in the world (EEA, 2019). Next, Dorninger et al. (2020) report 
evidence of ecologically unequal trade during the period 1990 to 2015: the world’s high-income countries 
are net-appropriators of materials, energy, land (and labor).36 In addition, the planetary boundary 
framework reveals that Europe’s environmental footprints transgressed several safe planetary boundaries 
(O’Neill et al., 2018; EEA and FOEN, 2020; Sala et al., 2020). Similar conclusions can be drawn by comparing 
ecological footprints with the biocapacity available. Rees (2013, p. 58) notes that “[h]igh-income nations 
and people are able to ‘appropriate’ vastly more than their equitable share of global biocapacity through 
trade and by exploiting the global commons.” A comparison of the EU-15’s fair earth share, i.e. “the amount 
of ecologically productive land “available” per capita on Earth” (Rees, 1996), with their ecological footprints 
illustrates that between 1995 and 2016 the EU-15 countries have overshot their fair share by a factor of 
3.06.37 Despite these environmental challenges of unprecedented urgency and scale, the broader ecological 
costs only increased by 3.6% between 1995 and 2018. 
The moderate increase in the broader ecological costs may indicate three things: (1) the ecological 
catastrophe limit has not been crossed since ecological costs do not rise exponentially, (2) that the current 
methodology is limited, or (3) that ecological issues have not deteriorated that much over time but that the 
environmental state was already very problematic in 1995, which goes unnoticed in aggregate EWM 
because we are not looking careful enough at the data to see that the broader ecological costs were already 
substantial in 1995. Later in this section, we will come back to the third point by suggest a “user guide” for 
                                                     
36 In this literature the exact term that is used by Dorninger et al. (2020) is “ecologically unequal exchange”. 
37 The data on the world’s biocapacity and the EU-15’s footprints come are obtained from the Global Footprint 
Network (2019), while fair earth shares of the world’s biocapacity are calculated using global population data from 
the World Bank (2020) and country level population numbers from Eurostat (2019). 
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EWM, in which we confirm the calls to complement EWM with a comparison of a country’s ecological 
footprint and its biocapacity in order to evaluate whether a country is living within the means of the planet 
(Lawn, 2003, 2008, 2013; Kubiszewksi et al., 2013). Yet, in the remainder of this subsection, we will look 
into the former two methodological issues.  
The modest increase in the broader ecological costs could be a shortcoming of our current methodology 
since BCPA’s cost account may be underestimating them due to: (a) a limited number of items included, or 
(b) fixed cost estimates that do not properly reflect the current state of the environment. First, the number 
of ecological items included in Chapters 2 and 3 is limited because of data availability issues. The following 
ecological costs are not computed in this study: farmlands and soil lost, wetlands lost, forest lost, noise 
pollution, light pollution, ozone layer depletion, costs of alien-invasive species, mineral resource depletion, 
plastic pollution, fresh water depletion, depletion of fisheries, biodiversity losses etc. Whilst it is an almost 
impossible task to properly monetize all these ecological impacts, we believe that the items included 
capture an important part of the economy’s impact on the ecosystem. The methodology developed in 
Chapter 2 focused on resolving time and boundary issues within EWM, while at the same time updating 
several of the valuation methods used such as including the emissions embodied in trade for air pollution 
and climate change and updating (increasing) the cost estimates for climate disruption and nonrenewable 
energy resources depletion compared to earlier studies. Second, an important methodological shortcoming 
that remains, however, is the fact that many of the cost estimates used in the EWM do not vary over time. 
Yet, varying cost estimates are needed that (a) decrease to indicate improvements in environmental issues, 
or (b) increase to signal that many environmental issues are worsening and are no longer marginal when 
tipping points are being crossed. Due to these methodological limitations, it is definitely possible to pursue 
efforts in future research to improve the methodology, especially with regards to the ecological costs. 
5.2 Compensability and incommensurability 
A characteristic of EWM and of all aggregate indicators, is that they are compensability indicators in which 
the evolutions of certain items can be traded-off with other components. The aspect of compensability is 
an artefact of EWM’s monetary measurement. Compensability is the “possibility of offsetting a 
disadvantage on some attribute by a sufficiently advantage on another attribute, whereas smaller 
advantages would not do the same” (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998). Furthermore, by expressing every variable 
in a common monetary unit, EWM also assumes commensurability of different values. Commensuration is 
defined as “the expression or measurement of characteristics normally represented by different units 
according to a common metric” (Espeland and Stevens, 1998).  
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It is worthwhile to point to the existence of two sorts of comparability: “From a philosophical perspective, 
it is possible to distinguish between the concepts of strong comparability (there exists a single comparative 
term by which all different actions can be ranked) implying strong commensurability (common measure of 
the different consequences of an action based on a cardinal scale of measurement) or weak 
commensurability (common measure based on an ordinal scale of measurement), and weak comparability 
(irreducible value conflict is unavoidable but compatible with rational choice employing practical 
judgement)” (O’Neill, 1993 in Martinez-Alier et al., 1998, 277-286).  
EWM are based on strong commensurability since all items are expressed in a common monetary measure. 
This commensurability is problematic because “aggregating different dimensions into a single-value metric 
entails loss of complexity, obscures the sources of change in well-being, and therefore provides incomplete 
information for decision making” (Berik, 2018). Further on in this section, we will therefore suggest a 
disaggregated approach to look at EWM, which is a complementary way to use these one-dimensional 
monetary aggregate indicators. Yet, it should be noted that there also exist other approaches with a multi-
dimensional framework that operationalize weak comparability by making use of multi-criteria evaluation 
– see, for instance, Munda (2015, 2016). 
5.3 Methodological trade-offs 
In order to illustrate the trade-offs and compensability in our current methodology, we will investigate in a 
simulation for the EU-15 what would have happen if the broader ecological costs were reduced in 2018, 
the final year of the study period. More specifically, we will compute the trade-offs in a case where Paris-
compliant emissions reduction pathways are pursued from 2017 to 2018. 
Anderson et al. (2020) showed that Paris-compliant pathways to limit global heating to well below 2°C imply 
much deeper and faster emission cuts than those commonly acknowledged: developed countries should 
increase their mitigation rate to at least 10% per annum and achieve a fully decarbonized energy system by 
2035-40. Anderson and co-authors come to these findings when determining the mitigating agenda for 
developing countries by taking into account the Paris principles of equity and of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’ and by not relying on planetary scale negative emission 
technologies. Negative emission technologies are a problematic ‘high-stakes gamble’ because “[t]here is a 
real risk they will be unable to deliver on the scale of their promise” (Anderson and Peters, 2016, p. 183). 
Double digit emission reductions would mean for the EU to step up its ambition to become the first climate 
neutral continent much earlier than 2050. For our trade-off analysis, we will apply an emission reduction 
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rate of 10% to a country’s production-based total GHG emissions without LULUCF and indirect emissions.38 
The 10% emission reduction is much higher compared to the actual emission reduction rate between 2017 
and 2018 of 2.77% in the EU-15’s production-based total GHG emissions without LULUCF and indirect 
emissions. In our compilation for the EU-15, BCPA per capita increased by 1.06% between 2017 and 2018, 
everything else being equal. Yet, if the EU-15 would have achieved double digit emission reductions, then 
welfare would have, ceteris paribus, increased between these two years with 2.08%. Instead of translating 
these emission reductions in welfare improvements, we could also illustrate the trade-off with individual 
consumption by maintaining the same 2017-level. If emissions are reduced by 10%, it is – ceteris paribus – 
possible to achieve the same welfare level as in 2017 while per capita individual consumption expenditures 
are 1.87% lower than they actually were in 2017. Or in other words, a reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions by 10% can reduce per capita individual consumption expenditures up to 1.87% without that per 
capita welfare declines. 
Future scenarios could explore how the welfare losses from income inequality could be reduced, for 
instance, by redistributing the incomes so that also the people in the lowest income deciles earn an income 
equal to the sufficiency threshold of $20,000 in 2011 prices. Similarly, scenarios can look into the welfare 
effects of meeting the climate goals from the Paris Agreement. Such future research could predict future 
welfare levels under various sustainability (see, for instance, Rugani et al., 2018), equity, or just and 
sustainable scenarios. These forecasts will help to determine what would happen in a dynamic situation in 
which all else is not assumed to remain constant – besides looking at actual welfare levels in future 
computations. Recent developments in ecological macroeconomics illustrated the possibility of improving 
social and environmental conditions by introducing specific targeted policy measures, even when the 
growth rate decreases to zero (Jackson and Victor, 2020) or in a degrowth scenario (D’Alessandro et al., 
2020). Yet, other important impacts of such policies should also be investigated, as D’Alessandro et al. found 
that the improved social and ecological outcomes from the degrowth scenario resulted in an increase in 
public debt in the long run. 
                                                     
38 The total amount of emissions included in the cost of climate disruption in Chapter 3 contains a broader basket of 
emissions as it also includes the emissions embodied in trade, the emissions from aviation and navigation, the 
emissions from biomass and from land use, land-use change and forestry) and the emissions related to global land use 
changes which are allocated to countries based on a consumption footprint approach. 
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5.4 Articulating a “living well within limits” narrative for economic welfare measures  
Most welfare studies suggest to (1) move beyond GDP because GDP cannot serve as a welfare indicator and 
(2) move beyond economic growth since there are social and biophysical limits to growth. Yet, what 
alternatives are available beyond growth? In this subsection, we will first look into the dominant narrative 
of economic growth in which green growth takes a pivotal role before suggesting an alternative narrative 
that may accompany EWM in order to fare well within planetary boundaries. 
Currently, a dominant approach for “sustainable prosperity” relies on green growth and decoupling – this 
approach that still prioritizes economic growth, is put forward by institutions and actors such as 
governments, financial institutions, voters and scientists, is implemented in EU and OECD policies and aligns 
closely with dominant interests, systems and cultures (Wiedmann et al., 2020). The European Commission, 
for instance, frames its European Green Deal as a new growth strategy in which economic growth is 
decoupled from resource use, but also focuses on a just transition (European Commission, 2019). Green 
growth and decoupling are appealing strategies for European policy-makers because they hold the promise 
of decoupling greenhouse gas emissions, environmental impacts and resource use from GDP growth. As 
such, economic growth does not need to be questioned. While the European Green Deal is a clear critical 
juncture that transformed the EU’s climate policy path (Dupont et al., 2020), it may be needed to move 
beyond (green) growth and beyond decoupling in the European Green Deal and other political initiatives 
for a sustainable future. 
The decoupling approach is misleading from both a social welfare and sustainability view. First, it is 
misleading from a social welfare view – what is the point in trying to decouple environmental impacts from 
GDP, when the indicator you are decoupling from is a bad proxy for social welfare after all. Second, scientific 
review studies have debunked the myth that ecological sustainability can be achieved with green growth 
and decoupling (Parrique et al., 2019; Hickel and Kallis, 2019; Haberl et al., 2020; EEA, 2020). For these 
reasons, it is needed to move beyond green growth and target sustainability (and equity) directly (O’Neill, 
2020). For an effective sustainability transition technological advancements need to be complemented with 
stringent absolute reduction targets and ‘sufficiency’ or degrowth strategies that reduce production and 
(over)consumption (Parrique et al. 2019; Wiedmann et al., 2020; Haberl. et al., 2020). In order to achieve 
the goals of the  European Green Deal, for instance, changes in consumption and social practices are 
required besides technological change (EEA, 2020). Today, there are many alternatives ready and available 
that offer valuable insights to mainstream conceptions of economic growth such as post-growth, degrowth, 
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doughnut economics (EEA, 2020) or a-growth, i.e. being agnostic or indifferent about what happens to GDP 
(van den Bergh, 2011). These approaches differ, some are reformist (e.g. post-growth, a-growth, steady 
state economy, prosperity and managing without growth), while other approaches such as eco-socialism, 
degrowth and eco-anarchism are more radical (Wiedmann et al., 2020). 
Yet, it is not easy to overcome growth because economies are structurally dependent on it. In this regard, 
calls have been made redesign economies so they become less dependent on growth and can manage 
without growth (Raworth, 2017; Jackson, 2017; Victor, 2019). As growth is deep-rooted in cultures, politics 
and institutions, change demands democratic ways to overcome these built-in cultural, political and 
institutional barriers (EEA, 2020). EWM could be of use to overcome these barriers by making visible there 
are social and biophysical limits to growth – in this regard, EWM can be seen as pragmatic tools for political 
and democratic accountability. This is important, because changing “the goals in the system” and “the 
mindset or paradigm out of which the system arises” are key leverage points to intervene in a system 
(Meadows, 1999). Nonetheless, to date, EWM have had little impact on policy-making (Corlet Walker and 
Jackson, 2019; Bleys and Whitby, 2015). Hayden and Wilson (2016) suggest that alternative indicators are 
by themselves not transformative forces, since “the widespread use of new indicators is more accurately 
seen a product of political and social movement efforts to expand the role of non-economic values in policy-
making and in society more generally”. Bleys and Whitby (2015) identified that improving the 
communication around alternative welfare measures poses an opportunity to increase their policy value, 
while Berik (2018) suggested to complement the welfare measurement approach with a narrative approach 
in a plural policy-input process to overcome the criticisms regarding EWM being one-dimensional monetary 
indicators. Therefore, we propose to embed EWM in a post-growth, degrowth, a-growth, or doughnut 
narrative of safely living well (with less) within planetary boundaries as a starting point to make the 
transition beyond GDP toward well-being and ecological sustainability. Based on one’s preferences one 
could take either a reformist or more radical narrative. 
Finally, this narrative can be linked to some concrete proposals for policy-makers. Based on the design of 
our EWM, some conclusions can be drawn for economic policy-making at the international level (e.g. EU 
institutions, IMF, OECD, etc.), national and regional level. Given the diminishing marginal utility of income 
and the sufficiency threshold that is introduced in EWM, it is becoming increasingly inefficient to stimulate 
welfare by increasing or growing aggregate incomes. Instead it would be more effective to improve welfare 
with redistributive policies that target people with incomes below the threshold. Furthermore, given the 
quantitative importance of the broader ecological costs and the urgency and scale of the ecological 
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challenges, alternative policies should be explored to effectively reduce these ecological costs. There are 
various potential policies to address inequality, see, for instance, Ashford et al. (2020) for an overview, 
while Hartley et al. (2020) specifically propose strategies for equality when there is low or no growth. 
Ecological costs and the cost of climate disruption could be reduced by policies to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions such as non-tradable caps or carbon pricing via taxation or via emission trading systems (Daly 
and Cobb, 1994; Alcott, 2010; Kallis and Martinez-Alier, 2010; Baranzini et al., 2017; Edwards and Cox, 2020; 
van den Bergh et al., 2020). In a global context, carbon pricing can alleviate all pressures on (other) planetary 
boundaries if it is allied with a biofuel policy (Engström et al., 2020). 
5.5 Developing a user guide for economic welfare measures 
Given EWM’s inherent compensability, the aggregate welfare trend should be interpreted carefully. Here 
we will put forward a user guide on how to interpret EWM. But first, a careful reflection is needed on the 
direction of the aggregate EWM.  
It is – often implicitly – assumed a good thing if the ISEW goes up, and a bad thing when it goes down 
(Costanza, 2000). Yet, similar to GDP we could wonder whether EWM have to increase or be maximized. 
Given the simulations that were made in Section 5.3, we believe that EWM could also be used with a focus 
on keeping welfare constant. For instance, it would be possible to reduce the welfare losses from income 
inequality and the ecological costs and keep welfare constant, while simultaneously consume less, which 
may be beneficial to well-being. Consuming less may be beneficial to well-being because it would halt 
phenomena such as “keeping up with the Joneses”. More income and thus more consumption fail to deliver 
their promise of increased well-being as individuals adapt to their new living conditions and as the living 
standards of others improve. Since individuals fail to properly anticipate the well-being effects of adaptation 
and social comparison, their well-being is reduced (Easterlin 2003) as they spend too much time on 
monetary goals and work and too little time on health, family life and friends (Frank 2000; Easterlin 2003). 
Escaping this process thus may not be detrimental to well-being. In a comparative study between Germany 
and the United States, Hüttel et al. (2020) found that voluntary simplicity and collaborative consumption 
do not reduce individual’s well-being but even enhances it in some cases. Moreover, these two types of 
“anti-consumption” are thus not only good for societal welfare but also for protecting environmental 
resources since voluntary simplicity involves less material consumption and as collaborative consumption 
involves the shared use of products. For these reasons, Kasser (2009) suggested that higher personal well-
being and ecological sustainability can be jointly promoted by shifting people’s values from materialistic, 
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extrinsic aims to intrinsic aims and helping people to live lifestyles that are voluntarily simple and time rich. 
In order to capture these potential well-being effects, it is suggested to complement EWM with life 
satisfaction data. 
All of the above lead us to the formulation of the following user guide: 
1. Be cautious about the aggregate welfare trend because the overall trend might hide important 
imbalances between different components, such as rising welfare losses from income inequality or 
ecological costs. This means that EWM should not be maximized or seen as a target. Why wouldn’t 
we try to keep welfare constant? 
2. Adopt a disaggregated approach to reduce ecological costs and welfare losses from income 
inequality. An economy is not performing well if aggregate welfare increases, while any of these 
categories are increasing or remaining constant. 
3. Embed EWM in a broader set of Well-being and Sustainability Accounts by complementing it with 
a dashboard of social and biophysical indicators such as well-being, life expectancy, ecological 
footprint. 
4. Complement EWM with its underlying physical, non-monetized data, as argued by Berik (2020) and 
connect these physical data to absolute reduction targets, to reduce emissions by ten percent per 
year in rich countries, for instance. This dashboard would provide meaningful insights for a detailed 
policy analysis, whereas calculating the aggregate number is useful to communicate the overall 
welfare trend to the media and the broader public (Patterson et al. 2019). 
5. Move beyond seeing more consumption as something that stimulates well-being, highlight the need 
of sufficiency and decommodify welfare measures because reducing overconsumption is not only 
needed for sustainability, but living well with less may also be desirable from a well-being 
perspective. Gerber and Gerber (2017), for instance, argued that decommodification may be the 
best option toward a post-growth future. 
6. Take social and ecological costs shifted in time and space into account. 
7. Ignore GDP information. A-growth or being indifferent about growth is a logical option because 
GDP is a flawed indicator for social welfare (van den Bergh, 2011).  
8. Where possible, substitute GDP with EWM such as the ISEW or GPI to evaluate economic 
performance and make progress toward social welfare. It is not needed to wait to replace GDP until 
a perfect alternative welfare indicator is available (van den Bergh and Antal, 2014). For instance, 
replace GDP as indicator for Sustainable Development Goal 8 in Europe with the ISEW or GPI to 
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measure progress to sustainable development in a more coherent way (Coscieme et al., 2020). This 
would be compatible with Target 19 of Sustainable Development Goal 17 that wants to “develop 
measurements on progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic 
product”.  
9. Accompany the welfare measurement approach with a post-growth, degrowth or doughnut 
narrative of living well within planetary limits. 
10. Articulate concrete policy proposals that focus on social equity, social welfare and social security 
systems without growth, full employment via a job guarantee – for instance, see Mitchell and 
Muyskens (2008), Lawn (2010) and Alcott (2013), environmental protection, Paris-compliant 
emission reduction pathways, and standards for better product quality and durability and greater 
resource use efficiency. 
6. Conclusion 
Economic welfare measures (EWM) measure the benefits and costs of economic activity. Concerns over 
social limits and biophysical limits to growth have led scholars to belief that the social benefits indicated by 
GDP growth would evaporate when a more comprehensive measure of economic welfare is used to 
evaluate economic performance. By applying the principles of diminishing marginal benefits and increasing 
marginal cost at the macroeconomic level, EWM can be used to indicate the point beyond which economic 
growth becomes uneconomic growth, i.e. further growth brings more costs than benefits. Pursuing growth 
beyond this point is suboptimal. Due to the limits to growth, economic welfare measures are expected to 
indicate a threshold point in a time series of welfare results beyond which continued GDP growth reduces 
welfare.  
The welfare results for the EU-15 from 1995 to 2018 in Chapter 3 do not provide evidence for the threshold 
hypothesis as formulated by Max-Neef (1995). Yet, our results indicate that welfare has been stagnating 
after the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. After the financial crisis, as incomes grow, the growth in individual 
consumption is not translated into welfare. Our methodology that makes use of a sufficiency threshold thus 
signals there are social limits to growth, or that “keeping up with the Joneses” or aggregate consumption 
growth yields little welfare gains beyond a certain point.  
This stagnation in welfare is not caused by the existence of biophysical limits to growth, since the broader 
ecological costs have not substantially increased. Yet, as the EU-15 has transgressed planetary boundaries, 
one would expect that the broader ecological costs would have increased substantially. We believe the 
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absence of clear biophysical limits is is potentially a shortcoming of the current methodology since: (a) the 
number of ecological items is limited and does not account for the ecosystem losses related to land-use 
changes, for instance and (b) the cost estimates of most ecological items do not change over time, which 
makes it difficult to capture deteriorating or improving environmental conditions. At this point the 
methodology could definitely be improved in future research. Yet, the observation that there are no clear 
biophysical limits to growth is only partly a methodological shortcoming because the methodological 
advances made in the welfare study for the EU-15 tried to account for the biophysical limits to growth by 
improving the valuation of the ecological costs as follows: (1) the emissions embodied in trade were 
included for air pollution and climate change, (2) greenhouse gas emissions from aviation, shipping and 
land-use changes are counted in, (3) the costs for the use of nuclear energy were included and (4) the cost 
estimates for climate change and nonrenewable energy resources depletion were updated and revised 
upwards compared to earlier studies.  
Besides a potential shortcoming of the current methodology, the failure to detect clear biophysical limits 
to growth could also be related to the way of looking at and using EWM. Since evaluating economic 
performance should not be reduced to merely balancing the monetized benefits and costs, we suggested 
to be cautious about the aggregate welfare trend and to de-emphasize the aggregate welfare trend. 
Instead, EWM should adopt a disaggregate approach to verify whether issues such as the welfare losses 
from income inequality and ecological costs are reduced. We proposed a user guide to facilitate the use 
and transformative potential of EWM and articulated a narrative of living well within planetary limits, so 





A. Beyond GDP growth 
Small steps are being taking to gradually abandon GDP, as illustrated by the following examples. The 
Wellbeing Economy Alliance, a collaboration of organizations and individuals, wants to facilitate economic 
system change so that the economic system will bring human and ecological well-being. Certain policy 
entrepreneurs such as the New Zealand Government led by Jacinda Ardern are introducing well-being 
budgets to spend the government budget on those areas that would stimulate New Zealanders’ well-being 
instead of allocating the budget as a way to accelerate economic growth. Together with Scotland, Wales 
and Iceland, New Zealand is part of the Wellbeing Economy Governments network – established in 2018 
and supported by the Wellbeing Economy Alliance – recognizing “that ’development’ in the 21st century 
entails delivering human and ecological wellbeing” (Wellbeing Economy Alliance, 2020). Also at the local 
level, cities such as Amsterdam and Brussels are adopting the doughnut model developed by Kate Raworth 
(2017) that prioritizes human and planetary health as a way for societies to flourish within planetary 
boundaries.  
These small steps for mankind are encouraged by repeated calls to move beyond GDP. Stiglitz et al. (2009, 
2018) urge us to measure what counts for social and economic performance and to focus on designing 
policies that stimulate well-being and economic welfare in a sustainable way, while Hoekstra (2019) 
proposed to come up with a common well-being and sustainability language in order to “replace GDP by 
2030”. Moreover, Coscieme et al. (2020) suggested to replace GDP as indicator for the United Nation’s 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8 “Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, 
full and productive employment and decent work for all” in Europe with the Index of Sustainable Economic 
Welfare (ISEW) or Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) to measure progress to sustainable development in a 
more coherent way. Cook and Davidsdottir (2021) compared several macro-economic indicators (i.e. 
Environmentally Adjusted Net Domestic Product, Measure of Economic Welfare, Genuine Savings, Genuine 
Progress Indicator and Inclusive Wealth Index) and found that the GPI was the most comprehensive one as 
it made direct links to targets in fourteen of the seventeen SDGs. 
 
Besides these calls to move beyond GDP, there also have been repeated calls to move beyond growth. This 
is needed because “[f]or over seventy years, economic growth has been the dominant goal of economic 
policy, and the principal measure of an economy’s success … [e]quity and environmental considerations 
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have largely been dealt with ‘after the event’ rather than as integral to economic policy” (OECD, 2020). In 
2018, a landmark Post-Growth conference was held in Brussels to discuss that the European Union should 
plan for a post-growth future where human and planetary well-being are prioritized over growth and where 
alternative indicators are incorporated into the macroeconomic framework. An open letter signed by 238 
scientists and more than 91.000 citizens urged the EU to transform its Stability and Growth Pact into a 
Stability and Wellbeing Pact (The Guardian, 2018). This petition together with a poll indicating that a 
majority of Europeans believe that the environment should be a priority even if it comes at the expense of 
growth (The Guardian, 2019), illustrate that there is bottom-up support for prioritizing other goals than 
economic growth. Recent initiatives indicate that post-growth is gaining momentum. More than 11.000 
scientists have warned humanity that to adequately respond to the climate emergency “our goals need to 
shift from GDP growth and the pursuit of affluence toward sustaining ecosystems and improving human 
well-being by prioritizing basic needs and reducing inequality” (Ripple et al., 2019). Also the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES, 2019) stressed 
the necessity of “steering away from the current, limited paradigm of economic growth”. The OECD’s (2020) 
New Approaches To Economic Challenges initiative of the OECD (2020) pleads for moving “Beyond Growth” 
in a new economic approach the need to focus on the goals well-being, reducing inequality, environmental 
sustainability and resilience although the OECD states that this “means neither abandoning growth as an 
objective nor relying upon it”. The degrowth movement, in contrast, contests the growth paradigm in an 
attempt to prioritize well-being, social justice and ecological sustainability by contesting the growth 
paradigm (Demaria e al., 2013). Finally, the European Environmental Agency’s (2020) rapport Growth 
without economic growth, urges societies to rethink growth since economic growth and economic activities 
are closely linked to biodiversity losses, climate change, pollution and environmental degradation since fully 
decoupling economic growth from resource consumption may be impossible. 
 
Questions on the necessity or desirability of economic growth date back to the 1960s and 1970s. Scholars 
argued it is needed to move beyond growth because there are social limits to growth (Hirsch, 1976) and 
biophysical limits to growth (Meadows et al., 1972). First, there are social limits to growth, which means 
that growth fails to deliver its promise that growth improves the human condition. Due to the existence of 
status or positional goods and phenomena such as “keeping up with the Joneses” (e.g. larger houses and 
expensive cars), the gains from possessing these goods disappear as incomes grow and give more people 
access to them, which illustrates that there are certain social limits to what growth can deliver in terms of 
social welfare or well-being (Hirsch, 1976; Kallis, 2015). Or to put it in other words: when a rising tide lifts 
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all boats, no one notices that the tide is rising. As a consequence, aggregate growth is socially pointless in 
affluent societies. Second, there are biophysical limits to growth. Ecological economists have been 
questioning the goal of economic growth ever since Kenneth Boulding (1966) and Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen (1971) introduced the laws of thermodynamics to economic theory. Key message of their research 
is that continuous economic growth on a finite planet is not possible. Recent research by Steffen et al. 
(2015) has shown that several planetary boundaries such as climate change and biodiversity have already 
been crossed, which means that humanity may push itself out of a “safe operating space” as argued by 
Rockström et al. (2009). Ecological economists have questioned the goal of continued growth as early as 
1970 because the scale of the economy relative to the Earth System was already too large ever since, when 
the global Ecological Footprint first exceeded global biocapacity. Therefore, ecological economists would 
aim to bring the economy back within safe planetary boundaries and envisage an economy that operates 
within ecological limits. 
Green growth and decoupling are appealing strategies for European policy-makers because they hold the 
promise of decoupling greenhouse gas emissions, environmental impacts and resource use from GDP 
growth. As such, economic growth does not need to be questioned. Yet, one could wonder what the point 
is in trying to decouple environmental impacts from GDP, when the indicator you are decoupling from is a 
bad proxy for social welfare after all. Green growth holds the promise to keep expanding economies while 
mitigating climate change by absolutely decoupling carbon emissions from economic growth. Yet, is a high-
risk strategy because it is incompatible with remaining within safe planetary boundaries. Hickel and Kallis 
(2019) argued that while it is technically possible to absolutely decouple carbon emissions from economic 
growth, it is highly unlikely that this decoupling will be achieved rapidly enough to limit global warming to 
2°C and this also holds true for optimistic policy scenario’s. Recent opinion surveys indicate that Europeans 
are supportive of more radical and rapid measures than those proposed by the European Commission, since 
(1) a majority of Europeans believe that the environment should be a priority even if it comes at the expense 
of growth (The Guardian, 2019), (2) 70% of Europeans think the EU is not doing enough to tackle climate 
change (Garton Ash et al., 2020) and (3) a majority of Europeans wants the EU to be climate neutral by 2030 
already (Garton Ash and Zimmermann, 2020). 
Since global growth in affluence has, for more than five decades, “continuously increased resource use and 
pollutant emissions far more rapidly than these have been reduced through better technology” (Wiedmann 
et al., 2020), a sustainability transition does not only require technological advances, but also sufficiency 
strategies that reduce consumption and production (Parrique et al., 2019; Wiedmann et al., 2020; Haberl 
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et al., 2020; Büscher et al., 2021). Today, there are many alternatives ready and available that offer valuable 
insights to mainstream conceptions of economic growth such as post-growth, degrowth, doughnut 
economics (EEA, 2020) or a-growth, i.e. being agnostic or indifferent about what happens to GDP (van den 
Bergh, 2011). These approaches differ, some are reformist (e.g. post-growth, a-growth, steady state 
economy, prosperity and managing without growth), while other approaches such as eco-socialism, 
degrowth and eco-anarchism are more radical (Wiedmann et al., 2020). 
Degrowth is often wrongly interpreted as a reduction in consumption and production, yet, degrowth is 
more nuanced than that. As noted by Demaria et al. (2013) “degrowth challenges the hegemony of growth 
and calls for a democratically led downscaling of production and consumption in industrialised countries as 
a means to achieve environmental sustainability, social justice and well-being”. Degrowth in the global 
North would be a potential pathway toward an equitable steady-state global economy that remains within 
planetary boundaries by freeing up some ecological space for the global South to have some economic 
growth (Kerschner, 2010). In the coming years, degrowth may be a crucial strategy to avert climate 
breakdown. While, the European Commission recognizes the need to tackle the climate crisis and proposed 
the European Green deal to become the first climate neutral continent by 2050, further steps are needed. 
High-income countries should step up their climate ambitions and actions in order to comply with the Paris 
Agreement. Paris-compliant pathways to limit global heating to well below 2°C imply much deeper and 
faster emission cuts than those commonly acknowledged: developed countries should increase their 
mitigation rates to minimum 10% per annum and achieve a fully decarbonized energy system by 2035 to 
2040 (Anderson et al., 2020). Since such sharp emission reductions are not deemed compatible with 
economic growth, high-income countries would temporarily need to adopt degrowth strategies in order to 
avoid “beyond dangerous climate change” of more than 2°C as articulated by Anderson and Bows (2011) 
and Anderson and Bows-Larkin (2013).  
Notwithstanding the popular support, frontrunners and steps taken, economic growth still remains a 
dominant goal in economic policy-making and narrative at the international and national level because 
economies are structurally dependent on growth – see, for instance, Schmelzer (2016). The United Nation’s 
Sustainable Development Goal 8 is to “Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth”, 
while the OECD still believes in green growth as going Beyond Growth in the OECD’s (2020) New Economic 
Approach “means neither abandoning growth as an objective nor relying upon it” (OECD, 2020). 
Furthermore, the European Green Deal is also framed as a new “growth story” by the European Commission 
(2019). These examples illustrate that it is difficult to say farewell to growth. Because of the growth 
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dependency, calls have been made redesign economies so they become less dependent on growth and can 
manage without growth (Raworth, 2017; Jackson, 2017; Victor, 2019; Bohnenberger and Fritz, 2020). 
B. Main contributions 
This thesis contributes to the field of economic welfare measures (EWM) with a focus on the ISEW and GPI 
by elaborating on the theoretical and conceptual welfare framework of these measures, by standardizing 
and improving their methodologies, and by estimating welfare levels for the EU-15 based on a comparable 
methodology while at the same time investigating whether the ISEW and GPI are able to reveal a threshold 
point and social and biophysical limits to growth.  
The ISEW and GPI are often argued to lack a sound theoretical foundation. However, we observe that the 
initial ISEW by Daly and Cobb (1989) was jointly inspired by Hicksian and Fisherian income. Welfare’s 
experiential nature is Fisher-inspired, whereas seeing the consumption of community capital (e.g. the 
ecosystem) as a cost is Hicks-inspired. As most scholars do not recognize this double theoretical foundation, 
they have found it difficult to deal with welfare’s time and boundary issues. Elaborating on this double 
theoretical foundation, we have put forward two welfare interpretations with distinct time and boundary 
dimensions to address time and boundary complexities. EWM can be seen as either capturing the benefits 
and costs experienced (BCE), or as reflecting the benefits and costs of present economic activities (BCPA). 
The former interpretation only takes into account what is currently experienced within domestic borders: 
it excludes future costs, costs shifted abroad and capital changes. BCPA makes use of broader time and 
boundary dimensions, and includes the benefits and costs of present activities. Consequently, costs shifted 
in time and space and capital changes are included in BCPA as they all are benefits and costs arising from 
current economic activities. Recent developments reveal that EWM are converging toward the ex post 
established experiential Fisherian foundation and the BCE-interpretation. Yet, we argue that this is not the 
only way forward as the BCPA-perspective offers an alternative viewpoint to account for the costs of 
present activities shifted abroad or to the future such as those involved in climate change, irrespective of 
whether they are currently “experienced” or not.  
Based on these different welfare interpretations, two EWM with distinct time and boundary effects are 
calculated for Belgium in this dissertation: the benefits and costs experienced and the benefits and costs of 
present activities. This welfare compilation for Belgium is the first of its kind to include the welfare benefits 
of the shadow economy and to make use of a sufficiency threshold to calculate the diminishing marginal 
utility of income for the item welfare losses from income inequality. Other methodological novelties for the 
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broader BCPA include a consumption footprint view for greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution by 
accounting for the emissions embodied in trade, and the registration of the climate impacts of aviation and 
shipping. Belgium’s welfare measured by both indicators improved from 1995 to 2018: BCE per capita 
improved by 15% and BCPA per capita enhanced by 18%, which is about half of the growth in GDP per capita 
by 30%. These trends indicate a growing divergence between both welfare measures and GDP. 
Furthermore, the aggregate trend over time masks that the per capita welfare losses from income 
inequality and the per capita broader ecological costs in BCPA have increased by, respectively, 89.9% and 
6.8%. Yet, these trends are outweighed or compensated by increasing benefits from consumption. As there 
are substantial ecological costs shifted in time and space, we suggest to account for ecological cost-shifting 
by using the BCPA-view when calculating EWM because it is more informative for policy-makers. A careful 
reflection on EWM’s design and use is needed in future studies in order to stimulate their policy-guiding 
and transformative potential.  
Next, we estimate both EWM for the EU-15 as a whole and all individual countries from 1995 to 2018. For 
the EU-15, GDP per capita improved by about 31% during the studied period. Also at the level of the EU-15 
GDP and EWM diverged as BCE and BCPA per capita (only) improved by 13% and 17%. The EU-15’s GDP per 
capita reached its maximum in 2018, while its welfare per capita already peaked right before the financial 
crisis. By 2018, the EU-15 had entirely recovered from the financial crisis from a GDP-perspective but not 
from a welfare view. The financial crisis and its recovery had a different impact on GDP and economic 
welfare measures. In contrast to GDP, the response in economic welfare measures to the financial crisis of 
2009 was delayed in some countries: their per capita BCPA only fell during the economic GDP-recovery in 
2010 as the broader ecological costs increased. At the level of the EU-15, the broader ecological costs 
decreased in 2009 but increased again in 2010 during an environmentally more polluting recovery in GDP 
per capita. Our results thus indicate that a post-COVID agenda needs to aim for a green and just economic 
recovery that is centered around welfare and a move beyond GDP that prioritizes human well-being within 
planetary boundaries without growth. The overall trends in per capita BCE and BCPA were driven by 
individual consumption growth (+29.3%) and the welfare losses from income inequality (+97.5%), yet, since 
the welfare losses from income inequality increased, part of the growth in consumption is not translated 
into welfare because of the diminishing marginal utility of income. Despite the overall improvements over 
the entire period, GDP per capita barely improved after 2007: it only fully recovered from the financial crisis 
in 2018, when the EU-15’s GDP per capita reached its maximum value that was slightly higher than its pre-
crisis level. The EU-15’s economic welfare per capita already peaked right before the financial crisis in 2006 
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for BCE and in 2007 for BCPA. In 2018, BCE per capita and BCPA per capita were respectively 1.5% and 1.8% 
below their maximum values. As a consequence, we found no conclusive evidence for the EU-15 as a whole 
regarding the threshold hypothesis (i.e. the existence of a threshold beyond which continued GDP growth 
reduces welfare). However, we found evidence of threshold points in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK, where the per capita welfare levels were at least 5% 
lower by the end of the study period in 2018 compared to their maximum welfare value. 
Finally, concerns over social limits and biophysical limits to growth have led scholars to belief that the social 
benefits indicated by GDP growth would evaporate when a more comprehensive measure of economic 
welfare is used to evaluate economic performance. By applying the principles of diminishing marginal 
benefits and increasing marginal cost at the macroeconomic level, economic welfare measures can be used 
to indicate the point beyond which economic growth becomes uneconomic growth, i.e. further growth 
brings more costs than benefits. Pursuing growth beyond this point is suboptimal. Due to the limits to 
growth, economic welfare measures are expected to indicate a threshold point in a time series of welfare 
results beyond which continued GDP growth reduces welfare. The welfare results for the EU-15 from 1995 
to 2018 do not provide evidence for the threshold hypothesis as formulated by Max-Neef (1995). Yet, our 
results indicate that welfare has been stagnating after the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. After the 
financial crisis, as incomes grow, the growth in individual consumption is not translated into welfare. Our 
methodology that makes use of a sufficiency threshold thus signals there are social limits to growth, or that 
“keeping up with the Joneses” or aggregate consumption growth yields little welfare gains beyond a certain 
point. This stagnation in welfare is not caused by the existence of biophysical limits to growth, since the 
broader ecological costs have not substantially increased. Yet, as the EU-15 has transgressed planetary 
boundaries, one would expect that the broader ecological costs would have increased substantially. We 
believe the absence of clear biophysical limits is potentially a shortcoming of the current methodology since 
the number of ecological items is limited and the cost estimates of most ecological items do not change 
over time, which makes it difficult to capture deteriorating or improving environmental conditions. Yet, the 
observation that there are no clear biophysical limits to growth is only partly a methodological shortcoming 
because the methodological advances made for welfare study for the EU-15 tried to account for the 
biophysical limits to growth by improving the valuation of the ecological costs, for instance, by updating 
and revising upwardly the cost estimates for climate change and nonrenewable energy resources depletion. 
Besides a potential shortcoming of the current methodology, the failure to detect clear biophysical limits 
to growth could also be related to the way of looking at and using EWM. Since evaluating economic 
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performance should not be reduced to merely balancing the monetized benefits and costs, we suggested 
to be cautious about the aggregate welfare trend and to de-emphasize the aggregate welfare trend. 
Instead, EWM should adopt a disaggregate approach to verify whether issues such as the welfare losses 
from income inequality and ecological costs are reduced. We proposed a user guide to facilitate the use 
and transformative potential of EWM and articulated a narrative of living well within planetary limits, so 
that EWM may be a starting point to move beyond GDP and its growth. 
C. Some insights for policy-making 
Now that the COVID-19 pandemic is bringing the world to a standstill and economies are contracting due 
to mitigation measures, lockdowns and a vicious cycle of falling consumer demand and deepening 
recessions, economies are at a crossroad. The policy decisions made today will have an impact for decades 
to come. On the one hand, some policy makers and economists are proposing to kickstart economic growth. 
On the other hand, others are putting addressing inequality, sustainability and biodiversity losses high on 
the policy agenda (Ashford et al., 2020; McElwee et al., 2020; Büscher et al., 2021). 
Based on the design of our EWM, some conclusions can be drawn for economic policy-making at the 
international level (e.g. EU institutions, IMF, OECD, etc.), national and regional level. If we acknowledge that 
(a) ever increasing incomes will lead to increasingly smaller additions to welfare due to the correction for 
the diminishing marginal utility of income, (b) economic growth is ecologically cataclysmic and (c) many 
economists argue that we are in a situation of Secular Stagnation, in which economic growth rates have 
declined and are not likely to return to their earlier higher growth rates (Summers, 2016; Jackson, 2018), 
then policies that empower economies and societies to fare well without growth will become increasingly 
important in the future. Given the diminishing marginal utility of income and the sufficiency threshold that 
is introduced in EWM, it is becoming increasingly inefficient to stimulate welfare by increasing or growing 
aggregate incomes. Instead it would be more effective to improve welfare with redistributive policies that 
target people with incomes below the threshold. Furthermore, given the quantitative importance of the 
broader ecological costs and the urgency and scale of the ecological challenges, alternative policies should 
be explored to effectively reduce these ecological costs.  
With effective social and environmental welfare policies in place, EWM could continue to increase beyond 
their earlier welfare peak or threshold point. There are various potential policies to address inequality, see, 
for instance, Ashford et al. (2020) for an overview, while Hartley et al. (2020) specifically propose strategies 
for equality when there is low or no growth. Ecological costs and the cost of climate disruption could be 
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reduced by policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions such as non-tradable caps or carbon pricing via 
taxation or via emission trading systems (Daly and Cobb, 1994; Alcott, 2010; Kallis and Martinez-Alier, 2010; 
Baranzini et al., 2017; Edwards and Cox, 2020; van den Bergh et al., 2020). In a global context, carbon pricing 
can alleviate all pressures on (other) planetary boundaries if it is allied with a biofuel policy (Engström et 
al., 2020). Examples of policies that could reinforce existing initiatives such as the European Green Deal, 
could be a Green New Deal without growth (Mastini et al., 2021), measures that make social security and 
welfare systems less dependent on growth (Bohnenberger and Fritz, 2020), or a post-COVID economic 
agenda that takes into account inequality (Ashford et al., 2020) and biodiversity (McElwee et al., 2020) to 
build back better. More concretely, Büscher et al. (2021) outline five priorities for a post-COVID 
development pathway: (1) a move away from development focused on aggregate economic growth, (2) an 
economic framework focused on redistribution and care, (3) a transformation towards regenerative 
agriculture and convivial conservation, (4) reduction of consumption and travel, and (5) debt cancellation. 
A good starting point here, would be to evaluate economic performance differently by using alternative 
measures of economic welfare, for instance – with the wrong goals in place it will prove extremely difficult 
to start making effective progress toward living well within ecological limits. 
D. Areas of future research 
Future research on EWM would benefit from updated methods and better data availability. Future studies 
could explore how to account for the costs related to land use changes and the social costs shifted in time 
and abroad. Moreover, valuation methods such as the transition cost due to the use of non-renewable 
energy resources could be updated making use of estimates from cost effectiveness studies to achieve the 
Paris goals of limiting global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C. Furthermore, more frequent and timely time-use and 
environmental data would be helpful to compile more up-to-date and real-time welfare measures, which 
would increase their use for policy-making and policy analysis. Besides these data and methodological 
improvements, the EWM literature would also benefit from continued theoretical and conceptual 
refinements, for instance, by investigating if and how leisure time should be registered. 
A second future research area for EWM could look into estimating future welfare levels under specific policy 
interventions – e.g. the European Green Deal, emission pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement or 
the introduction of a shorter workweek. Rugani et al. (2018), for instance, forecasted Luxembourg’s future 
welfare levels based on different energy policy scenarios. These predictions could together with future 
welfare levels be used to verify whether the aggregate welfare trend would decline or has declined in a just 
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ecological and climate transition with reduced consumption and production. In addition, EWM could also 
be integrated in (ecological) macroeconomic models – e.g.  the state-of-the-art models by D’Alessandro et 
al. (2020) and by Jackson and Victor (2020) – and in economic research more generally as a different 
dependent variable. 
A third research agenda for EWM could compare the determinants of GDP growth versus the determinants 
of EWM by investigating historical GDP and EWM data. This research would highlight which traditional pro-
economic growth policies are most (or least) effective in also stimulating economic welfare. To date, only 
three studies (Talberth and Bohara, 2006; Feeny et al., 2013; Hashim et al., 2019) have investigated in what 
ways the determinants of economic growth are different from or comparable to the determinants of 
economic welfare. All these studies only focus on one or two countries and none of these studies focused 
on Europe. In order to overcome model uncertainty, robust determinants can be obtained from panel data 
approaches as those by Moral-Benito (2012, 2016). These traditional determinants of economic growth 
could be extended by including inequality and useful work. Recent research has indicated that inequality 
negatively affects growth (Berg et al., 2018) and that ‘raw’ energy (exergy) converted to useful work 
explains output and drives long-run growth in the US, together with labor and capital (Ayres and Warr, 
2005). 
Finally, the ‘Beyond GDP’ movement would greatly benefit from harmonizing the multitude of existing 
initiatives and from developing policy tools to inform policy-makers on how to stimulate well-being, 
ecological sustainability and social justice (Hoekstra, 2020). Future research could investigate how rapid 
and drastic emission reductions can effectively be achieved in a socially sustainable way and how ecological 
debts owed to the global South and future generations can be somewhat “addressed”. These research 
avenues could explore paths of debt cancellation, making social security and welfare systems less 
dependent on growth (see, for instance, Bohnenberger and Fritz, 2020), full employment via job guarantees 
– for instance, see Mitchell and Muyskens (2008), Lawn (2010) and Alcott (2013) and, last but not least, 
making money public by seeing money as a public resource (Mellor, 2010, 2015). 
E. Reflections on economic welfare measures 
Despite the fact that GDP is widely criticized, it is still influential in politics, economics, policy-making and 
society (van den Bergh, 2009). According to van den Bergh, this “GDP paradox” can be explained by 
recognizing that many economists accept the GDP-criticism but refute its importance. Daly and Cobb (2007) 
thought that a conservatively estimated ISEW that is no longer correlated with GDP would help to persuade 
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economists to no longer deny the relevance of the GDP-criticism, and consequently facilitate the move 
beyond GDP. Therefore, several authors claim that the ISEW can best be seen as an indicator to ‘debunk’ 
GDP as a policy guide and objective (Ziegler, 2007; Daly and Cobb, 2007). As Daly and Cobb (2007) stated: 
“[i]f the world is perversely addicted to a one-dimensional monetary index of welfare, then at least try the 
ISEW – if you insist on smoking, at least try our charcoal filter!” Although the ISEW and GPI still have 
imperfections, they are clear improvements over GDP – operationalizing the idea that it is better to be 
approximately right than precisely wrong.  
As growth is deep-rooted in cultures, politics and institutions, change demands democratic ways to 
overcome these built-in cultural, political and institutional barriers (EEA, 2020). Economic welfare measures 
(EWM) such as the ISEW and GPI could be of use to overcome these barriers for two reasons. First, EWM 
help to move beyond GDP by providing an alternative indicator of economic welfare. Second, EWM also 
help to move beyond growth by making visible there are social and biophysical limits to growth – in this 
regard, EWM can be seen as pragmatic tools for political and democratic accountability. This is important, 
because changing “the goals in the system” and “the mindset or paradigm out of which the system arises” 
are key leverage points to intervene in a system (Meadows, 1999). Nonetheless, to date, EWM have had 
little impact on policy-making (Corlet Walker and Jackson, 2019; Bleys and Whitby, 2015). Providing 
alternative indicators alone is not enough. Hayden and Wilson (2016) suggest that alternative indicators 
are by themselves not transformative forces, since “the widespread use of new indicators is more 
accurately seen a product of political and social movement efforts to expand the role of non-economic 
values in policy-making and in society more generally”. 
A benefit of the ISEW and related one-dimensional indicators is that they are a simple communication tool 
to give policy-makers, media, economists and the broader public an overall idea about how the economy 
has been doing. On the downside, a lot of information and complexity is lost. Caution is warranted against 
focusing exclusively on the aggregate trend of EWM, especially since this dissertation has demonstrated 
that rising welfare losses from income inequality and ecological costs can be easily compensated by 
consumption growth. On the downside, the empirical welfare compilation is reducing many welfare aspects 
to balancing the benefits and costs of economic activities. This is problematic for two reasons. First, 
balancing benefits and costs is not a neutral criterion upon which one can safely base value judgements. 
Second, balancing benefits and costs is a recipe for disaster if you overestimate the benefits and 
underestimate the costs. A textbook example of both reasons is William Nordhaus who was awarded the 
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, but has seriously underestimated 
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the damages of climate change by at least an order of magnitude (Keen, 2020). By taking growth as a 
starting point and by balancing the overestimated benefits (i.e. by assuming continued growth), and the 
underestimated costs of climate change, Nordhaus (2018) comes to an “optimal” warming of 3.5°C by 2100. 
Whilst Earth and climate scientists would undoubtedly call this far beyond dangerous climate change – in 
fact they would label any temperature increase above 2°C already as beyond dangerous. Instead of 
abandoning outdated growth models as part of a precautionary approach to reduce the risk of climate 
breakdown, Nordhaus is optimally adjusting the climate system to fit obsolete growth models. Given the 
welfare measures’ cost-benefit rationale, it should be avoided to optimize them and caution is warranted 
against the aggregate welfare trend since economic welfare measures could also easily be misused. 
One could try to improve and further refine the methodology, yet, given the methodological difficulties and 
data availability issues inherent in measuring welfare, we may never arrive at a “perfect” welfare indicator 
whose aggregate trend can be safely trusted to get the trade-offs right so that can be safely considered it 
is beneficial to welfare if the indicator goes up, but detrimental to welfare if the indicator goes down. 
Therefore, this dissertation proposes to adopt a disaggregate approach and to complement welfare 
measurement with a dashboard of social and biophysical indicators to illustrate the degree of abstraction 
involved in measuring welfare and to partly overcome the loss of complexity when calculating aggregate 
measures. Given the difficulties and abstractions involved when measuring welfare, it may still be useful 
for economic welfare measures to be calculated because the world is still addicted to one-dimensional 
indicators. It is still needed to continue debunking, for instance, to replace economic growth in Sustainable 
Development Goal 8. Furthermore, economic welfare measures’ broader perspective could be used for 
educational purposes, as it helped university students to easily understand world problems regardless of 
their prior knowledge (Yoshida et al., 2020). In addition, it is crucial to complement EWM with a degrowth, 
sufficiency or post-growth narrative of living well within planetary limits. As such, the ISEW and GPI can be 
a bridge to the future by moving beyond GDP. Nonetheless, economic welfare measures could also be a 
bridge to nowhere if (1) too much importance is given to the aggregate welfare trend, (2) welfare measures 
are optimized or become a goal in itself, and (3) economic welfare measures fail in their purpose to properly 
debunk, abandon and overcome growth.  
Bell and Morse (2011) wondered why we would try to go beyond GDP because GDP in itself is not the 
problem as it only fulfills a certain demand: “GDP is a cultural artifact and a symptom of our mindset, not 
its creator.” Perhaps the difficulty does not lie in merely moving “Beyond GDP”, but in moving beyond the 
cultural mindset that demands one-dimensional indicators. And similarly, we could wonder whether EWM 
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have to increase or be maximized parallel to GDP. It may be a cultural thing that indicators have to increase, 
but why shouldn’t welfare be kept constant or remain in a steady-state? Consuming less, reducing the 
welfare losses from inequality, meeting basic needs and reducing ecological costs may all be part of living 
well within limits or faring well without welfare growth. Fortunately, we do not need to wait to replace GDP 
by 2030 as Simon Kuznets already warned us nine decades ago that social welfare can barely be deduced 
from a measuring gross domestic product. Therefore, it is time to move beyond GDP and beyond welfare 
growth – the sooner, the better. Since GDP can be seen as an indicator of biodiversity loss (Czech et al., 
2005), continued exponential economic growth on a finite planet would be cataclysmic. So, in order to have 
“a prosperous way down” (Odum and Odum, 2001) and live well within planetary boundaries, let’s flatten 
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Appendix A: Detailed methods 
This appendix discusses in detail the methods used to compute the items for the welfare study for the EU15-
countries.  
All estimates cover the time period 1995-2018 and are in million euros in 2010 prices. The deflators used 
are GDP deflators from the World Bank (2019). Population data to calculate per capita values was taken 
from Eurostat (2019a), while the Gross Domestic Product at market prices was also extracted from Eurostat 
(2020b).   
1. Unpaid work 
The time use data comes from the OECD’s (2019) Time Use Database – the data for Ireland were updated 
in 2020 (OECD, 2020a). This database lists the results from the Harmonized European Time Use Survey 
(HETUS) for European countries. In the HETUS-survey, unpaid work covers routine housework, shopping, 
care for household members, care for non-household members, volunteering, travel related to household 
activities and other unpaid work. Compared to other studies that have separate items for household work 
and volunteer work – see for instance Held et al. (2018) and Kenny et al. (2019) – the item unpaid work is 
in this study thus broader as it contains both household work and volunteer work. The availability is limited: 
only six countries have more than one data-point. Both data-points were used to interpolate the values 
between these data-points. Memory items are used for the values before and after these two datapoints. 
In the case of only one data-point, the time-use allocated to unpaid work is assumed constant throughout 
the entire period. 
Unpaid work is valued by multiplying the total hours of unpaid work by the population from 15 to 74 years, 
taken from Eurostat (2019b) by market wages. The replacement wages come from the mean earnings of 
service and sales workers in the business economy, which are collected from the Structure of earnings 
survey on Eurostat (2019h). This Survey was collected in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014. The values between 
these datapoints were interpolated. Values before 2002 and after 2014 were extrapolated using average 
annual wages from OECD.Stat (2019a). 
The average wages used for the opportunity cost method in the sensitivity analysis are calculated by 
dividing average annual wages (OECD.Stat, 2019a) by the average annual hours actually worked per worker 
(OECD.Stat, 2020).  
147 
 
2. Individual consumption expenditures 
2.1 Actual individual consumption 
Data on actual individual consumption is accessible via Eurostat (2019d).  
2.2 Costs of consumer durables 
This item deducts the expenditures on consumer durables, which are included in households’ final 
consumption expenditures and thus in actual individual consumption. In order to subtract these expenses, 
I make use of the availability category ‘durable goods’ in the System of National Accounts. Eurostat (2019f) 
provides data on Final consumption aggregates by durability from 1995-2018. This item only incorporates 
durable goods, goods classified as semi-durables are treated as normal consumer goods and thus not 
deducted from the index.39 In line with previous studies, consumer durables are expected to last for eight 
years. 
2.3 Services of consumer durables 
The services of consumer durables are the benefits experienced from using consumer durables. As the stock 
of consumer durables lasts for 8 years, this means a linear depreciation of 12.5%. However, all studies value 
the services of consumer durables by taking 20% of the stock of consumer durables, which is equal to 12.5% 
depreciation and an interest rate of 7.5% on the stock of capital. Present studies continue to use this 
interest rate, after Daly and Cobb (1994). Yet, this approach may be outdated. In this study I follow this 
common approach and calculate the services by multiplying the existing stock of consumer durables by 0.2.  
Future studies may look into this valuation method to increase the relevance and information-yielding 
capacity of this component by incorporating recent trends. First, using an interest rate of 7.5% may be 
outdated now there is a low interest environment in the aftermath of the great recession. With a 0% 
interest rate, a service of 20% would be similar to the linear depreciation of a stock of consumer durables 
with a life span of 5 years. Second, the durability of consumer durables may change over time because of 
planned obsolescence or perceived obsolescence or because of the introduction of product standards and 
regulation that increase the lifetime of consumer durables. Moreover, a transformation toward a sharing 
                                                     
39 Semi-durables also have an expected life time over one year. However, their life span and purchase price is lower 
compared to durable goods. 
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economy in which consumer durables are shared instead of owned may also impact the durability of and 
services from consumer durables.  
In order to construct the services from consumer durables, expenditures are needed as early as 1988 to 
build up the stock of consumer durables in 1995. As Eurostat only provides data from 1995 onwards, 
expenditures prior to 1995 are extrapolated using GDP data taken from AMECO (2019a), which is the annual 
macro-economic database of the European Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs. For the UK, data prior to 1995 is extrapolated using GDP figures. The 1988-deflator is also imputed 
using AMECO (2019b). 
3. Defensive, rehabilitative and intermediate expenditures 
Not all consumption expenditures incorporated in AIC are taken into account in economic welfare measures 
(EWM). Certain parts of consumption categories in the Classification of Individual Consumption According 
to Purpose (COICOP) are deducted as defensive expenditures. These expenditures are not counted as 
contributing to welfare as they are compensating for the unwanted effects of other activities. Moreover, 
not all expenditures are to be seen as welfare enhancing or as final consumption since some expenses are 
of intermediate nature. 
In this paper, defensive, intermediate and rehabilitative expenditures involve the subtracting of the 
following: 25% of food and alcohol expenditures, 100% of tobacco and narcotics expenditures, 100% of 
insurance and financial services expenditures and the cost of road accidents. The food deduction is 
supported by estimates for the EU-28 that 20% of the total amount of food produced was wasted in 2011 
(Stenmarck et al., 2016). 25% of alcohol expenses and 100% of tobacco expenditures and insurance are 
deducted, which is in line with Talberth and Weisdorf (2017). Narcotics are not counted, since these 
expenditures cover both legal and illegal purchases by households, whereas the narcotics for medical 
purposes and the instant consumption of narcotics in coffee shops are classified elsewhere in the COICOP 
(UNSD, 2018). 
Insurance and financial services expenditures are unusual categories in the COICOP. Both are imputed as 
their expenditures are not directly observable from expenditure surveys and household income (UNSD, 
2018). Similar to Talberth and Weisdorf (2017), insurance expenditures (life and non-life insurance) are 
entirely excluded as they are defensive by nature. The imputation of non-life insurance, for instance, is 
equal to the total amount of premiums earned plus investment income earned from investing the premiums 
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less adjusted claims incurred (UNSD, 2018). This category is not pure final consumption compared to true 
final consumption categories, as it is defensive and includes investment income. Yet, the effect of insurance 
is not entirely removed from the index, as insured losses help to reduce the economic losses related to 
extreme weather events (see Section 7.4). 
Financial services are entirely subtracted for two reasons. First, financial services include the following 
activities: monitoring services, convenience services, liquidity provision, risk assumption, underwriting and 
trading services (European Commission et al., 2009). This financial intermediation services are 
intermediate, i.e. they support other types of final consumption that are elsewhere included in the index. 
Second, over time GDP’s production boundary has expanded to include financial services (Derock, 2019). 
Yet, EWM do not have to follow this GDP bias. Including financial services in EWM would reflect tendencies 
of increasing financialization in the economy. As argued by Van der Slycken and Bleys (2020b), this 
intermediate consumption is not the final consumption that contributes to welfare. 
In contrast to Lawn (2008, 2013) who deducts certain fractions of all consumption categories, the defensive 
consumption categories in this paper are rather limited. Nonetheless, in Section 5 of this appendix we will 
discount overall consumption to account for the diminishing marginal utility of income. 
Defensive expenditures involve the subtracting of the following: 25% of food and alcohol expenditures, 
100% of tobacco and narcotics expenditures, 100% of insurance and financial services expenditures. 25% 
of food expenditures are subtracted. Detailed data on Final consumption expenditure of households by 
consumption purpose was extracted from Eurostat (2019e). The detailed data for Greece in 2018 was 
extrapolated using previous’ years trend. 
Finally, the costs of car accidents are deducted too because this are rehabilitative expenditures that are 
undertaken to restore to previous, more healthy conditions and are deducted because they are to be seen 
as costs, not benefits. The cost of road accidents is calculated by coupling costs estimates for deaths and 
injuries with the number of deaths and injured. The number of fatalities and injured is obtained from 
OECD.Stat (2019c) – memory items were used is data were missing toward the end of the time period. The 
country-specific cost estimates come from HEATCO, which is a EU-project dedicated to developing 
harmonized European approaches for transport costing and project assessment, by Bickel et al. (2006). As 
suggested by Bickel et al. the number of deaths and the number of injured are multiplied with respectively 
factors 1.02 and 2.25 to account for unreported road accidents. By using the factor 2.25 for average 
accidents, we assume that the accidents listed on OECD.Stat are ‘average’ accidents as the OECD-database 
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does not distinguish between severe of slight accidents, for which Bickel et al. provide other adjustment 
factors. 
The cost estimates used only captures the direct and indirect economic costs related to fatalities and 
injuries. Since the data from OECD.Stat gives no indication on the type of injury, the cost estimates for slight 
injuries are chosen instead of the higher estimates of severe injuries. Direct costs included are medical and 
rehabilitation costs, legal court and emergency service costs and material damages, while the indirect costs 
consist of the lost production that could have been produced if there was no accident (Bickel et al. 2006). 
For future years, the 2002-point estimate was converted using the trend in GDP, as recommended by Bickel 
et al. The cost estimates for the years before 2002 were obtained using the same scaling technique. 
This item is calculated in a similar fashion for both welfare interpretations because of a lack of estimates 
that allow to separate current from future costs. The indirect costs and the medical and rehabilitation costs 
include future costs, which makes this valuation method less appropriate for the experiential welfare 
interpretation. Nonetheless, we believe the used valuation method, also for the experiential interpretation, 
is rather conservative because the estimates for the value of safety or the value of a statistical life that cover 
the largest share of the total accident costs are not included. The value of safety is “the value of a very small 
change in the change of risk of dying or getting injured in an accident” (Bickel et al., 2006). In this study the 
value of a statistical life is not considered here, nor in other items, as it gives no indication about how many 
life years are lost. For this reason, the valuation of the items air pollution and the costs of extreme weather 
events, discussed in Sections 7.1 and 7.4, is based on estimates that account for the life years lost. Future 
research could, look into finding different valuation methods for each welfare interpretation, distinguishing 
the number of injuries by type and the number of life years lost. 
4. Shadow economy 
The new item shadow economy is introduced in the category net consumption to account for the welfare 
contributions of informal market activities. This item is estimated based on a study by Kelmanson et al. 
(2019), in which the size of the Europe’s shadow economy is estimated as a percentage of GDP from 2000 
to 2016. The percentages before 2000 and for 2017 are extrapolated from Medina and Schneider’s (2019) 
global study with country estimates from 1991 to 2017. The value for 2018 is a memory item.  
In order to conservatively approximate the welfare contribution of the shadow economy, the size of the 
shadow economy was halved. This can be thought of as a conservative estimate to exclude illegal activities, 
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avoid double counting with actual individual consumption and unpaid work and exclude defensive 
expenditures. As the shadow economy is also treated as consumption and included in net consumption, 
the value of the shadow economy is also corrected for income inequality using the adjusted Atkinson Index.  
Future research could investigate ways of refining this item’s valuation methods, for instance distinguishing 
between consumption and investment. Part of the shadow economy that is included as consumption here, 
but that is in fact an investment should be factored back in as capital adjustments in the broad welfare 
interpretation in a similar was as was done with the benefits of consumer durables. 
5. Welfare losses from income inequality 
The welfare losses from income inequality are calculated by multiplying an inequality adjustment factor 
with the sum of individual consumption expenditures and the shadow economy minus defensive, 
intermediate en rehabilitative expenditures. 
The adjustment for the diminishing marginal utility of income makes use of decile data obtained from 
Eurostat (2019g) to have an indication about the distribution of incomes in percentages. The income deciles 
are calculated based on disposable income. The total disposable household income is equivalized to 
account for the differences in household size and composition. Actual (average) incomes per decile and the 
median income are obtained by matching the decile data with GDP-data from Eurostat (2020b). The 
datagaps on income deciles are extrapolated for values in between two income decile datapoints. Income 
decile data gaps at the beginning of the time period for Denmark (1995-2002), Finland (1995) and Sweden 
(1995-2003) were filled via memory items. 
The sufficiency threshold of $20,000 in 2011 prices was converted to 2010 prices using World Bank (2019) 
deflators. This sufficiency threshold in 2010 dollars was converted to a country-specific sufficiency threshold 
in euro by using data on purchasing power parities from the OECD (2020b). 
Part of the sensitivity analysis is based on the Adjusted Atkinson Index. Compared to previous studies a 
higher income inequality aversion is chosen: in the final measure ε is put to 1.5 based on Latty (2011) 
instead of 0.8. Moreover, parameter α is put to 0.35 after Howarth and Kennedy (2016) to account for 
relative income effects, in contrast to earlier studies in which this is not the case (i.e. α = 0). The Atkinson 
index is calculated based on the decile data obtained from Eurostat (2019g). The Gini coefficient of 
equivalized disposable from Eurostat (2019c) was used to extrapolate the adjusted Atkinson Index when 
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income deciles were missing. Missing Gini coefficients were interpolated, while memory items were used 
if it was not possible to extrapolate the adjusted Atkinson Index based on the Gini coefficients. 
6. Non-defensive government expenditures 
This category measures the non-defensive goods and services produced by the general government, but 
consumed by households collectively such as housing, cultural and artistic activities. In contrast to the 
individual consumption expenditures by the government on health and education that is incorporated in 
actual individual consumption, this adjustment factors in the non-defensive part of the general 
government’s collective consumption expenditures. The categories general public services, housing and 
community amenities and recreation, culture and religion are entirely seen as non-defensive and thus seen 
as beneficial to welfare. Defense, public order and safety, economic affairs, environmental protection, 
health, education, and social protection are categories that treated as defensive and are not counted in 
EWM, except for the part of health and education expenditures which are reallocated as actual individual 
consumption. Data are obtained from Eurostat (2020c).  
The categories included here and labelled as ‘non-defensive’ are rather broad. General public services 
includes the following subcategories: ‘general public services’ and ‘general public services not elsewhere 
classified’, but also ‘executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs’, ‘foreign 
economic aid’, ‘basic research’, ‘R&D General public services’, ‘public debt transactions’ and ‘ transfers of a 
general character between different levels of government’. Therefore, future research should scrutinize 
these categories in greater detail to verify which expenditures are defensive, which expenditures are on 
durable goods, which expenditures are investments, which expenditures should be included in the different 
welfare interpretations and which expenses are potentially double counted. Data availability could, 
however, limit a proper translation of these subcategories from theory to practice. Government 
expenditures are exactly the same for both welfare interpretations because subcategories in general public 
services are only available from 2001 onwards. If data would have been available from 1995 on, BCE and 
BCPA could be calculated differently, for instance, by excluding foreign economic aid for BCE and including 
it in BCPA. 
At this point, I believe the approach of including or excluding entire categories of government expenditures 
and the reallocation of health and education to actual individual consumption is less arbitrary compared to 
previous welfare studies, in which certain fractions were deducted. 
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7. Ecological costs 
7.1 Cost of air pollution 
The cost of air pollution is calculated differently for BCE’s narrow ecological costs (NEW) and BCPA’s broad 
ecological costs (BEC). The starting point to estimate this item are within border (i.e. production-based) 
emissions for the following air pollutants: PM 2,5, NOx, NH3, SOx and NMVOC. Emission data for these 
pollutants from 1995-2017 are available on Eurostat (2019i). The cost estimate for each pollutant (€/ton) is 
taken from a study by the European Environmental Agency (EEA, 2014). This report specifically estimates 
air pollution’s health-related costs as the valuation methods consist of two complementary approaches: 
the value of a statistical life (VSL), “an estimate of damage costs based on how much people are willing to 
pay for a reduction in their risk of dying from adverse health conditions”; and the value of a life year (VOLY), 
“an estimate of damage costs based upon the loss of life expectancy (expressed as potential years of life 
lost, or YOLLs). This measure takes into account the age at which deaths occur by giving greater weight to 
deaths at younger age and lower weight to deaths at older age”. The low VOLY (and not high VSL) is taken 
to obtain cost estimates, as it provides more information by accounting for the years of life lost. Because 
the EEA-study only provides a cost estimate for SO2 and not SOx the emissions of SOx are valued using the 
cost SOx-estimate. This can be considered as a decent approximation as all the sulphur emitted from other 
points sources than SO2 accounts for less than 5% of the total amount of sulphur emitted (Green et al., 
2016). 
The EEA-study quantifies both chronic and acute effects of air pollution’s health impacts. This is not 
problematic for BEC as it also incorporates future costs. However, in order to approximate the presents 
costs of air pollution for NEC, an adjustment is needed. For this reason, only 20% of the production-based 
cost of air pollution is treated as a cost in the present. Lawn (2008) executed a similar adjustment to capture 
the direct disamenity cost as opposed to the long-term health impacts.  
The broad ecological costs, in contrast, include the entire cost from domestic emissions and adds the costs 
of the air pollution embodied in trade to account for costs shifted elsewhere. Data on the effect of air 
pollution on human health (for pollutants PM 2.5 from fossil and biogenic sources, NH3, NOx, SO2) from a 
domestic production and consumption footprint are obtained from the SCP Hotspots Analysis Tool (UN 
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Environment, 2020)40. The amount of air pollution embodied in trade is obtained by taking the difference 
between the consumption and production perspectives. However, as these data are expressed in disability-
adjusted life years (DALYs) instead of raw emissions, they are valued using a cost estimate of €41,000 per 
life year related to air pollution mortality taken from Desaigues et al.’s (2011) contingent valuation survey 
on the value of a life year related to air pollution mortality in the EU-15.  
Data from SCP-HAT only covers the years up until 2015, of which the values for 2013 until 2015 also have 
been extrapolated (Piñero et al., 2019). These authors used CO2-emissions to project PM 2.5 fossil, NOx and 
SO2. In order to project the emissions embodied in trade until 2018, production and consumption based 
CO2-emissions from the global carbon project 2019 were taken (see Section 7.3). The same production-
based emissions were used to extrapolate domestic emissions for PM 2.5, NOx and SOx to 2018 as Eurostat 
only records emissions up until 2017. Emission data for NH3 and NMVOC in 2018 are memory items of the 
values in 2017. 
7.2 Ecosystem costs of nitrogen pollution 
In Van der Slycken and Bleys (2020b), a new item was introduced: the costs of nitrogen pollution. The 
rationale for including this item stems from recent scientific evidence, showing that the nitrogen cycle is a 
planetary boundary that is being transgressed (Steffen et al., 2015).41 This item is included in the NEC and 
BEC since it is assumed to reflect the current ecosystem costs within domestic borders.  
The cost of nitrogen pollution is calculated by matching emissions data on NOx and NH3 from Eurostat 
(2019i) and a study for Europe by Van Grinsven et al. (2013). These authors provide detailed costs for 
nitrogen pollution’s impact on health, the climate and ecosystems. In order to avoid double counting with 
the items air pollution and climate disruption, the valuation method of this item does not incorporate the 
health and climate impacts of nitrogen pollution, instead it only registers the ecosystem costs from the 
emissions of NOx and NH3. This study provides a range for the costs from NOx and NH3 emissions (to air) for 
the entire EU27. Marginal cost estimates per ton for both types of emissions were obtained by dividing the 
average of this cost range by the total amount of emissions for the EU27. Similarly, the total ecosystem cost 
                                                     
40 The use of this information is with permission from UN Environment, subject to the Terms and Conditions in 
www.scp-hat.lifecycleinitiative.org. 
41 Steffen et al. (2015) identified that the threshold for biochemical flows has been crossed. The planetary boundary 
biochemical flows consists of two subcomponents, the nitrogen and phosphorus cycle, which have both transgressed 
planetary boundaries. This study only includes the ecosystem costs of nitrogen pollution. Calculating the costs related 
to the phosphorus cycle is left for future research, because of a lack of available data.  
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from reactive nitrogen losses to rivers and seas from agricultural sources was converted in an estimate per 
ton using data on the consumption of inorganic nitrogen fertilizer from Eurostat’s (2020d) – memory items 
were used to fill data gaps at the beginning and end of the period. The consumption of inorganic nitrogen 
fertilizer was used as a quantity to capture the nitrogen run-off to rivers and seas from agricultural sources. 
In a next step, the cost per ton in € 2008 was converted to € 2010 using a country-specific deflator. For 
Belgium, for instance, NOx is valued in 2010 prices at € 3,842.71 per ton, NH3 at € 11,675.02 per ton and 
reactive nitrogen at € 5,697.82 per ton.  
Van der Slycken and Bleys (2020b) proposed not to include a separate “cost of water pollution” item as 
most other studies do, yet to instead approximate these costs by including in this item the ecosystem costs 
from reactive nitrogen losses from agricultural sources to rivers and seas.  
7.3 Cost of climate breakdown 
This item, previously referred to as the costs of ‘climate change’, has changed significantly over the years – 
see e.g. O’Mahony et al. (2018) for an overview.42 Most studies valued this item by coupling the emissions 
related to the domestic consumption of fossil fuels with a social cost of carbon. Nevertheless, scholars are 
still discussing how to properly account for ‘climate change’. Bagstad et al. (2014) suggested to substitute 
this common valuation method with components such as the cost of natural disasters and water scarcity, 
whereas O’Mahony et al. (2018) stipulated the need for a separate approach to distinguish between future 
global impact costs related to current domestic emitting activities and the current national welfare costs of 
climate change stemming from past global emissions. 
The appropriate approach to account for climate disruption depends on the welfare interpretation used. 
Van der Slycken and Bleys’s (2020a) conceptual exploration on welfare costs here and now and the costs 
shifted abroad and to the future, helps to distinguish between BCPA and BCE. BCPA can include future and 
distant costs and thus can make use of a social cost of carbon to capture damages caused. However, BCE 
can’t and should focus on the local and current costs arising from climate change, i.e. the damages suffered. 
That is why, the item costs of climate breakdown is only included in BCPA. Yet, the new item costs of extreme 
weather events, which approximates the damages suffered ‘here and now’, is to be included in BCE (see 
Section 7.4) but not in BCPA to avoid double counting with the cost of climate breakdown. 
                                                     
42 I prefer to use the term climate breakdown instead of a mere change in climate as recent evidence on climate tipping 
points indicates the threat of rapid and irreversible changes in the climate system that would severely disrupt 
ecosystems, societies and economies. 
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Other methodological novelties regarding the calculation of the costs of climate breakdown are a broader 
set of emissions beyond territorial GHG-emissions. The quantity of emissions is based on the data countries 
send to UNFCCC and includes: territorial GHG emissions (without Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
(LULUCF), without indirect CO2), the emissions from international bunkers (aviation and navigation), CO2 
emissions from biomass and LULUCF. This data is taken from a data viewer by the EEA (2019a).43 The values 
for 2018 are taken from a greenhouse gas inventory report (EEA, 2019b), which are sometimes memo items 
if the data are missing from the inventory report. 
The emissions of navigation were slightly changed to account for the bunkering of fuels – the navigation 
emissions send to the UNFCCC are based on marine fuel sales in each European country, which does not 
reflect each countries’ activity-based emissions (Transport and Environment, 2019). Based on this study 
from Transport and Environment, navigation emissions are allocated to countries’ activities and not sales 
for the year 2018. This estimate was compared to the country-estimate reported to the UNFCCC in 2018 
that was taken from EEA (2019b). The ratio between both 2018 values for the emission from navigation 
was used to extrapolate a time series based on Transport and Environment’s methodology until the 
beginning of the time period. This ratio is assumed to stay constant over this time period and is applied to 
the navigation emission data reported to the UNFCCC. The final emissions for international navigation is 
calculated by taking the average of the UNFCCC-series and the series based on Transport and Environment’s 
methodology. 
Furthermore, two types of footprint emissions are added to register the emissions beyond domestic 
borders that can be related to national consumption. The first type involves the carbon dioxide emissions 
embodied in goods and services. These emissions are updated from Peters et al. (2011) in the Global Carbon 
Project by Friedlingstein et al. (2019). Consumption based emissions for 2018 were extrapolated using last 
year’s trend. It should be noted, however, that the Global Carbon Atlas defines ‘transfer emissions’, as the 
difference between production and consumption carbon dioxide emissions. Because this procedure gives 
negative quantities for countries that import emissions, I have taken the opposite numbers, i.e. the 
difference between consumption and production emissions, in this paper to obtain positive quantities if 
countries are net importers of emissions, i.e. the emission from the production of imports are larger than 
the emissions from the production of exports. 
                                                     
43 Data is taken for the following categories on the EEA-viewer: Total (without LULUCF, without indirect CO2), 1.D.1.a 
– International Aviation, 1.D.1.b – International Navigation, 1.D.3 – CO2 emissions from biomass, 4 – Land Use, Land-
Use Change and Forestry. 
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The second type of footprint emissions relates the land-use change emissions from the Global Carbon 
Project 2019 (Friedlingstein et al., 2019) a EU15-country’s share in the global land-use consumption 
footprint using SCP-HAT. The global carbon project emission data is based on the average of two 
bookkeeping models from Houghton and Nassikas (2017) and Hansis et al. (2015). These global emissions 
are allocated to EU15-countries according to their land-use consumption footprint as a share of the global 
land-use consumption footprint. Both consumption footprints are taken from UN Environment (2019). As 
these footprints only cover the years up until 2015, 2016 values are projected using data on the global and 
country’s Ecological Footprint provided by the Global Footprint Network (2019) – more specifically by 
assuming the land-use footprint follows the same trend from 2015 to 2016 as the combined ecological 
footprint of built-up land, cropland, forest products and grazing land, however, since some countries do not 
have such a detailed breakdown of their footprint, I used their total footprint. The values for 2017 and 2018 
are memory items.   
To calculate the damage caused by climate disruption, these emissions are coupled with a social cost of 
carbon (SCC). The SCC differs significantly depending on the specific parameters (i.e. damage functions, 
discount rate, climate sensitivity). Ackerman and Stanton’s (2012) estimates of the SCC in 2010 vary 
between $28 and $892 in 2007$. O’Mahony et al. (2018) use in the Spanish ISEW-study an estimate of $232 
in 2010$ or €175.37 in 2010€ per tonne of CO2 (equivalent), which is based on a 3% discount rate, 95th 
percentile climate sensitivity and Hanemann Weitzman damage functions. Stern (2006), however, argued 
in favor of a lower discount rate based on the aspect of intergenerational equity. In order to suitably 
measure the future costs in BCPA and thus discount future costs less, we would suggest to use a lower 
discount rate compared to O’Mahony et al. (2018). Using the same damage functions, a 1.5% discount rate 
would lead to SCC-estimates of $445 and $892 in 2007$ (or €340.23 and €681.98 in 2010€ for Belgium), for 
respectively average and 95th percentile climate sensitivity (Ackerman and Stanton, 2012). As the lowest of 
these SCC’s is almost the double of O’Mahony et al.’s estimate, I use the estimate based on average climate 
sensitivity and apply an annual growth rate of 1.4452407% to extrapolate and interpolate the estimates in 
the years before and after 2010. The annual growth rate is obtained by extrapolation Ackerman and 
Stanton’s (2012) 2010 values to 2050. Using discount rate of 1.5%, is similar the 1.4% discount rate 
proposed by Stern (2006) in the Stern Review. The 2007 values are first converted to euros in 2007 prices. 
Afterwards, national deflators from the World Bank (2019) were used to obtain a SCC-estimate in 2010 
prices for each country. 
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7.4 Cost of extreme weather events 
Van der Slycken and Bleys (2020b) introduced with the costs of extreme weather events a new item to 
capture the present damages suffered from geophysical, hydrological, meteorological and climatological 
extreme weather events. This item measures what is experienced ‘here and now’ from these events for 
BCE’s NEC. This item is excluded from BCPA’s BEC to avoid double counting. The calculation method, 
however, does not cover all the costs of extreme weather events, but only focuses on the uninsured costs. 
This way, the insurance expenditures made in previous years help to reduce the damages suffered from 
these events. This approach thus accounts for the positive contribution of insurance when they are of use 
or consumed, instead of when expenditures are made.  
Data on the uninsured losses is taken from Munich Reinsurance Company’s NatCatService (2019). This 
global database of natural catastrophes lists the economic losses from the following types of extreme 
events: hydrological (i.e. flood, mass movement wet), climatological (i.e. extreme temperature, drought, 
wildfire), geophysical (i.e. earthquake, volcanic eruption, mass movement dry) and meteorological (i.e. 
tropical storm, extra-tropical storm, convective storm, local windstorm). The cost is calculated by taking the 
difference between direct economic loss estimates (all physical/tangible losses) and insured losses (i.e. all 
paid-out insured losses through all affected lines of business – “market loss”) from NatCatService (2018). 
Exchange rate data is taken from OECD.Stat (2019b) to convert US dollars to euros. 
7.5 Depletion of non-renewable energy resources 
The valuation of this item is based on the total energy investments expenditures needed in the European 
Union under the requirement of meeting certain climate goals agreed upon by the European Council as an 
approximation to value the depletion of non-renewable resources. These targets include an overall GHG 
emission reduction of at least 40% compared to 1990 and a share of renewable energy in final energy 
consumption of at least 27%. Moreover, the European Council agreed on the following minimum ambition 
level for the energy efficiency target: a 27% reduction of primary energy consumption compared to 2007. 
The investments needed are calculated, given the various policy options for 2030 energy efficiency targets: 
27%, 30%, 33%, 35% and 40%. Policy options with a level of energy efficiency higher than 30% in 2030 also 
have higher share of renewable energy sources of 28% (European Commission, 2016). A mid-value of 33% 
target was chosen, which leads to a total energy related investment expenditure of 1115 billion euros (in 
2010 prices) in the EU-28. This amount is an annual average investment that needs to be made every year 
from 2010 to 2030 to meet the 2030 targets. A marginal cost estimate of € 797,45 (in 2010 prices) per ton 
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of oil equivalent is obtained by dividing the total investment by the primary energy consumption in 2016 
for the EU-28, which was taken from Eurostat (2020a). A 27% and 40% energy efficiency target would result 
respectively in a marginal cost of € 670,58 and € 1.012,99. This marginal cost was than coupled with EU15-
countries’ primary energy consumption taken from Eurostat (2020a) to approximate the transition 
investments needed.  
7.6 Costs of use of nuclear power 
Using nuclear energy involves significant costs and these costs should be accounted for. So far, the German 
welfare study by Held et al. (2018) is the only one that accounts for this item. This item couples data from 
the IEA (2020) on nuclear electricity generation with a cost estimate (€0,124 per kWh in 2010 prices) from 
Held et al. (2018). The cost of use of nuclear power is only included in BCPA’s broad ecological costs, as the 
estimate used includes the costs of dismantlement, search of a disposal site and final storage of radioactive 
waste and the costs of insurance against a worst case event. Future research may look into finding a way 
to calculate the costs that are experienced in the present. 
8. Capital adjustment 
This item net capital growth is included in BCPA. In contrast to previous studies, this study only traces mere 
capital adjustments. It breaks with taking 5-year rolling averages and by including the growth requirement 
in this item. Following Hicks’ income concept, capital changes should be counted as income. However, by 
taking 5-year rolling averages to smooth out fluctuations, one is actually treating this item as the services 
flowing from a stock that would last five years. Furthermore, the net capital growth required to keep the 
capital stock per worker intact is removed as this procedure is motivated by a sustainability rationale. As 
Lawn (2013) articulated welfare measures only capture economic welfare and not sustainability. Including 
this net investment has a clear welfare interpretation. Weitzman (1976), for instance, has shown that 
adding net investments to a country’s consumption (i.e. the net national product) is (in theory) a proxy for 
the present discounted value of future consumption – as such the future consumption possibilities locked 
up in current wealth are registered. 
Net capital growth is calculated by taking the difference between the capital stock in the present and 
previous year. The data on the net capital stock comes from the AMECO (2019c). In the Ameco-database 
this year’s net capital stock is obtained by adding the difference between gross fixed capital formation and 
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Appendix B: Data 
The data presented here are per capita data in 2010 prices, except the population data. 
Austria 
 
gdp bce bcpa population
1995 28.814,64 € 27.415,72 € 22.673,17 € 7943489
1996 28.903,41 € 27.668,91 € 22.522,01 € 7953067
1997 28.634,14 € 27.229,18 € 22.428,31 € 7964966
1998 29.571,64 € 27.809,82 € 22.871,18 € 7971116
1999 30.789,08 € 28.138,29 € 23.367,34 € 7982461
2000 31.749,98 € 28.772,82 € 24.075,72 € 8002186
2001 32.077,10 € 29.016,43 € 23.833,97 € 8020946
2002 32.434,23 € 28.723,93 € 23.156,78 € 8063640
2003 32.591,53 € 29.115,61 € 22.599,51 € 8100273
2004 33.309,01 € 29.366,99 € 22.768,04 € 8142573
2005 33.812,36 € 29.466,59 € 22.576,94 € 8201359
2006 34.755,92 € 29.755,58 € 22.436,09 € 8254298
2007 35.926,56 € 29.692,70 € 22.836,85 € 8282984
2008 36.341,53 € 29.753,23 € 22.833,95 € 8307989
2009 34.860,07 € 30.275,16 € 23.073,90 € 8335003
2010 35.429,75 € 30.442,68 € 22.497,93 € 8351643
2011 36.362,89 € 30.544,67 € 22.991,76 € 8375164
2012 36.466,81 € 30.643,28 € 23.155,26 € 8408121
2013 36.287,35 € 30.662,59 € 23.145,84 € 8451860
2014 36.287,19 € 30.475,36 € 22.992,37 € 8507786
2015 36.373,29 € 30.287,52 € 22.746,56 € 8584926
2016 36.730,30 € 30.229,18 € 22.877,44 € 8700471
2017 37.285,30 € 30.078,48 € 22.742,90 € 8772865
2018 38.009,93 € 30.283,16 € 23.324,32 € 8822267
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 9.058,68 € 18.737,79 € 1.324,65 € 3.494,73 € 1.679,72 € 3.093,36 € 427,06 € 7.785,59 € 2.615,98 €
1996 9.023,44 € 18.924,93 € 1.344,01 € 3.523,28 € 1.618,18 € 3.091,43 € 437,13 € 8.377,97 € 2.793,94 €
1997 8.958,86 € 18.831,00 € 1.346,62 € 3.082,15 € 1.617,81 € 2.924,21 € 447,43 € 7.959,38 € 2.711,08 €
1998 9.228,70 € 19.367,19 € 1.375,08 € 3.135,66 € 1.686,13 € 3.180,29 € 430,39 € 8.169,39 € 2.800,36 €
1999 9.419,25 € 19.919,35 € 1.464,23 € 3.223,38 € 1.699,81 € 3.735,69 € 452,42 € 7.935,44 € 2.712,07 €
2000 9.509,55 € 20.555,82 € 1.476,37 € 3.262,84 € 1.775,10 € 3.808,48 € 448,18 € 8.108,53 € 2.963,25 €
2001 9.523,55 € 20.859,75 € 1.411,39 € 3.382,71 € 1.823,33 € 3.907,64 € 429,99 € 8.277,93 € 2.665,47 €
2002 9.667,62 € 20.992,31 € 1.491,97 € 3.260,66 € 1.777,23 € 4.131,25 € 780,15 € 8.589,55 € 2.242,25 €
2003 9.702,38 € 21.297,93 € 1.548,10 € 3.149,49 € 1.792,55 € 4.346,48 € 443,26 € 9.339,72 € 2.380,37 €
2004 9.697,48 € 21.602,37 € 1.565,52 € 3.125,19 € 1.825,31 € 4.414,73 € 383,55 € 9.293,69 € 2.311,19 €
2005 9.612,66 € 21.883,61 € 1.690,62 € 3.222,62 € 1.878,86 € 4.617,66 € 446,39 € 9.512,22 € 2.176,18 €
2006 9.589,53 € 22.295,76 € 1.720,42 € 3.284,81 € 1.889,22 € 4.834,86 € 410,87 € 9.888,08 € 2.157,71 €
2007 9.615,50 € 22.588,42 € 1.688,55 € 3.366,63 € 1.981,00 € 5.186,85 € 398,56 € 9.671,18 € 2.416,78 €
2008 9.663,60 € 22.891,24 € 1.708,05 € 3.243,90 € 1.902,39 € 5.469,66 € 381,51 € 9.725,68 € 2.424,90 €
2009 9.715,12 € 22.745,50 € 1.812,72 € 3.353,84 € 1.815,15 € 5.182,20 € 354,68 € 9.274,68 € 1.718,73 €
2010 9.860,31 € 23.104,06 € 1.736,06 € 3.315,04 € 1.806,48 € 5.423,99 € 342,32 € 9.730,97 € 1.443,90 €
2011 9.851,97 € 23.528,90 € 1.672,69 € 3.271,48 € 1.829,09 € 5.623,53 € 327,75 € 9.738,76 € 1.858,10 €
2012 9.820,62 € 23.699,65 € 1.695,71 € 3.239,80 € 1.767,42 € 5.714,53 € 330,55 € 9.631,63 € 1.813,06 €
2013 9.825,84 € 23.796,41 € 1.705,51 € 3.197,48 € 1.773,95 € 5.659,85 € 428,84 € 9.769,55 € 1.823,96 €
2014 9.764,63 € 23.725,35 € 1.741,79 € 3.044,67 € 1.793,90 € 5.676,02 € 331,17 € 9.491,05 € 1.676,89 €
2015 9.720,67 € 23.521,04 € 1.764,10 € 3.041,23 € 1.779,65 € 5.625,96 € 353,91 € 9.641,64 € 1.746,77 €
2016 9.770,41 € 23.581,47 € 1.763,05 € 2.946,72 € 1.757,68 € 5.726,74 € 348,06 € 9.626,87 € 1.927,07 €
2017 9.756,33 € 23.845,36 € 1.717,14 € 2.797,60 € 1.736,46 € 5.971,06 € 330,43 € 9.754,39 € 2.088,38 €









gdp bce bcpa population
1995 37.828,31 € 41.007,04 € 32.090,94 € 5215718
1996 38.499,18 € 41.460,51 € 31.942,12 € 5251027
1997 38.915,73 € 41.450,28 € 32.823,56 € 5275121
1998 39.547,65 € 42.136,25 € 34.063,36 € 5294860
1999 40.918,24 € 42.516,56 € 34.442,94 € 5313577
2000 42.216,52 € 42.355,70 € 34.804,39 € 5330020
2001 42.421,02 € 42.392,61 € 34.510,29 € 5349212
2002 42.590,32 € 42.898,48 € 34.469,45 € 5368354
2003 42.634,97 € 43.426,24 € 34.396,60 € 5383507
2004 43.603,94 € 43.851,90 € 34.926,09 € 5397640
2005 44.438,25 € 43.696,88 € 35.397,11 € 5411405
2006 45.995,47 € 44.311,97 € 36.190,05 € 5427459
2007 46.299,22 € 44.963,98 € 37.048,29 € 5447084
2008 45.787,48 € 45.707,45 € 37.609,59 € 5475791
2009 43.316,10 € 47.214,94 € 38.247,93 € 5511451
2010 43.934,40 € 47.204,62 € 37.387,60 € 5534738
2011 44.294,79 € 47.307,32 € 38.116,31 € 5560628
2012 44.277,90 € 47.337,56 € 38.635,12 € 5580516
2013 44.430,03 € 46.468,18 € 37.794,25 € 5602628
2014 44.970,78 € 46.076,83 € 37.751,14 € 5627235
2015 45.736,23 € 46.827,55 € 38.713,12 € 5659715
2016 46.696,07 € 46.733,68 € 38.972,15 € 5707251
2017 47.214,52 € 46.265,61 € 38.770,24 € 5748769
2018 48.181,10 € 46.890,05 € 39.933,58 € 5781190
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 16.047,79 € 24.704,67 € 3.279,01 € 4.979,47 € 2.404,02 € 4.701,73 € 898,15 € 10.797,49 € 983,24 €
1996 16.229,38 € 25.019,80 € 3.407,18 € 4.978,97 € 2.308,95 € 4.937,84 € 928,04 € 11.590,17 € 1.143,74 €
1997 16.403,76 € 25.118,02 € 3.373,27 € 4.733,50 € 2.294,45 € 5.037,42 € 846,42 € 11.004,05 € 1.530,93 €
1998 16.689,79 € 25.809,82 € 3.499,97 € 4.619,32 € 2.355,44 € 5.314,13 € 813,08 € 10.699,41 € 1.813,44 €
1999 16.853,21 € 26.361,00 € 3.621,26 € 4.649,29 € 2.362,63 € 5.731,63 € 873,94 € 10.553,35 € 1.605,80 €
2000 16.759,51 € 26.594,37 € 3.736,16 € 4.562,19 € 2.458,50 € 6.092,03 € 746,01 € 10.354,45 € 2.057,13 €
2001 16.800,61 € 26.809,30 € 3.690,63 € 4.436,21 € 2.460,25 € 6.172,00 € 711,88 € 10.390,32 € 1.796,11 €
2002 17.076,38 € 27.102,38 € 3.939,60 € 4.239,40 € 2.452,81 € 6.329,42 € 677,05 € 10.521,84 € 1.415,75 €
2003 17.427,13 € 27.437,28 € 4.007,69 € 4.147,70 € 2.502,79 € 6.417,29 € 673,47 € 11.004,82 € 1.301,71 €
2004 17.663,79 € 27.943,47 € 4.011,56 € 4.062,43 € 2.505,21 € 6.665,15 € 659,00 € 10.968,10 € 1.383,28 €
2005 17.759,09 € 28.173,13 € 4.110,54 € 3.850,63 € 2.558,59 € 6.936,69 € 701,23 € 10.800,50 € 1.799,49 €
2006 17.992,90 € 28.842,65 € 4.185,59 € 3.895,75 € 2.576,17 € 7.412,11 € 616,64 € 11.631,18 € 2.892,62 €
2007 18.472,27 € 29.230,44 € 4.190,08 € 4.052,94 € 2.607,67 € 7.750,55 € 623,53 € 11.299,92 € 2.760,70 €
2008 18.632,33 € 29.424,35 € 4.372,70 € 4.219,24 € 2.682,47 € 7.652,30 € 606,39 € 10.750,73 € 2.046,47 €
2009 19.420,55 € 29.530,25 € 4.353,27 € 4.439,43 € 2.610,61 € 7.366,15 € 551,79 € 10.349,10 € 830,29 €
2010 19.679,54 € 29.433,86 € 4.217,70 € 4.387,60 € 2.494,78 € 7.473,17 € 546,13 € 10.541,64 € 178,50 €
2011 19.691,68 € 29.510,06 € 4.141,56 € 4.547,65 € 2.533,29 € 7.453,03 € 597,32 € 10.055,38 € 267,05 €
2012 19.361,34 € 29.412,62 € 3.940,73 € 4.996,48 € 2.458,12 € 7.413,77 € 501,72 € 9.745,12 € 540,96 €
2013 19.312,40 € 29.201,28 € 4.087,56 € 4.272,63 € 2.334,54 € 7.512,33 € 558,82 € 10.008,07 € 775,32 €
2014 19.233,32 € 29.243,32 € 3.957,43 € 4.174,35 € 2.382,63 € 7.665,76 € 483,20 € 9.845,28 € 1.036,39 €
2015 19.577,64 € 29.483,09 € 4.367,81 € 4.281,81 € 2.431,33 € 7.955,48 € 495,99 € 10.088,41 € 1.477,99 €
2016 19.841,77 € 29.703,02 € 4.296,04 € 4.005,83 € 2.408,67 € 8.220,56 € 483,74 € 10.261,98 € 2.016,70 €
2017 19.676,23 € 29.856,56 € 4.200,14 € 3.849,02 € 2.444,74 € 8.336,44 € 535,17 € 10.329,43 € 2.298,90 €





uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 9.443,84 € 16.280,78 € 2.408,86 € 2.617,02 € 1.497,23 € 1.737,48 € 519,78 € 11.983,87 € 306,72 €
1996 9.763,67 € 16.492,37 € 2.493,24 € 2.812,95 € 1.381,93 € 1.829,00 € 523,71 € 12.189,53 € 663,93 €
1997 9.757,25 € 16.701,94 € 2.541,00 € 2.966,21 € 1.358,96 € 2.142,06 € 519,31 € 13.125,19 € 1.115,52 €
1998 9.883,17 € 16.856,25 € 2.545,82 € 2.785,91 € 1.401,43 € 2.237,48 € 502,63 € 12.869,14 € 1.578,23 €
1999 10.175,12 € 17.564,18 € 2.666,85 € 2.740,51 € 1.466,18 € 2.671,62 € 503,48 € 12.828,75 € 1.684,75 €
2000 10.509,16 € 18.206,38 € 2.770,34 € 2.772,80 € 1.545,25 € 3.062,43 € 483,32 € 12.800,90 € 1.901,33 €
2001 10.495,00 € 18.594,34 € 3.071,50 € 2.784,46 € 1.595,25 € 3.410,38 € 489,45 € 13.093,64 € 1.853,32 €
2002 10.621,80 € 19.181,80 € 3.146,62 € 2.692,16 € 1.557,06 € 3.598,99 € 478,36 € 13.661,47 € 1.462,90 €
2003 10.859,79 € 20.025,10 € 3.298,92 € 2.766,43 € 1.553,14 € 3.867,27 € 485,21 € 14.717,30 € 1.508,24 €
2004 11.055,35 € 20.773,56 € 3.488,70 € 2.824,20 € 1.577,51 € 4.255,37 € 471,11 € 14.902,59 € 1.684,86 €
2005 11.205,96 € 21.420,19 € 3.557,13 € 2.879,70 € 1.639,23 € 4.587,62 € 437,98 € 13.633,91 € 1.795,90 €
2006 11.360,48 € 22.241,22 € 3.776,40 € 2.919,40 € 1.715,37 € 5.036,59 € 445,20 € 14.799,20 € 1.776,86 €
2007 11.538,03 € 22.795,83 € 3.698,46 € 2.997,89 € 1.800,80 € 5.523,39 € 431,81 € 15.066,53 € 2.433,15 €
2008 11.671,91 € 23.398,50 € 3.821,89 € 3.163,01 € 1.838,10 € 5.714,91 € 426,92 € 14.370,61 € 2.310,72 €
2009 11.926,04 € 23.150,93 € 3.715,27 € 3.219,66 € 1.699,24 € 4.916,98 € 381,87 € 12.442,85 € 1.126,28 €
2010 12.346,47 € 23.741,07 € 3.656,38 € 3.292,21 € 1.659,86 € 5.187,57 € 423,35 € 14.491,58 € 1.190,58 €
2011 12.247,61 € 24.356,08 € 3.626,62 € 3.473,96 € 1.750,16 € 5.486,67 € 392,57 € 13.760,75 € 1.428,26 €
2012 12.098,76 € 24.490,76 € 3.559,43 € 3.447,64 € 1.754,94 € 5.354,16 € 363,07 € 13.305,17 € 1.340,62 €
2013 11.988,51 € 24.292,85 € 3.354,61 € 3.526,29 € 1.762,84 € 5.120,20 € 361,22 € 13.493,57 € 939,57 €
2014 11.965,01 € 24.180,19 € 3.445,89 € 3.475,92 € 1.801,78 € 5.063,48 € 359,61 € 13.438,89 € 792,50 €
2015 11.905,44 € 24.171,02 € 3.587,83 € 3.528,09 € 1.760,37 € 5.068,51 € 339,22 € 13.329,84 € 793,16 €
2016 12.032,33 € 24.587,03 € 3.534,93 € 3.420,88 € 1.812,76 € 5.346,88 € 328,45 € 13.861,45 € 1.435,67 €
2017 11.909,75 € 24.602,41 € 3.434,52 € 3.464,70 € 1.784,15 € 5.525,81 € 322,44 € 13.787,72 € 1.736,98 €





gdp bce bcpa population
1995 25.843,45 € 26.540,64 € 19.511,80 € 59315139
1996 26.246,34 € 26.860,61 € 19.524,08 € 59522297
1997 26.283,61 € 27.018,80 € 19.794,12 € 59726386
1998 27.178,11 € 27.308,22 € 20.183,11 € 59934884
1999 28.182,10 € 27.700,35 € 21.053,12 € 60158533
2000 29.100,91 € 28.334,69 € 21.627,17 € 60545022
2001 29.466,83 € 28.617,87 € 21.898,17 € 60979315
2002 29.585,66 € 29.109,31 € 22.155,60 € 61424036
2003 29.617,02 € 29.268,54 € 22.253,52 € 61864088
2004 30.245,78 € 29.391,74 € 22.260,42 € 62292241
2005 30.513,40 € 29.593,97 € 22.572,79 € 62772870
2006 31.034,95 € 29.565,91 € 22.829,84 € 63229635
2007 31.579,98 € 29.756,83 € 23.262,58 € 63645065
2008 31.481,37 € 29.548,54 € 22.998,95 € 64007193
2009 30.413,81 € 30.153,42 € 23.151,23 € 64350226
2010 30.858,71 € 30.191,09 € 23.138,59 € 64658856
2011 31.380,11 € 30.230,96 € 23.219,69 € 64978721
2012 31.334,55 € 30.399,96 € 23.592,35 € 65276983
2013 31.359,79 € 30.581,51 € 23.671,88 € 65600350
2014 31.389,00 € 30.635,63 € 23.877,60 € 66165980
2015 31.598,80 € 30.445,69 € 23.595,65 € 66458153
2016 31.858,55 € 30.610,33 € 24.007,10 € 66638391
2017 32.497,79 € 30.878,85 € 24.419,09 € 66804121
2018 32.998,06 € 31.315,68 € 24.974,69 € 66926166
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 9.254,46 € 17.666,13 € 1.901,37 € 2.626,42 € 1.604,39 € 2.649,13 € 654,21 € 8.903,11 € 1.220,06 €
1996 9.294,50 € 18.008,70 € 1.944,61 € 2.677,40 € 1.649,65 € 2.771,54 € 643,40 € 9.168,27 € 1.188,34 €
1997 9.388,62 € 17.851,33 € 1.988,22 € 2.796,06 € 1.620,24 € 2.765,40 € 619,79 € 8.996,31 € 1.151,84 €
1998 9.462,15 € 18.248,66 € 1.971,40 € 2.748,18 € 1.624,64 € 2.876,82 € 620,71 € 9.119,05 € 1.373,24 €
1999 9.591,30 € 18.749,83 € 2.044,22 € 2.809,62 € 1.583,15 € 3.214,42 € 697,05 € 9.002,58 € 1.658,30 €
2000 9.691,75 € 19.408,47 € 2.080,72 € 2.886,50 € 1.763,24 € 3.379,04 € 590,48 € 9.165,66 € 1.867,66 €
2001 9.732,56 € 19.761,11 € 2.121,61 € 2.954,81 € 1.848,46 € 3.536,71 € 567,05 € 9.117,98 € 1.831,24 €
2002 9.863,58 € 20.018,88 € 2.189,34 € 2.987,51 € 1.762,93 € 3.632,41 € 554,66 € 9.127,21 € 1.618,83 €
2003 9.765,86 € 20.291,74 € 2.280,51 € 2.945,96 € 1.718,87 € 3.714,21 € 582,46 € 9.203,61 € 1.606,14 €
2004 9.694,67 € 20.605,93 € 2.298,68 € 2.983,15 € 1.769,35 € 3.896,01 € 525,32 € 9.363,81 € 1.707,17 €
2005 9.588,70 € 20.908,63 € 2.334,28 € 3.005,23 € 1.768,06 € 3.964,99 € 509,83 € 9.294,77 € 1.763,76 €
2006 9.459,88 € 21.180,13 € 2.389,69 € 2.933,20 € 1.847,39 € 4.073,15 € 476,46 € 9.089,82 € 1.877,29 €
2007 9.422,32 € 21.448,49 € 2.384,29 € 3.078,91 € 1.959,55 € 4.148,01 € 469,61 € 9.068,00 € 2.104,13 €
2008 9.398,19 € 21.613,28 € 2.408,32 € 3.105,55 € 2.028,09 € 4.467,67 € 481,03 € 9.050,09 € 2.019,46 €
2009 9.580,85 € 21.421,96 € 2.569,97 € 3.138,44 € 1.814,50 € 4.297,31 € 445,99 € 8.725,17 € 1.276,98 €
2010 9.665,96 € 21.741,95 € 2.406,98 € 3.052,61 € 1.834,48 € 4.386,50 € 455,43 € 8.850,46 € 1.342,52 €
2011 9.794,07 € 21.923,48 € 2.337,82 € 3.098,57 € 1.857,15 € 4.619,27 € 446,55 € 8.873,16 € 1.415,33 €
2012 9.898,64 € 21.905,14 € 2.303,09 € 3.088,49 € 1.819,82 € 4.570,29 € 405,28 € 8.574,94 € 1.362,05 €
2013 10.041,53 € 21.963,02 € 2.336,30 € 3.053,70 € 1.845,36 € 4.550,44 € 417,24 € 8.569,78 € 1.242,91 €
2014 10.199,03 € 21.905,61 € 2.275,70 € 2.925,34 € 1.811,58 € 4.448,20 € 410,27 € 8.341,46 € 1.173,16 €
2015 10.208,17 € 21.882,51 € 2.322,51 € 2.792,48 € 1.863,68 € 4.492,54 € 403,75 € 8.414,40 € 1.160,60 €
2016 10.274,21 € 22.071,77 € 2.389,39 € 2.744,95 € 1.863,08 € 4.595,76 € 411,15 € 8.255,69 € 1.241,31 €
2017 10.442,38 € 22.401,79 € 2.337,44 € 2.738,14 € 1.897,16 € 4.736,60 € 407,15 € 8.312,44 € 1.445,53 €





gdp bce bcpa population
1995 27.397,97 € 28.089,00 € 20.799,72 € 81538603
1996 27.003,39 € 28.448,90 € 20.949,07 € 81817499
1997 26.659,37 € 28.340,37 € 20.844,47 € 82012162
1998 27.137,34 € 28.505,08 € 21.254,23 € 82057379
1999 27.851,38 € 29.100,53 € 22.108,82 € 82037011
2000 28.607,06 € 29.820,55 € 22.739,94 € 82163475
2001 29.062,14 € 30.187,28 € 22.682,11 € 82259540
2002 28.948,88 € 30.124,69 € 22.269,31 € 82440309
2003 28.745,09 € 30.197,42 € 21.785,40 € 82536680
2004 29.090,92 € 29.937,17 € 21.336,94 € 82531671
2005 29.251,95 € 30.161,55 € 21.608,69 € 82500849
2006 30.419,74 € 30.199,78 € 21.646,20 € 82437995
2007 31.394,50 € 29.632,20 € 21.515,79 € 82314906
2008 31.755,46 € 29.900,11 € 21.638,09 € 82217837
2009 30.051,10 € 30.050,70 € 21.471,70 € 82002356
2010 31.348,77 € 30.144,32 € 21.405,49 € 81802257
2011 33.220,68 € 30.369,51 € 21.989,63 € 80222065
2012 33.301,38 € 30.395,86 € 22.047,84 € 80327900
2013 33.363,79 € 29.931,16 € 21.361,89 € 80523746
2014 34.037,86 € 29.833,10 € 21.500,97 € 80767463
2015 34.364,56 € 29.833,32 € 21.498,03 € 81197537
2016 34.648,60 € 29.967,64 € 21.826,62 € 82175684
2017 35.185,31 € 30.155,42 € 22.030,45 € 82521653
2018 35.483,05 € 30.131,66 € 22.364,60 € 82792351
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 10.721,26 € 18.233,24 € 2.084,05 € 2.513,28 € 1.777,08 € 3.164,05 € 521,69 € 9.557,66 € 1.746,69 €
1996 10.843,65 € 18.149,66 € 2.136,20 € 2.458,93 € 1.690,47 € 2.946,97 € 502,10 € 9.603,78 € 1.601,85 €
1997 10.879,31 € 17.888,08 € 2.092,76 € 2.436,64 € 1.613,45 € 2.856,23 € 486,72 € 9.501,29 € 1.518,66 €
1998 10.968,00 € 18.001,24 € 2.097,25 € 2.473,78 € 1.595,11 € 2.970,78 € 469,29 € 9.339,20 € 1.619,05 €
1999 11.151,16 € 18.610,49 € 2.169,39 € 2.489,68 € 1.686,38 € 3.163,73 € 470,07 € 9.183,27 € 1.721,49 €
2000 11.346,76 € 19.144,79 € 2.245,65 € 2.574,74 € 1.686,91 € 3.357,85 € 446,64 € 9.215,82 € 1.688,57 €
2001 11.511,46 € 19.496,82 € 2.281,38 € 2.563,12 € 1.730,23 € 3.508,22 € 427,04 € 9.291,03 € 1.358,82 €
2002 11.572,77 € 19.331,56 € 2.460,65 € 2.577,65 € 1.747,50 € 3.514,77 € 555,67 € 9.271,49 € 860,44 €
2003 11.483,48 € 19.463,98 € 2.500,82 € 2.543,47 € 1.856,74 € 3.515,50 € 422,09 € 9.511,57 € 677,46 €
2004 11.405,87 € 19.481,88 € 2.414,55 € 2.487,35 € 1.845,97 € 3.606,36 € 400,14 € 9.585,93 € 585,56 €
2005 11.373,92 € 19.741,12 € 2.603,42 € 2.485,31 € 1.911,45 € 3.740,79 € 389,98 € 9.503,85 € 561,00 €
2006 11.382,47 € 20.127,16 € 2.600,89 € 2.494,03 € 1.900,18 € 4.109,11 € 395,48 € 9.840,24 € 891,18 €
2007 11.178,72 € 20.308,94 € 2.574,35 € 2.511,31 € 1.916,62 € 4.636,00 € 388,49 € 9.485,91 € 981,01 €
2008 11.067,81 € 20.630,99 € 2.524,56 € 2.671,11 € 1.847,16 € 4.765,78 € 381,43 € 9.586,41 € 942,96 €
2009 10.854,42 € 20.459,78 € 2.599,42 € 2.601,92 € 1.797,91 € 4.314,30 € 352,63 € 9.169,14 € 237,51 €
2010 10.723,40 € 20.987,43 € 2.711,67 € 2.658,17 € 1.868,70 € 4.702,45 € 365,20 € 9.583,25 € 479,22 €
2011 10.576,51 € 21.832,53 € 2.707,49 € 2.814,99 € 1.924,35 € 5.253,88 € 383,78 € 9.628,15 € 864,49 €
2012 10.410,22 € 22.083,20 € 2.697,41 € 2.751,23 € 1.917,14 € 5.267,87 € 361,20 € 9.460,34 € 751,12 €
2013 10.285,99 € 22.160,05 € 2.552,33 € 2.668,56 € 1.900,91 € 5.391,13 € 443,73 € 9.598,42 € 585,41 €
2014 10.171,26 € 22.254,79 € 2.740,05 € 2.638,15 € 1.892,62 € 5.713,41 € 365,11 € 9.412,57 € 715,33 €
2015 10.199,14 € 22.263,57 € 2.903,81 € 2.528,22 € 1.925,43 € 5.760,76 € 375,24 € 9.445,10 € 734,57 €
2016 10.220,55 € 22.401,91 € 2.893,16 € 2.486,02 € 1.869,14 € 5.799,20 € 365,67 € 9.383,12 € 876,44 €
2017 10.259,54 € 22.614,23 € 2.855,60 € 2.532,56 € 1.837,95 € 5.914,69 € 353,88 € 9.402,50 € 923,65 €





gdp bce bcpa population
1995 16.948,11 € 19.329,40 € 13.868,84 € 10535973
1996 17.201,79 € 19.390,71 € 13.868,33 € 10588332
1997 17.683,48 € 19.412,51 € 13.588,87 € 10629267
1998 17.081,98 € 18.893,55 € 13.384,44 € 10693250
1999 17.784,83 € 18.971,56 € 14.099,06 € 10747768
2000 17.838,92 € 19.856,75 € 14.129,48 € 10775627
2001 18.249,12 € 20.132,33 € 14.421,24 € 10835989
2002 18.873,95 € 20.786,07 € 14.764,45 € 10888274
2003 19.917,31 € 21.249,97 € 15.992,67 € 10915770
2004 20.878,27 € 22.459,34 € 17.180,91 € 10940369
2005 20.946,80 € 23.018,91 € 17.040,54 € 10969912
2006 22.060,81 € 23.700,37 € 18.249,13 € 11004716
2007 22.718,42 € 24.041,55 € 19.278,25 € 11036008
2008 22.591,25 € 24.667,25 € 19.136,34 € 11060937
2009 21.553,78 € 24.766,00 € 18.136,41 € 11094745
2010 20.327,86 € 24.109,14 € 17.221,73 € 11119289
2011 18.464,62 € 22.722,16 € 15.593,03 € 11123392
2012 17.173,71 € 21.125,84 € 13.514,36 € 11086406
2013 16.742,07 € 20.385,60 € 13.200,31 € 11003615
2014 16.984,47 € 20.072,61 € 13.012,39 € 10926807
2015 17.017,24 € 19.866,84 € 13.022,86 € 10858018
2016 17.101,72 € 19.607,49 € 12.873,52 € 10783748
2017 17.384,20 € 19.601,23 € 12.911,07 € 10768193
2018 17.765,06 € 19.784,75 € 12.932,56 € 10741165
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 4.415,95 € 12.910,90 € 2.481,57 € 2.969,34 € 1.338,88 € 1.557,03 € 552,44 € 6.807,19 € 794,18 €
1996 4.459,61 € 13.094,60 € 2.435,37 € 2.754,81 € 1.376,73 € 1.546,54 € 430,42 € 6.896,48 € 943,68 €
1997 4.838,86 € 13.205,44 € 2.560,68 € 2.520,61 € 1.462,56 € 1.796,61 € 453,92 € 7.224,38 € 946,82 €
1998 4.909,90 € 12.814,81 € 2.427,60 € 2.372,69 € 1.481,42 € 1.624,44 € 525,59 € 7.500,08 € 1.465,37 €
1999 5.044,88 € 13.151,42 € 2.546,64 € 2.409,66 € 1.573,87 € 1.689,62 € 917,55 € 7.378,46 € 1.588,42 €
2000 5.249,67 € 13.479,74 € 2.506,37 € 2.298,33 € 1.600,54 € 1.640,30 € 436,51 € 7.729,01 € 1.565,23 €
2001 5.322,04 € 13.575,64 € 2.637,00 € 2.280,75 € 1.494,91 € 1.751,36 € 436,84 € 7.766,37 € 1.618,45 €
2002 5.630,25 € 14.045,94 € 2.774,47 € 2.260,57 € 1.491,98 € 2.005,46 € 427,71 € 7.921,14 € 1.471,81 €
2003 5.820,02 € 14.629,65 € 2.957,72 € 2.188,73 € 1.474,56 € 2.386,27 € 485,32 € 7.682,58 € 1.939,96 €
2004 6.016,85 € 15.102,14 € 3.183,94 € 2.603,80 € 1.470,40 € 2.520,14 € 456,86 € 7.681,66 € 1.946,38 €
2005 6.242,39 € 15.909,15 € 3.142,02 € 2.294,93 € 1.450,40 € 2.696,41 € 422,75 € 7.674,41 € 1.273,28 €
2006 6.374,03 € 16.188,11 € 3.430,46 € 2.630,95 € 1.369,36 € 3.137,12 € 416,71 € 7.793,87 € 1.925,93 €
2007 6.342,87 € 16.822,92 € 3.487,28 € 2.832,89 € 1.488,27 € 3.383,65 € 572,49 € 7.838,60 € 2.502,80 €
2008 6.249,05 € 17.380,03 € 3.501,64 € 2.797,04 € 1.524,69 € 3.351,02 € 384,80 € 7.835,08 € 1.919,36 €
2009 6.247,83 € 17.190,73 € 3.470,16 € 2.827,45 € 1.547,01 € 3.052,30 € 370,86 € 8.058,32 € 1.057,87 €
2010 6.357,98 € 16.377,13 € 3.232,13 € 2.650,89 € 1.549,94 € 2.615,92 € 343,14 € 7.392,06 € 161,52 €
2011 6.046,72 € 15.138,77 € 2.889,71 € 2.521,36 € 1.515,71 € 2.048,93 € 309,76 € 6.957,53 € -481,36 €
2012 5.804,56 € 13.999,49 € 2.627,58 € 2.032,51 € 1.381,31 € 1.672,75 € 284,24 € 6.725,35 € -1.170,37 €
2013 5.677,47 € 13.572,70 € 2.544,79 € 1.801,59 € 1.370,43 € 1.554,00 € 286,52 € 6.273,64 € -1.198,18 €
2014 5.515,95 € 13.457,53 € 2.530,69 € 1.853,06 € 1.395,64 € 1.602,96 € 286,01 € 6.272,55 € -1.073,68 €
2015 5.388,08 € 13.300,37 € 2.586,62 € 1.865,81 € 1.391,25 € 1.575,26 € 307,52 € 6.154,55 € -996,97 €
2016 5.340,34 € 13.268,09 € 2.582,36 € 1.677,92 € 1.398,60 € 1.579,34 € 283,29 € 6.167,23 € -850,02 €
2017 5.324,82 € 13.346,13 € 2.563,01 € 1.630,21 € 1.372,81 € 1.593,46 € 296,68 € 6.380,56 € -606,28 €





gdp bce bcpa population
1995 21.657,28 € 22.155,31 € 15.939,43 € 3597617
1996 23.823,38 € 23.297,04 € 16.936,48 € 3620065
1997 27.775,30 € 24.719,28 € 18.699,58 € 3654955
1998 28.397,81 € 24.888,34 € 19.207,21 € 3693386
1999 31.009,69 € 25.414,25 € 20.061,22 € 3732006
2000 33.532,66 € 26.283,28 € 20.612,02 € 3777565
2001 34.807,51 € 27.038,26 € 21.416,59 € 3832783
2002 36.238,12 € 27.578,21 € 22.032,83 € 3899702
2003 36.701,82 € 27.667,50 € 22.068,39 € 3964191
2004 38.485,88 € 28.327,10 € 23.198,04 € 4028851
2005 39.848,01 € 28.905,89 € 24.478,36 € 4111672
2006 40.898,42 € 29.392,61 € 25.111,30 € 4208156
2007 41.760,22 € 30.389,48 € 25.926,57 € 4340118
2008 38.866,98 € 31.707,65 € 26.519,87 € 4457765
2009 36.396,05 € 32.397,33 € 26.606,31 € 4521322
2010 36.868,88 € 32.641,14 € 25.752,85 € 4549428
2011 37.989,12 € 33.271,71 € 26.630,62 € 4570881
2012 37.953,58 € 33.152,55 € 27.348,51 € 4589287
2013 38.256,39 € 32.866,92 € 26.525,76 € 4609779
2014 41.330,64 € 33.013,53 € 27.618,19 € 4637852
2015 51.468,88 € 30.412,55 € 23.881,71 € 4677627
2016 53.101,03 € 31.293,42 € 29.550,44 € 4726286
2017 57.147,30 € 31.086,99 € 26.883,51 € 4784383
2018 60.802,17 € 31.553,53 € 23.217,66 € 4830392
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 9.478,83 € 13.565,78 € 1.710,28 € 1.946,90 € 1.569,25 € 1.737,22 € 1.240,01 € 8.963,53 € 1.507,65 €
1996 9.835,53 € 14.768,84 € 1.868,62 € 1.974,99 € 1.741,46 € 2.171,53 € 1.237,95 € 9.650,76 € 2.052,26 €
1997 10.355,75 € 16.370,69 € 2.104,50 € 2.053,05 € 1.925,09 € 2.993,42 € 1.246,20 € 9.898,07 € 2.632,16 €
1998 10.768,13 € 16.269,52 € 2.091,05 € 2.056,61 € 1.914,53 € 3.130,57 € 1.251,87 € 10.111,92 € 3.178,91 €
1999 10.925,53 € 17.363,33 € 2.217,19 € 1.876,84 € 2.103,37 € 3.619,25 € 1.246,02 € 10.361,59 € 3.762,54 €
2000 11.005,86 € 18.431,35 € 2.397,59 € 1.960,22 € 2.129,37 € 4.186,23 € 1.196,14 € 10.669,53 € 3.802,13 €
2001 11.125,21 € 19.091,08 € 2.645,37 € 2.011,84 € 2.198,07 € 4.525,01 € 1.112,17 € 10.710,95 € 3.977,11 €
2002 11.228,85 € 19.776,01 € 2.826,57 € 2.050,57 € 2.187,47 € 5.039,18 € 1.077,15 € 10.704,76 € 4.082,24 €
2003 11.227,56 € 20.135,73 € 2.936,15 € 1.937,64 € 2.226,43 € 5.290,72 € 1.052,41 € 11.021,23 € 4.369,70 €
2004 11.567,69 € 20.842,93 € 3.021,14 € 2.045,49 € 2.289,56 € 5.851,49 € 1.009,09 € 11.025,08 € 4.886,93 €
2005 11.627,99 € 21.604,73 € 3.227,69 € 2.125,59 € 2.339,11 € 6.368,02 € 972,98 € 11.206,22 € 5.805,71 €
2006 11.648,57 € 22.215,73 € 3.292,32 € 2.231,78 € 2.337,52 € 6.737,62 € 920,65 € 11.096,34 € 5.894,39 €
2007 11.699,90 € 23.322,72 € 3.340,82 € 2.410,19 € 2.350,19 € 7.181,91 € 852,05 € 10.853,75 € 5.538,79 €
2008 11.885,84 € 23.680,49 € 3.225,96 € 2.443,64 € 2.097,51 € 6.634,60 € 796,19 € 10.073,38 € 4.089,41 €
2009 12.566,96 € 22.575,68 € 3.111,86 € 2.472,98 € 1.745,46 € 5.802,49 € 782,19 € 9.031,68 € 2.458,47 €
2010 13.076,15 € 22.393,10 € 3.023,25 € 2.669,21 € 1.683,60 € 6.038,97 € 798,01 € 8.880,01 € 1.193,71 €
2011 13.569,29 € 22.380,72 € 3.058,12 € 2.821,96 € 1.636,78 € 6.211,09 € 710,51 € 8.372,52 € 1.020,92 €
2012 13.560,97 € 21.865,79 € 3.074,24 € 3.011,81 € 1.485,06 € 6.169,50 € 705,69 € 8.419,92 € 1.910,18 €
2013 13.693,59 € 21.678,05 € 3.060,51 € 2.990,77 € 1.640,15 € 6.141,42 € 774,43 € 8.495,49 € 1.379,89 €
2014 14.050,46 € 22.089,05 € 3.182,46 € 3.027,25 € 1.672,53 € 6.884,59 € 778,57 € 8.483,95 € 2.310,05 €
2015 13.385,08 € 21.015,06 € 4.066,04 € 2.662,55 € 1.555,43 € 8.393,00 € 767,75 € 8.617,69 € 1.319,10 €
2016 13.789,76 € 22.052,23 € 4.194,98 € 2.573,49 € 1.511,84 € 9.055,09 € 750,12 € 8.769,15 € 6.276,04 €
2017 13.767,74 € 22.798,19 € 4.468,09 € 2.526,28 € 1.625,49 € 10.058,08 € 789,75 € 8.877,88 € 3.884,65 €





gdp bce bcpa population
1995 22.606,51 € 27.440,09 € 22.080,26 € 56844408
1996 24.882,47 € 28.757,13 € 23.582,53 € 56844197
1997 25.704,12 € 29.055,57 € 23.747,45 € 56876364
1998 25.931,42 € 29.046,84 € 23.635,98 € 56904379
1999 26.429,16 € 29.361,51 € 24.005,86 € 56909109
2000 27.376,57 € 29.796,44 € 24.669,98 € 56923524
2001 27.905,44 € 30.163,82 € 24.959,67 € 56960692
2002 27.941,53 € 29.992,82 € 24.820,09 € 56987507
2003 27.901,16 € 29.914,20 € 24.369,80 € 57130506
2004 28.158,69 € 30.152,14 € 24.457,17 € 57495900
2005 28.237,01 € 30.656,16 € 24.899,94 € 57874753
2006 28.712,39 € 30.945,32 € 25.132,48 € 58064214
2007 29.072,11 € 30.602,62 € 24.652,58 € 58223744
2008 28.559,50 € 30.522,43 € 24.431,90 € 58652875
2009 26.818,28 € 29.945,93 € 23.876,72 € 59000586
2010 27.222,09 € 30.194,69 € 23.836,13 € 59190143
2011 27.371,42 € 30.118,27 € 23.790,68 € 59364690
2012 26.586,07 € 29.835,95 € 23.377,15 € 59394207
2013 25.952,85 € 29.485,69 € 22.904,60 € 59685227
2014 25.471,58 € 29.152,13 € 22.773,25 € 60782668
2015 25.664,06 € 28.983,18 € 22.507,80 € 60795612
2016 26.047,07 € 28.582,20 € 22.349,16 € 60665551
2017 26.566,69 € 28.785,09 € 22.319,66 € 60589445
2018 26.838,65 € 28.870,43 € 22.513,01 € 60483973
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 10.078,65 € 15.537,86 € 2.944,62 € 3.731,42 € 1.726,00 € 2.623,07 € 503,39 € 7.003,98 € 1.140,76 €
1996 10.092,26 € 16.916,38 € 3.072,71 € 4.190,86 € 1.826,34 € 3.200,59 € 488,15 € 6.835,89 € 1.173,13 €
1997 10.267,72 € 17.477,87 € 3.348,10 € 3.815,87 € 1.829,25 € 3.410,47 € 614,28 € 7.105,46 € 1.183,06 €
1998 10.228,43 € 17.740,99 € 3.260,73 € 3.546,26 € 1.814,91 € 3.457,10 € 457,57 € 7.149,96 € 1.281,53 €
1999 10.324,92 € 18.298,93 € 3.427,64 € 3.277,16 € 1.836,65 € 3.688,78 € 441,72 € 7.192,11 € 1.394,74 €
2000 10.430,47 € 19.037,57 € 3.504,20 € 3.272,53 € 1.952,02 € 3.907,13 € 589,18 € 7.350,36 € 1.634,71 €
2001 10.417,77 € 19.307,40 € 3.599,80 € 3.363,96 € 1.986,93 € 4.123,70 € 414,48 € 7.280,16 € 1.661,53 €
2002 10.274,43 € 19.328,55 € 3.730,19 € 3.240,11 € 1.918,12 € 4.250,92 € 411,43 € 7.346,12 € 1.761,95 €
2003 10.393,05 € 19.436,18 € 3.752,71 € 3.108,92 € 1.961,45 € 4.348,51 € 466,70 € 7.628,46 € 1.617,36 €
2004 10.580,91 € 19.512,79 € 3.801,42 € 3.070,00 € 1.902,85 € 4.537,97 € 372,16 € 7.673,61 € 1.606,47 €
2005 10.804,66 € 19.766,05 € 3.981,42 € 3.033,63 € 1.960,49 € 4.612,81 € 356,31 € 7.717,47 € 1.604,95 €
2006 11.003,07 € 20.112,87 € 3.919,24 € 3.010,58 € 2.036,29 € 4.711,66 € 352,49 € 7.828,59 € 1.663,26 €
2007 10.675,21 € 20.220,18 € 3.924,74 € 3.057,20 € 2.137,15 € 4.795,93 € 341,63 € 7.955,20 € 1.663,53 €
2008 10.368,10 € 20.135,23 € 3.941,21 € 3.092,30 € 2.098,18 € 4.586,67 € 329,57 € 7.800,94 € 1.380,85 €
2009 10.114,97 € 19.391,51 € 3.969,11 € 2.879,78 € 1.809,03 € 4.157,62 € 442,78 € 7.250,77 € 738,78 €
2010 10.133,26 € 19.693,34 € 3.919,98 € 2.827,34 € 1.775,88 € 4.292,60 € 310,76 € 7.339,51 € 670,18 €
2011 10.161,98 € 19.783,25 € 3.818,31 € 2.847,07 € 1.815,50 € 4.386,32 € 290,51 € 7.166,66 € 548,55 €
2012 10.205,90 € 19.347,65 € 3.602,41 € 2.974,97 € 1.730,13 € 4.100,93 € 463,92 € 6.935,13 € 12,41 €
2013 10.257,59 € 18.803,92 € 3.490,66 € 2.811,29 € 1.715,61 € 3.876,62 € 285,54 € 6.578,83 € -287,80 €
2014 10.240,36 € 18.315,22 € 3.515,08 € 2.701,43 € 1.681,64 € 3.650,14 € 288,18 € 6.289,88 € -377,19 €
2015 10.227,34 € 18.344,79 € 3.580,14 € 2.511,59 € 1.688,13 € 3.716,16 € 276,38 € 6.447,09 € -304,66 €
2016 10.191,72 € 18.352,09 € 3.555,42 € 2.459,54 € 1.714,07 € 3.856,66 € 405,85 € 6.490,58 € -148,32 €
2017 10.148,46 € 18.703,38 € 3.485,52 € 2.451,56 € 1.742,90 € 3.980,46 € 280,47 € 6.708,32 € -37,58 €





gdp bce bcpa population
1995 59.511,53 € 31.891,68 € 19.047,02 € 405650
1996 58.335,80 € 31.274,93 € 17.716,41 € 411600
1997 59.035,30 € 32.266,99 € 19.524,96 € 416850
1998 61.699,42 € 33.321,12 € 22.409,22 € 422050
1999 66.561,92 € 32.738,82 € 22.908,75 € 427350
2000 71.008,08 € 32.638,28 € 21.542,58 € 433600
2001 71.910,40 € 33.957,60 € 22.512,55 € 439000
2002 73.808,00 € 34.676,55 € 21.838,55 € 444050
2003 74.299,49 € 35.255,86 € 20.377,10 € 448300
2004 75.856,29 € 34.959,61 € 17.937,86 € 454960
2005 77.198,84 € 34.804,21 € 16.209,35 € 461230
2006 79.836,74 € 33.093,61 € 12.797,65 € 469086
2007 85.216,91 € 33.535,94 € 18.690,54 € 476187
2008 82.802,84 € 33.874,33 € 10.689,85 € 483799
2009 77.636,96 € 34.705,54 € 9.156,08 € 493500
2010 80.024,94 € 34.378,83 € 9.074,69 € 502066
2011 80.489,95 € 33.557,12 € 19.957,88 € 511840
2012 78.217,70 € 33.815,79 € 11.984,71 € 524853
2013 79.236,42 € 33.298,69 € 12.280,20 € 537039
2014 80.740,46 € 32.854,18 € 13.402,63 € 549680
2015 82.696,72 € 33.434,18 € 12.002,60 € 562958
2016 84.368,95 € 32.919,87 € 12.340,92 € 576249
2017 83.423,28 € 33.337,24 € 12.487,04 € 590667
2018 83.387,13 € 33.000,78 € 10.082,14 € 602005
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 10.208,55 € 30.340,51 € 2.996,83 € 4.169,48 € 3.586,12 € 10.949,13 € 1.288,45 € 18.379,81 € 4.246,70 €
1996 10.026,42 € 29.425,65 € 3.021,56 € 3.846,69 € 3.309,29 € 10.493,70 € 1.242,39 € 18.307,80 € 3.506,88 €
1997 10.393,04 € 29.623,10 € 3.057,79 € 4.484,56 € 3.730,69 € 10.404,56 € 1.156,25 € 17.760,39 € 3.862,11 €
1998 10.793,61 € 30.914,83 € 3.107,01 € 4.857,78 € 4.142,13 € 11.164,89 € 1.045,10 € 16.457,53 € 4.500,53 €
1999 10.623,81 € 31.675,17 € 3.224,18 € 5.135,04 € 5.128,85 € 11.725,02 € 1.065,50 € 16.911,83 € 6.016,26 €
2000 11.048,45 € 32.635,61 € 3.337,38 € 5.061,76 € 5.548,68 € 12.792,57 € 1.103,68 € 17.016,39 € 4.817,00 €
2001 11.354,20 € 34.053,68 € 3.343,83 € 5.050,87 € 4.813,85 € 13.957,40 € 1.073,74 € 17.469,22 € 4.950,43 €
2002 11.544,53 € 35.228,42 € 3.358,26 € 5.434,12 € 5.303,59 € 14.535,48 € 1.049,72 € 18.406,91 € 4.519,19 €
2003 11.484,62 € 35.860,77 € 3.603,53 € 5.543,00 € 5.113,35 € 15.089,47 € 1.033,24 € 20.290,62 € 4.378,62 €
2004 11.414,50 € 35.749,62 € 3.679,03 € 5.826,99 € 5.485,32 € 15.067,17 € 1.158,04 € 22.997,84 € 4.818,04 €
2005 11.187,80 € 35.438,80 € 3.744,14 € 5.965,68 € 5.167,88 € 15.248,82 € 1.115,52 € 24.010,64 € 4.300,26 €
2006 10.680,32 € 34.270,21 € 3.991,84 € 5.353,40 € 4.629,82 € 15.557,65 € 1.014,68 € 25.625,05 € 4.314,40 €
2007 10.934,43 € 34.953,50 € 4.047,80 € 5.530,09 € 4.506,71 € 16.504,03 € 919,16 € 21.374,85 € 5.610,30 €
2008 10.944,85 € 34.960,73 € 4.015,94 € 5.602,48 € 4.570,70 € 16.220,89 € 858,08 € 30.640,41 € 6.597,86 €
2009 11.213,86 € 34.600,98 € 3.881,85 € 5.679,08 € 4.343,04 € 15.553,69 € 773,50 € 30.438,60 € 4.115,64 €
2010 11.226,80 € 33.921,11 € 4.001,25 € 5.693,08 € 4.049,55 € 15.638,55 € 775,31 € 30.364,40 € 4.284,96 €
2011 10.893,02 € 33.240,44 € 4.024,50 € 5.600,13 € 4.136,59 € 15.317,53 € 746,85 € 20.228,55 € 5.882,46 €
2012 10.828,52 € 33.290,42 € 3.754,45 € 5.733,50 € 4.091,90 € 15.012,36 € 686,84 € 28.706,52 € 6.188,59 €
2013 10.823,08 € 33.211,41 € 3.842,97 € 5.430,38 € 3.998,17 € 15.377,11 € 633,87 € 27.929,46 € 6.277,10 €
2014 10.699,87 € 32.986,64 € 3.875,54 € 5.382,16 € 4.133,82 € 15.356,41 € 599,80 € 27.133,41 € 7.082,07 €
2015 10.910,35 € 33.128,07 € 4.176,18 € 5.304,80 € 3.549,05 € 15.984,64 € 551,55 € 27.233,61 € 5.250,48 €
2016 10.865,02 € 33.003,05 € 4.091,89 € 5.536,62 € 3.721,79 € 16.274,70 € 580,21 € 26.536,04 € 5.376,87 €
2017 11.087,22 € 32.855,76 € 4.092,53 € 5.524,38 € 3.601,57 € 16.124,13 € 496,96 € 26.915,07 € 5.567,91 €





gdp bce bcpa population
1995 30.729,54 € 31.067,85 € 22.364,14 € 15424122
1996 31.057,48 € 29.579,19 € 20.835,12 € 15493889
1997 31.212,83 € 29.754,55 € 21.439,87 € 15567107
1998 32.357,17 € 29.691,16 € 21.489,13 € 15654192
1999 34.001,79 € 30.418,42 € 23.208,57 € 15760225
2000 35.196,73 € 31.044,72 € 23.675,37 € 15863950
2001 35.738,37 € 31.551,09 € 23.979,39 € 15987075
2002 35.553,14 € 31.804,65 € 23.430,46 € 16105285
2003 35.416,52 € 31.541,19 € 23.094,55 € 16192572
2004 35.974,09 € 31.217,59 € 22.485,96 € 16258032
2005 36.604,95 € 30.816,53 € 22.199,57 € 16305526
2006 37.805,33 € 30.561,08 € 21.812,24 € 16334210
2007 39.174,63 € 30.370,05 € 23.287,44 € 16357992
2008 39.909,19 € 30.587,51 € 22.954,34 € 16405399
2009 38.258,29 € 31.123,83 € 22.868,38 € 16485787
2010 38.563,34 € 31.263,25 € 22.131,02 € 16574989
2011 38.971,53 € 31.237,96 € 22.833,12 € 16655799
2012 38.398,12 € 31.114,94 € 22.272,28 € 16730348
2013 38.235,63 € 30.754,54 € 21.852,84 € 16779575
2014 38.665,32 € 30.563,99 € 21.595,95 € 16829289
2015 39.256,21 € 30.431,55 € 23.288,23 € 16900726
2016 39.931,37 € 30.144,09 € 22.305,64 € 16979120
2017 40.891,54 € 30.109,31 € 22.387,57 € 17081507
2018 41.715,19 € 30.140,49 € 22.626,82 € 17181084
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 11.568,86 € 18.887,41 € 1.991,27 € 4.864,37 € 2.117,28 € 3.469,76 € 657,02 € 10.727,95 € 1.367,22 €
1996 11.611,52 € 19.154,15 € 2.012,52 € 3.184,38 € 2.105,15 € 3.698,65 € 579,58 € 10.947,28 € 1.623,63 €
1997 11.587,99 € 19.157,58 € 1.985,14 € 3.099,83 € 2.166,39 € 3.358,81 € 550,78 € 10.737,79 € 1.872,32 €
1998 11.171,87 € 19.878,78 € 2.057,92 € 3.150,00 € 2.252,15 € 3.754,04 € 561,22 € 10.864,70 € 2.101,45 €
1999 11.412,63 € 20.989,07 € 2.121,71 € 3.178,32 € 2.373,21 € 4.399,75 € 510,36 € 10.242,76 € 2.522,56 €
2000 11.632,02 € 21.674,81 € 2.217,39 € 3.151,30 € 2.448,89 € 4.709,01 € 472,90 € 10.273,88 € 2.431,63 €
2001 11.679,01 € 22.005,87 € 2.251,52 € 3.186,02 € 2.233,28 € 4.894,18 € 443,87 € 10.299,29 € 2.283,72 €
2002 11.670,15 € 22.356,66 € 2.328,73 € 3.067,30 € 2.186,65 € 5.001,02 € 430,52 € 10.595,54 € 1.790,83 €
2003 11.299,53 € 22.540,53 € 2.390,62 € 3.024,23 € 2.242,36 € 5.055,26 € 416,09 € 10.395,87 € 1.533,14 €
2004 11.041,02 € 22.748,11 € 2.482,21 € 2.891,94 € 2.259,46 € 5.273,16 € 413,08 € 10.577,34 € 1.432,64 €
2005 10.708,55 € 22.923,13 € 2.452,53 € 2.847,42 € 2.286,42 € 5.433,00 € 395,68 € 10.556,34 € 1.543,69 €
2006 10.334,45 € 23.471,53 € 2.438,44 € 2.898,07 € 2.433,84 € 5.751,92 € 395,66 € 11.071,57 € 1.927,08 €
2007 10.192,88 € 23.941,00 € 2.526,76 € 2.863,90 € 2.547,97 € 6.225,56 € 380,97 € 10.364,89 € 2.901,32 €
2008 10.028,33 € 24.181,70 € 2.673,92 € 3.070,77 € 2.518,94 € 6.499,68 € 348,58 € 10.420,93 € 2.439,18 €
2009 10.072,39 € 24.015,35 € 2.716,34 € 3.003,58 € 2.178,47 € 6.180,79 € 324,57 € 10.145,97 € 1.565,95 €
2010 10.040,67 € 24.234,39 € 2.564,46 € 3.043,74 € 2.182,41 € 6.122,63 € 314,98 € 10.376,99 € 929,79 €
2011 10.014,67 € 24.503,94 € 2.708,52 € 2.857,37 € 2.210,62 € 6.332,86 € 303,06 € 9.921,18 € 1.213,29 €
2012 9.865,49 € 24.255,42 € 2.668,67 € 2.768,63 € 2.009,27 € 6.143,17 € 290,84 € 9.784,72 € 651,21 €
2013 9.738,42 € 24.064,13 € 2.580,91 € 2.714,74 € 2.019,15 € 6.030,69 € 293,82 € 9.657,67 € 462,15 €
2014 9.712,92 € 24.149,12 € 2.551,91 € 2.700,92 € 2.046,92 € 6.218,90 € 285,06 € 9.468,84 € 215,74 €
2015 9.735,07 € 24.170,11 € 2.590,91 € 2.616,48 € 2.016,20 € 6.367,84 € 296,98 € 9.533,43 € 2.093,13 €
2016 9.764,09 € 24.278,07 € 2.655,44 € 2.417,57 € 2.066,19 € 6.582,77 € 322,12 € 9.503,83 € 1.343,26 €
2017 9.723,34 € 24.657,37 € 2.629,64 € 2.339,17 € 2.076,65 € 6.878,91 € 284,65 € 9.525,11 € 1.518,71 €





gdp bce bcpa population
1995 13.979,40 € 14.959,62 € 11.301,35 € 10008659
1996 14.444,48 € 15.419,43 € 12.024,03 € 10043693
1997 14.805,58 € 15.419,01 € 12.080,25 € 10084196
1998 15.200,87 € 15.321,20 € 12.003,23 € 10133758
1999 15.804,77 € 15.907,15 € 12.416,65 € 10186634
2000 16.301,82 € 16.603,60 € 12.850,83 € 10249022
2001 16.487,39 € 16.871,26 € 13.242,67 € 10330774
2002 16.509,48 € 17.016,25 € 12.876,57 € 10394669
2003 16.275,81 € 17.208,69 € 12.693,25 € 10444592
2004 16.522,49 € 17.694,02 € 13.068,76 € 10473050
2005 16.617,85 € 17.878,61 € 12.962,01 € 10494672
2006 16.859,94 € 18.271,33 € 13.556,47 € 10511988
2007 17.246,62 € 18.755,41 € 14.366,00 € 10532588
2008 17.267,66 € 19.435,51 € 15.069,93 € 10553339
2009 16.713,52 € 19.808,27 € 15.319,00 € 10563014
2010 16.986,92 € 20.289,78 € 15.754,83 € 10573479
2011 16.700,73 € 20.395,48 € 15.553,19 € 10572721
2012 16.070,73 € 20.288,41 € 15.131,07 € 10542398
2013 16.003,25 € 20.049,62 € 14.739,71 € 10487289
2014 16.215,46 € 19.928,72 € 14.611,53 € 10427301
2015 16.588,02 € 19.875,28 € 14.409,68 € 10374822
2016 16.972,12 € 19.895,44 € 14.267,67 € 10341330
2017 17.619,28 € 19.857,53 € 13.701,79 € 10309573
2018 18.145,99 € 20.274,44 € 14.862,87 € 10291027
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 4.086,81 € 10.322,87 € 1.620,99 € 1.550,78 € 970,67 € 1.278,61 € 372,55 € 4.994,43 € 963,62 €
1996 4.269,27 € 10.692,93 € 1.635,60 € 1.514,07 € 1.002,81 € 1.329,39 € 360,25 € 4.819,65 € 1.064,01 €
1997 4.354,77 € 10.804,25 € 1.716,79 € 1.403,52 € 1.007,08 € 1.476,58 € 376,65 € 5.139,03 € 1.423,62 €
1998 4.358,88 € 10.908,33 € 1.712,97 € 1.308,73 € 1.035,32 € 1.559,89 € 372,51 € 5.419,09 € 1.728,61 €
1999 4.471,24 € 11.354,66 € 1.815,44 € 1.402,05 € 1.093,42 € 1.675,09 € 367,73 € 5.699,13 € 1.840,90 €
2000 4.697,55 € 11.814,11 € 1.899,16 € 1.403,41 € 1.123,99 € 1.724,65 € 361,99 € 5.991,18 € 1.876,42 €
2001 4.876,80 € 12.061,76 € 1.953,76 € 1.465,33 € 1.157,17 € 1.983,84 € 345,38 € 5.767,76 € 1.793,78 €
2002 4.988,14 € 12.178,18 € 2.005,90 € 1.372,81 € 1.164,47 € 2.028,95 € 335,37 € 6.032,86 € 1.557,81 €
2003 5.197,75 € 12.232,38 € 2.018,20 € 1.372,36 € 1.205,25 € 2.008,88 € 397,87 € 6.118,10 € 1.204,79 €
2004 5.455,16 € 12.444,79 € 2.048,79 € 1.389,24 € 1.238,40 € 2.102,73 € 302,83 € 6.083,82 € 1.155,73 €
2005 5.657,32 € 12.634,84 € 2.093,85 € 1.423,74 € 1.256,06 € 2.200,48 € 474,61 € 6.494,90 € 1.103,70 €
2006 5.860,24 € 12.736,42 € 2.065,34 € 1.433,67 € 1.341,77 € 2.215,60 € 266,98 € 6.015,50 € 1.033,66 €
2007 6.082,42 € 12.933,26 € 2.112,71 € 1.530,66 € 1.389,98 € 2.237,80 € 275,86 € 5.755,04 € 1.089,76 €
2008 6.376,63 € 13.221,22 € 2.123,92 € 1.608,82 € 1.442,12 € 2.197,73 € 255,24 € 5.648,18 € 1.027,36 €
2009 6.712,07 € 12.864,16 € 2.222,90 € 1.613,44 € 1.322,74 € 2.043,50 € 238,05 € 5.411,42 € 684,10 €
2010 7.084,06 € 13.054,37 € 2.182,82 € 1.579,34 € 1.356,28 € 1.988,69 € 265,83 € 5.388,54 € 587,76 €
2011 7.207,21 € 12.811,72 € 2.120,99 € 1.760,99 € 1.340,71 € 1.941,47 € 223,26 € 5.197,07 € 131,52 €
2012 7.337,29 € 12.444,44 € 2.065,09 € 1.736,62 € 1.259,56 € 1.782,13 € 253,33 € 5.084,48 € -326,19 €
2013 7.274,77 € 12.188,46 € 1.968,40 € 1.753,22 € 1.226,71 € 1.683,70 € 224,82 € 5.116,12 € -418,61 €
2014 7.156,00 € 12.258,06 € 1.970,18 € 1.717,02 € 1.186,29 € 1.753,08 € 233,17 € 5.159,80 € -390,56 €
2015 7.061,52 € 12.310,88 € 2.032,03 € 1.672,66 € 1.171,25 € 1.801,69 € 228,88 € 5.408,42 € -286,06 €
2016 7.028,04 € 12.514,41 € 2.079,08 € 1.610,49 € 1.201,57 € 1.899,86 € 235,16 € 5.565,65 € -297,28 €
2017 6.990,88 € 12.780,48 € 2.032,14 € 1.565,22 € 1.237,66 € 2.019,76 € 253,76 € 6.322,55 € -86,95 €





gdp bce bcpa population
1995 18.344,81 € 21.711,14 € 17.899,79 € 39639726
1996 19.013,93 € 22.123,01 € 18.385,38 € 39808374
1997 19.024,36 € 21.950,60 € 17.947,79 € 39971329
1998 19.627,96 € 22.107,46 € 18.213,03 € 40143449
1999 20.501,15 € 22.319,51 € 18.616,26 € 40303568
2000 21.498,97 € 22.797,70 € 18.900,77 € 40470182
2001 22.243,24 € 23.010,08 € 19.164,99 € 40665545
2002 22.638,21 € 23.253,76 € 19.124,64 € 41035278
2003 22.874,73 € 23.125,82 € 19.126,95 € 41827838
2004 23.181,37 € 23.119,58 € 18.901,71 € 42547451
2005 23.601,37 € 23.165,32 € 19.047,19 € 43296338
2006 24.171,59 € 23.284,07 € 19.362,65 € 44009971
2007 24.630,02 € 23.339,37 € 19.432,76 € 44784666
2008 24.395,74 € 23.716,74 € 19.805,98 € 45668939
2009 23.162,96 € 23.903,56 € 19.415,42 € 46239273
2010 23.075,65 € 23.879,05 € 19.069,35 € 46486619
2011 22.788,07 € 23.885,26 € 18.668,38 € 46667174
2012 22.002,13 € 23.606,00 € 18.078,32 € 46818219
2013 21.737,94 € 23.432,25 € 18.007,61 € 46727890
2014 22.134,67 € 23.511,89 € 18.088,06 € 46512199
2015 23.021,99 € 23.723,92 € 18.287,79 € 46449565
2016 23.731,58 € 23.678,74 € 18.316,42 € 46440099
2017 24.406,48 € 23.634,38 € 18.251,33 € 46528024
2018 24.936,45 € 23.975,41 € 18.747,02 € 46658447
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 8.720,49 € 12.962,61 € 1.893,96 € 1.902,56 € 1.516,64 € 1.656,34 € 595,49 € 5.927,20 € 1.520,35 €
1996 8.840,49 € 13.262,47 € 1.875,97 € 1.983,90 € 1.465,27 € 1.777,73 € 596,82 € 5.854,97 € 1.520,51 €
1997 8.916,59 € 13.112,81 € 1.916,60 € 1.907,10 € 1.461,47 € 1.871,68 € 569,35 € 6.210,59 € 1.638,43 €
1998 8.874,88 € 13.328,78 € 1.903,87 € 1.908,14 € 1.435,86 € 1.905,90 € 566,45 € 6.415,55 € 1.954,67 €
1999 8.812,37 € 13.860,27 € 2.005,64 € 1.860,14 € 1.420,23 € 2.114,31 € 684,37 € 6.662,47 € 2.274,85 €
2000 8.736,88 € 14.591,91 € 2.031,65 € 1.871,40 € 1.583,20 € 2.275,55 € 575,40 € 6.989,54 € 2.517,21 €
2001 8.684,59 € 15.023,99 € 2.124,23 € 1.867,69 € 1.633,11 € 2.516,00 € 541,31 € 6.993,81 € 2.607,42 €
2002 8.623,98 € 15.315,34 € 2.207,23 € 1.845,24 € 1.580,61 € 2.627,60 € 529,81 € 7.345,59 € 2.686,66 €
2003 8.487,29 € 15.307,98 € 2.253,16 € 1.828,63 € 1.538,52 € 2.656,13 € 556,59 € 7.420,48 € 2.865,03 €
2004 8.340,33 € 15.618,26 € 2.283,37 € 1.695,13 € 1.568,60 € 2.738,35 € 510,56 € 7.683,72 € 2.955,30 €
2005 8.176,77 € 15.913,69 € 2.348,34 € 1.733,36 € 1.548,33 € 2.958,15 € 500,35 € 7.800,62 € 3.182,14 €
2006 8.018,73 € 16.206,40 € 2.417,16 € 1.768,28 € 1.550,85 € 3.121,09 € 454,56 € 7.819,91 € 3.443,92 €
2007 7.923,81 € 16.528,64 € 2.401,43 € 1.835,24 € 1.643,33 € 3.251,18 € 455,25 € 7.856,00 € 3.494,14 €
2008 7.920,29 € 16.580,21 € 2.537,16 € 1.916,36 € 1.602,45 € 3.281,93 € 352,91 € 7.272,87 € 3.009,21 €
2009 8.047,07 € 16.013,10 € 2.605,83 € 2.002,61 € 1.385,02 € 3.023,99 € 356,04 € 6.636,77 € 1.792,59 €
2010 8.178,44 € 16.148,47 € 2.480,63 € 1.841,07 € 1.374,31 € 3.046,32 € 348,93 € 6.582,35 € 1.423,72 €
2011 8.209,34 € 16.065,93 € 2.426,93 € 1.900,31 € 1.356,01 € 3.020,92 € 340,32 € 6.521,44 € 964,25 €
2012 8.238,67 € 15.673,89 € 2.321,22 € 1.860,98 € 1.357,73 € 2.783,11 € 347,91 € 6.415,38 € 539,78 €
2013 8.256,05 € 15.292,97 € 2.228,14 € 1.926,71 € 1.306,55 € 2.630,20 € 334,87 € 6.072,06 € 312,55 €
2014 8.326,99 € 15.538,53 € 2.279,87 € 1.923,17 € 1.387,27 € 2.813,77 € 355,63 € 6.188,97 € 409,51 €
2015 8.418,04 € 15.869,79 € 2.382,78 € 1.877,18 € 1.414,10 € 3.046,76 € 363,01 € 6.342,26 € 543,12 €
2016 8.327,09 € 16.218,39 € 2.408,75 € 1.821,82 € 1.500,93 € 3.241,42 € 354,95 € 6.298,83 € 581,55 €
2017 8.197,33 € 16.670,02 € 2.360,95 € 1.734,03 € 1.530,21 € 3.403,82 € 393,93 € 6.552,30 € 775,33 €





gdp bce bcpa population
1995 29.297,21 € 31.775,11 € 24.574,33 € 8816381
1996 32.536,49 € 35.140,45 € 27.860,10 € 8837496
1997 32.973,69 € 35.272,55 € 27.964,69 € 8844499
1998 33.355,70 € 34.943,78 € 27.840,47 € 8847625
1999 35.176,89 € 35.750,98 € 28.898,62 € 8854322
2000 38.412,06 € 37.367,59 € 30.997,02 € 8861426
2001 35.464,51 € 35.042,68 € 28.483,23 € 8882792
2002 36.488,90 € 36.197,48 € 29.145,59 € 8909128
2003 37.311,49 € 36.551,45 € 29.231,84 € 8940788
2004 38.729,91 € 36.924,83 € 29.376,04 € 8975670
2005 38.966,61 € 37.504,64 € 30.448,91 € 9011392
2006 40.697,63 € 37.922,61 € 31.369,06 € 9047752
2007 41.796,71 € 38.096,18 € 32.119,02 € 9113257
2008 39.780,80 € 37.575,63 € 31.553,17 € 9182927
2009 34.216,32 € 36.276,07 € 29.741,31 € 9256347
2010 40.075,18 € 38.382,82 € 31.479,02 € 9340682
2011 43.232,42 € 39.701,48 € 33.226,31 € 9415570
2012 44.222,81 € 40.856,28 € 34.351,60 € 9482855
2013 44.577,81 € 41.585,45 € 35.071,99 € 9555893
2014 43.134,35 € 40.872,25 € 34.933,79 € 9644864
2015 43.408,14 € 40.079,55 € 34.962,12 € 9747355
2016 43.385,76 € 39.732,04 € 34.564,71 € 9851017
2017 43.005,39 € 39.125,79 € 34.102,69 € 9995153
2018 40.832,66 € 37.725,87 € 32.956,16 € 10120242
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 9.770,24 € 19.088,56 € 2.767,77 € 4.537,98 € 1.459,80 € 2.572,07 € 357,58 € 9.404,03 € 1.845,67 €
1996 11.287,62 € 21.235,13 € 3.120,02 € 4.944,44 € 1.544,42 € 3.547,95 € 354,39 € 9.541,46 € 1.906,72 €
1997 11.522,41 € 21.237,12 € 3.068,25 € 4.937,52 € 1.509,49 € 3.634,36 € 348,91 € 9.468,97 € 1.812,20 €
1998 11.493,70 € 21.293,01 € 3.151,19 € 4.575,74 € 1.490,03 € 3.737,20 € 342,63 € 9.492,41 € 2.046,47 €
1999 11.938,57 € 22.399,06 € 3.248,28 € 4.461,54 € 1.673,87 € 4.283,07 € 339,52 € 9.348,34 € 2.156,45 €
2000 12.754,48 € 24.156,69 € 3.437,88 € 4.536,61 € 1.857,58 € 5.328,36 € 332,11 € 9.017,73 € 2.315,04 €
2001 11.723,50 € 22.697,06 € 3.227,27 € 3.763,87 € 1.640,50 € 4.398,24 € 330,26 € 9.142,98 € 2.253,26 €
2002 12.034,69 € 23.586,46 € 3.393,47 € 3.955,51 € 1.648,56 € 4.807,30 € 316,80 € 9.340,91 € 1.972,22 €
2003 12.231,95 € 24.163,37 € 3.488,62 € 3.735,26 € 1.644,86 € 5.113,32 € 309,57 € 9.688,19 € 2.059,01 €
2004 12.589,09 € 24.613,97 € 3.563,15 € 3.702,83 € 1.685,44 € 5.554,87 € 303,91 € 10.182,18 € 2.329,48 €
2005 12.903,37 € 24.841,97 € 3.877,18 € 3.786,64 € 1.688,92 € 5.733,42 € 482,17 € 10.069,98 € 2.532,07 €
2006 13.096,31 € 25.424,02 € 3.845,93 € 3.931,33 € 1.783,88 € 6.307,62 € 283,47 € 9.891,34 € 3.054,32 €
2007 13.159,42 € 25.798,19 € 3.782,60 € 3.988,23 € 1.827,88 € 6.519,42 € 284,97 € 9.827,49 € 3.565,36 €
2008 13.151,78 € 25.014,48 € 3.600,16 € 3.855,57 € 1.733,15 € 6.027,98 € 285,23 € 9.671,21 € 3.363,52 €
2009 13.243,06 € 22.815,96 € 3.301,87 € 3.199,43 € 1.557,38 € 4.480,87 € 246,01 € 8.661,20 € 1.880,43 €
2010 13.496,51 € 25.812,29 € 3.726,99 € 3.698,56 € 1.768,66 € 6.320,84 € 262,03 € 9.481,48 € 2.315,65 €
2011 13.827,45 € 27.548,31 € 3.999,00 € 4.081,09 € 1.914,21 € 7.573,87 € 266,29 € 9.426,44 € 2.684,98 €
2012 14.147,97 € 28.588,07 € 4.223,28 € 4.195,82 € 1.977,58 € 8.084,94 € 236,33 € 9.127,06 € 2.386,04 €
2013 14.446,34 € 29.041,60 € 4.368,63 € 4.307,25 € 2.016,13 € 8.312,09 € 250,14 € 9.065,12 € 2.301,51 €
2014 14.614,99 € 27.935,87 € 4.227,17 € 4.056,61 € 1.939,31 € 7.764,37 € 258,70 € 8.887,46 € 2.690,31 €
2015 14.242,06 € 27.621,88 € 4.210,59 € 3.885,85 € 1.874,73 € 7.741,35 € 264,74 € 8.440,92 € 3.058,75 €
2016 14.126,78 € 27.694,58 € 4.078,26 € 3.710,67 € 1.827,20 € 7.808,93 € 242,12 € 8.708,73 € 3.299,29 €
2017 13.845,21 € 27.203,25 € 3.968,33 € 3.712,71 € 1.748,78 € 7.611,21 € 243,71 € 8.907,38 € 3.640,56 €





gdp bce bcpa population
1995 23.969,96 € 22.427,65 € 14.762,70 € 57943472
1996 24.963,71 € 22.905,04 € 16.088,02 € 58094587
1997 30.507,07 € 26.817,46 € 19.811,40 € 58239312
1998 32.233,81 € 28.133,73 € 21.325,73 € 58394596
1999 34.166,61 € 29.502,58 € 22.957,72 € 58579685
2000 37.968,73 € 31.903,07 € 25.364,89 € 58785246
2001 38.247,47 € 32.440,49 € 25.841,29 € 58999781
2002 38.519,98 € 32.663,69 € 26.111,79 € 59239564
2003 35.943,51 € 31.626,72 € 24.815,34 € 59501394
2004 37.365,40 € 31.978,62 € 25.098,01 € 59793759
2005 38.000,69 € 32.113,50 € 25.358,58 € 60182050
2006 38.833,18 € 32.301,71 € 25.576,33 € 60620361
2007 39.347,51 € 32.089,36 € 25.655,98 € 61073279
2008 33.458,92 € 29.788,63 € 23.158,63 € 61571647
2009 28.425,84 € 28.379,39 € 21.285,61 € 62042343
2010 29.873,46 € 28.734,37 € 21.533,89 € 62510197
2011 29.774,16 € 28.558,21 € 21.678,59 € 63022532
2012 32.129,39 € 29.685,87 € 22.621,73 € 63495088
2013 31.141,37 € 29.349,20 € 22.540,28 € 63905342
2014 33.467,77 € 29.834,67 € 23.548,12 € 64351203
2015 37.805,06 € 32.261,25 € 26.251,01 € 64853393
2016 33.879,53 € 29.948,24 € 24.254,86 € 65379044
2017 31.942,25 € 28.498,06 € 22.781,37 € 65844142
2018 31.943,13 € 28.419,02 € 22.660,90 € 66273576
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 6.573,18 € 17.631,47 € 1.569,70 € 1.663,03 € 1.793,64 € 2.624,74 € 591,35 € 9.268,66 € 1.012,36 €
1996 6.638,86 € 18.335,07 € 1.606,35 € 1.695,59 € 1.895,55 € 2.906,40 € 568,88 € 8.680,70 € 1.294,80 €
1997 8.109,07 € 22.222,42 € 1.876,19 € 1.992,30 € 2.429,64 € 4.427,70 € 525,17 € 8.697,37 € 1.166,15 €
1998 8.708,81 € 23.756,38 € 1.945,67 € 2.191,46 € 2.648,04 € 5.300,08 € 520,48 € 8.756,20 € 1.427,72 €
1999 9.254,89 € 25.389,35 € 2.101,25 € 2.045,05 € 2.797,06 € 6.014,57 € 476,34 € 8.429,93 € 1.408,74 €
2000 10.340,51 € 28.214,39 € 2.335,08 € 2.333,05 € 3.146,57 € 7.703,74 € 469,65 € 8.517,09 € 1.509,26 €
2001 10.614,84 € 28.539,20 € 2.390,47 € 2.079,30 € 2.977,87 € 7.767,99 € 437,46 € 8.509,62 € 1.472,96 €
2002 10.528,72 € 29.006,75 € 2.484,54 € 2.032,25 € 2.830,67 € 8.133,97 € 423,92 € 8.468,67 € 1.492,86 €
2003 10.355,70 € 27.276,14 € 2.282,41 € 1.929,73 € 2.630,88 € 7.180,26 € 406,12 € 8.650,64 € 1.433,15 €
2004 10.177,48 € 28.483,90 € 2.335,34 € 2.098,37 € 2.821,91 € 7.903,50 € 391,06 € 8.710,04 € 1.438,36 €
2005 9.993,73 € 28.909,07 € 2.546,05 € 2.318,54 € 2.984,38 € 8.295,17 € 374,34 € 8.668,12 € 1.538,85 €
2006 9.744,02 € 29.319,10 € 2.543,57 € 2.407,34 € 3.009,23 € 8.351,22 € 351,87 € 8.733,80 € 1.656,54 €
2007 9.384,06 € 29.627,38 € 2.596,94 € 2.464,12 € 3.040,77 € 8.579,65 € 362,72 € 8.576,11 € 1.780,01 €
2008 9.004,26 € 25.835,91 € 2.057,72 € 2.138,33 € 2.580,94 € 6.351,60 € 315,04 € 8.256,55 € 1.311,50 €
2009 8.739,73 € 22.548,15 € 1.975,60 € 1.867,16 € 2.018,23 € 4.440,83 € 292,18 € 7.779,94 € 393,99 €
2010 8.484,83 € 23.358,53 € 1.882,03 € 2.215,53 € 1.954,62 € 4.951,06 € 300,86 € 7.996,60 € 495,26 €
2011 8.536,06 € 23.107,07 € 1.875,77 € 2.194,09 € 1.989,86 € 4.885,16 € 279,77 € 7.531,62 € 372,23 €
2012 8.605,25 € 24.826,32 € 2.072,35 € 2.178,87 € 2.090,03 € 5.627,33 € 279,56 € 7.715,27 € 371,57 €
2013 8.636,72 € 24.031,30 € 1.961,91 € 2.064,68 € 1.963,98 € 5.109,63 € 271,78 € 7.571,53 € 490,84 €
2014 8.674,67 € 25.512,05 € 2.158,67 € 2.099,54 € 2.222,86 € 6.116,92 € 270,48 € 7.373,20 € 816,16 €
2015 9.702,46 € 28.573,72 € 2.438,43 € 2.206,80 € 2.368,32 € 8.027,17 € 264,67 € 7.276,58 € 1.001,67 €
2016 8.598,28 € 25.919,55 € 2.185,23 € 1.942,27 € 2.124,50 € 6.327,43 € 245,16 € 7.053,66 € 1.115,12 €
2017 8.036,51 € 24.467,97 € 1.996,56 € 1.913,48 € 1.955,52 € 5.720,52 € 240,41 € 7.013,98 € 1.056,88 €





pc gdp bce bcpa population
1995 € 24.583,12 € 25.928,43 € 19.302,43 372458285
1996 € 25.273,94 € 26.451,81 € 19.870,07 373545996
1997 € 26.290,46 € 27.098,91 € 20.483,47 374565060
1998 € 27.015,44 € 27.397,78 € 20.908,01 375484537
1999 € 28.074,32 € 27.984,97 € 21.771,65 376365647
2000 € 29.487,99 € 28.877,86 € 22.622,18 377591232
2001 € 29.858,20 € 29.168,08 € 22.776,62 378987973
2002 € 30.018,37 € 29.349,65 € 22.704,45 380704422
2003 € 29.647,18 € 29.249,57 € 22.345,59 382812638
2004 € 30.291,87 € 29.371,98 € 22.328,91 384948320
2005 € 30.623,41 € 29.581,13 € 22.618,87 387276491
2006 € 31.437,24 € 29.713,10 € 22.813,32 389386803
2007 € 32.121,85 € 29.590,66 € 22.995,38 391489367
2008 € 31.098,19 € 29.366,46 € 22.637,00 394013787
2009 € 28.963,92 € 29.288,27 € 22.204,70 395975347
2010 € 29.765,76 € 29.466,53 € 22.102,89 397385718
2011 € 30.281,23 € 29.491,54 € 22.305,62 397417091
2012 € 30.400,75 € 29.608,05 € 22.367,75 398734337
2013 € 30.135,49 € 29.387,26 € 22.099,60 400034881
2014 € 30.682,08 € 29.379,02 € 22.332,05 402362437
2015 € 31.825,67 € 29.687,91 € 22.740,11 403829434
2016 € 31.565,10 € 29.298,71 € 22.553,37 405762666
2017 € 31.789,04 € 29.143,57 € 22.356,57 407193519
2018 € 32.146,83 € 29.267,80 € 22.592,79 408415604
uw c s g dire inq nec bec ca
1995 € 9.184,68 € 16.798,15 € 2.120,05 € 2.748,30 € 1.699,51 € 2.652,15 € 571,08 € 8.549,17 € 1.352,09
1996 € 9.299,25 € 17.288,99 € 2.175,17 € 2.761,56 € 1.710,73 € 2.809,59 € 552,82 € 8.529,93 € 1.395,36
1997 € 9.614,47 € 17.897,15 € 2.266,48 € 2.728,00 € 1.777,31 € 3.076,54 € 553,36 € 8.573,87 € 1.405,08
1998 € 9.724,62 € 18.341,37 € 2.266,85 € 2.700,31 € 1.814,30 € 3.295,16 € 525,92 € 8.623,08 € 1.607,40
1999 € 9.930,43 € 19.097,89 € 2.373,49 € 2.648,24 € 1.868,17 € 3.645,45 € 551,46 € 8.521,26 € 1.756,48
2000 € 10.212,53 € 20.096,54 € 2.463,58 € 2.724,58 € 2.005,74 € 4.093,83 € 519,79 € 8.654,06 € 1.878,60
2001 € 10.276,10 € 20.385,11 € 2.519,52 € 2.689,28 € 1.998,50 € 4.230,52 € 472,91 € 8.654,32 € 1.789,95
2002 € 10.299,85 € 20.574,65 € 2.634,72 € 2.659,21 € 1.943,41 € 4.375,63 € 499,74 € 8.750,10 € 1.605,16
2003 € 10.250,02 € 20.456,76 € 2.651,67 € 2.591,93 € 1.931,40 € 4.290,66 € 478,74 € 8.931,55 € 1.548,83
2004 € 10.225,71 € 20.816,43 € 2.672,21 € 2.594,55 € 1.967,60 € 4.531,54 € 437,80 € 9.058,09 € 1.577,23
2005 € 10.194,62 € 21.129,04 € 2.802,46 € 2.622,23 € 2.018,32 € 4.713,92 € 434,98 € 9.030,47 € 1.633,24
2006 € 10.147,24 € 21.490,25 € 2.819,53 € 2.639,32 € 2.058,32 € 4.916,55 € 408,36 € 9.149,39 € 1.841,25
2007 € 9.991,84 € 21.766,09 € 2.826,71 € 2.707,80 € 2.128,79 € 5.164,20 € 408,79 € 9.020,62 € 2.016,54
2008 € 9.863,37 € 21.310,62 € 2.763,05 € 2.716,86 € 2.036,34 € 4.872,58 € 378,52 € 8.866,27 € 1.758,29
2009 € 9.824,15 € 20.458,86 € 2.804,95 € 2.634,18 € 1.801,13 € 4.257,73 € 375,02 € 8.378,54 € 919,96
2010 € 9.825,47 € 20.892,83 € 2.750,89 € 2.666,59 € 1.807,65 € 4.500,75 € 360,86 € 8.592,77 € 868,27
2011 € 9.828,17 € 21.094,44 € 2.715,48 € 2.720,75 € 1.832,72 € 4.683,65 € 350,93 € 8.415,92 € 879,06
2012 € 9.817,63 € 21.289,53 € 2.679,69 € 2.712,19 € 1.810,10 € 4.717,87 € 363,02 € 8.270,13 € 666,81
2013 € 9.826,65 € 21.057,39 € 2.606,66 € 2.637,79 € 1.784,11 € 4.601,55 € 355,57 € 8.178,35 € 535,13
2014 € 9.841,94 € 21.247,27 € 2.676,81 € 2.589,00 € 1.826,16 € 4.812,00 € 337,85 € 8.006,53 € 621,71
2015 € 10.003,71 € 21.775,44 € 2.810,43 € 2.515,33 € 1.867,81 € 5.211,13 € 338,06 € 8.059,05 € 773,18
2016 € 9.835,75 € 21.501,18 € 2.777,83 € 2.416,68 € 1.833,27 € 5.047,40 € 352,07 € 8.022,62 € 925,21
2017 € 9.746,89 € 21.518,68 € 2.708,43 € 2.391,69 € 1.814,09 € 5.074,37 € 333,67 € 8.132,61 € 1.011,94
2018 € 9.773,97 € 21.719,54 € 2.737,97 € 2.430,72 € 1.828,09 € 5.239,22 € 327,10 € 8.041,38 € 1.039,27
